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Abstract 
 
 
This paper traces the construction of African identities in A Reasonable Man 
(South Africa 1999), Chikin Biznis:  The Whole Story (South Africa 1998), Fools (South 
Africa/France 1997), Hyènes (1992), Le cri du coeur (Burkina Faso/France 1994), Pièces 
d'Identités (France/Congo/Belgium 1998), Une couleur café (France 1997), and Xala 
(Senegal 1975) based on an analysis of race, ethnicity, tradition, modernization, 
Westernization, and cultural hybridity theories; as a way of contextualizing African 
history in general, this paper also explores the significance of colonialism, post-
colonialism, and forms of neo-colonialism.  I argue that nineteenth century perceptions of 
“race” that arose during the Enlightenment era are mistaken.  Instead, African identities 
presented in film should be re-conceived based on concepts of ethnicity and culture and 
not simplistic racial constructions—for example “white,” “black,” or “mulatto” to name a 
few—since such interpretations inevitably surrender to problematic analysis.  However, I 
also contend that neither a typical conception of fixed identities nor cultures can be 
applied to the understanding of contemporary African identities expressed in African 
film.  The conception of African identities can and ought to be reconsidered as a fluid, 
social construction based on changing historical phenomena.  As an alternative, I suggest 
that tradition, modernization, and Westernization processes contribute to the overall 
fluidity of contemporary African identities, which can be elucidated by cultural hybridity 
theories.  Therefore, I ultimately propose that the hybridization of African identities is 
specifically linked to forms of modernization and Westernization—the practice of 
Western medicine, beliefs in monogamy, and entrepreneurial aspirations—that have also 
 v
been filtered through traditional African value systems such as polygamy, traditional 
healing, patriarchy, communitarianism, and traditional religions within various African 
communities depicted in African film.  Thus, a fixed “African” category that we strive to 
define—against either Western or African points of reference—is actually neither a fully 
Westernized nor entirely African distinction but a hybridized identity of traditional, 
modernized, and Westernized elements.   
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Introduction 
I first knew that I wanted to properly study African cinema after watching Claire 
Denis’ film, Chocolat (1988), set in Cameroon during the 1950s.  The film is 
aesthetically complex and subtle in its arrangement of gendered space and treatment of 
colonial discourse.  Though Chocolat will not be a critical part of my exploration of 
African cinema in this paper, during times when I felt stuck or lost amidst piles of facts 
about other films, I liked to remind myself of my original encounter with cinema about a 
particular facet of African life—about my sincere curiosity and inclination to extract 
deeper meanings from the beautiful images I was seeing.  The simple objective of 
assigning meaning to films is not easy because it is not merely a matter of placing 
meaning but finding, interpreting, and articulating it.  In this sense, meaning is never a 
permanent quality that one can measure, but rather, a continuously transforming insight 
that changes, especially as social situations among African countries also change.    
This is why one of the main goals of this paper is to offer an in-depth but open 
examination of aesthetic and content-driven issues relating to the following films: A 
Reasonable Man (Gavin Hood 1999; South Africa), Chikin Biznis:  The Whole Story 
(Ntshaveni Wa Luruli 1998; South Africa), Fools (Ramadan Suleman 1997; South 
Africa/France), Hyènes (Djibril Diop Mambéty 1992; Senegal), Pièces d'Identités 
(Mweze Ngangura 1998; France/Congo/Belgium), Une couleur café (Henri Duparc 1997; 
France), and Xala (Ousmane Sembene 1975; Senegal).  I propose that the subject of 
cultural hybridization is a common thread woven into the aesthetic, political, and social 
content of A Reasonable Man, Chikin Biznis, Fools, Hyènes, Pièces d'Identités, Une 
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couleur café, and Xala.  To develop an accurate assessment of how cultural hybridity is 
recognized, interpreted, and represented by filmmakers of African cinema, this paper will 
investigate reoccurring themes such as the question of African identity; the value of 
material wealth in rural and urban African communities; the upholding of individual and 
community dignity in the face of oppression; relationships between former colonial 
powers and émigrés; and the dynamics between tradition, modernization, and 
Westernization processes.  In Chapter 1, the basic principles of nineteenth century “race” 
discourse will be outlined as an explanation for colonial attitudes and behavior.  Chapter 
1 will also provide a brief analysis of post-colonial transitions and the emergence of a 
“black” cinematic voice.  In Chapter 2, the representation of contemporary African 
identities will be considered based on an analysis of filmmakers’ observations of “race,” 
which have been influenced by Africa’s colonial past.  In Chapters 3, 4, and 5 tradition, 
modernization, Westernization, and cultural hybridity concepts will be considered to 
present additional aspects of African identities as perceived by filmmakers.  To be 
discussed in Chapter 1, Bhabha proposes that Western signifiers can be re-assessed by 
“erasing the politics of binary opposition” and thinking “beyond theory” (Bhabha 1994: 
179).  Bhabha’s model of thought will be a key evaluation tool for the understanding of 
overall fluidity of contemporary African identities discussed in Chapters 5, 6, and 7.  
In attempting to address the representation of African identities in African film, I 
hope to clarify the meaning of cultural hybridity and its significance as a concept that 
helps explain competing forces of tradition, modernization, and Westernization, which 
affect filmmakers’ observation of identity and “Africanness” among different African 
communities.   
 xi
Because film in Africa is still a developing industry, only a small amount of 
literature has been written on specific films though a wide range of contextual 
information may be deduced from other non-film sources such as cultural studies, 
ethnographic, anthropological, political, and postcolonial theories.  Therefore, I hope to 
draw my own conclusions based on personal film analyses, which will be informed and 
supported by general contextual reading from articles and books from these fields.  
 These fields will inform several basic points of my research.  Ethnographic, 
cultural, and anthropological studies will help explain complicated issues of race, 
ethnicity, culture, and “Africanness” as represented in African cinema.  The examination 
of cultural sources will also help illuminate questions of tradition, modernization, and 
Westernization, which significantly influence definitions of African identities.  Likewise, 
in the case of African identities, no analysis would be complete without critical reflection 
upon colonial, post-colonial, and neo-colonial issues that continue to affect African 
societies.  
Thus, a comprehensive application of the aforementioned fields of study— 
in combination with cinematic studies in general—will supply appropriate information to 
approach the ways that filmmakers reflect the shaping of contemporary African identities 
by tradition, modernization, and Westernization processes. 
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Film Descriptions 
 
 
A Reasonable Man (Gavin Hood 1999; South Africa) 
 
A Reasonable Man tells the story of a the main character, Sean Raine, who deals 
with the ghosts of his past by defending a young herdsman, Sipho, whose cultural dictates 
differ with South Africa’s highly Westernized legal system.  Sean Raine was born and 
raised in South Africa, but during his time as a soldier in that nation's army, he killed a 
young black man by mistake while fighting in Angola and has been plagued with guilt 
ever since.  He left South Africa soon after to live abroad during the last years of 
apartheid; in time, he studied law and became a successful corporate attorney. While 
returning to South Africa for the first time in nine years, Sean and his wife Jennifer meet 
a young herdsman named Sipho during a canoe trip.  As they are returning to camp, Sean 
and Jennifer meet Sipho again, but this time he is in shock, standing motionless with a 
bloody axe in his hand as his mother carries the body of a baby with a fatal head injury.  
When questioned, Sipho asserts that what he killed was not a human infant but a 
tikoloshe, a creature cursed with evil spirits. Sean offers to defend Sipho, and as he stands 
before the court, he tries to explain to the judge and jury that Sipho was acting sincerely, 
in accordance with his faith, and therefore did not truly commit a crime. Thus, A 
Reasonable Man seriously addresses issues of cultural misunderstanding that affect post-
apartheid South Africa’s legal and social systems.       
 
 
Chikin Biznis:  The Whole Story (Ntshaveni Wa Luruli 1998; South Africa) 
 
 In Chikin Biznis, the director Nthasaveni wa Luruli light-heartedly examines the 
 xiii 
sense of freedom and optimism felt by the main character, Sipho, in post-apartheid South 
Africa.  Chikin Biznis comically traces the antics of Sipho, who, frustrated by his job, 
decides to start his own business selling chickens.  Sipho's new trade seemingly enhances 
his notable charisma and leads him into a string of endless incidents.  He has a talent for 
sweet talk, mischievous banter, illicit (often dangerous) liaisons, less than legitimate 
business dealings and general chaos.   However, all is restored to order in the end and 
Sipho settles down to a life of relative peace and contentment much to the happiness of 
all around. 
 
 
Fools (Ramadan Suleman 1997; South Africa/France) 
 
The film Fools is a post-apartheid production set in 1989 during the apartheid era 
in South Africa.  Situated in the Charterston township on Johannesburg's East Rand, 
Fools offers a moving portrait of how “racial” conflict during the apartheid years affected 
“black” South Africans who lived in the townships. Through the main character, 
Professor Zamani, Suleman analyzes the emotional impact of oppression and its role as a 
cause for cyclical violence among the oppressed. 
 
 
Hyènes (Djibril Diop Mambéty 1992; Senegal) 
 
Hyènes is a beautiful adaptation of Friedrich Durrenmatt’s play, The Visit.  Often 
abstract, Mambéty’s treatment of materialism, greed, love, betrayal, and community 
among the peri-urban town of Colobane is nonetheless effective and visually bold. 
Mambéty has adapted a timeless parable of human greed into a biting satire of today's 
Africa—betraying the hopes of independence for the false promises of Western 
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materialism. The final shot is of bulldozer tracks relentlessly erasing the past, a lone 
baobab tree. 
 
 
Pièces d'Identités (Mweze Ngangura 1998; France/Congo/Belgium) 
 
Pièces d'Identités is a film that raises interesting questions about the troubling 
issues of identity facing people of African descent in the ever-widening Diaspora of the 
late 20th century.  When Mani Kongo, a tribal king from the Congo, travels to Brussels in 
search of his daughter, Mwana, whom he sent away as a young girl during the Congo’s 
economic crisis, he finds his experiences in the city challenging.  Mwana, who Mani 
Kongo has assumed was a medical student, is a actually a dancer in a bar called “Le 
Katanga” and consorts with lowlifes such as Viva-wa-Viva.  Because of him, Mwana has 
spent time in jail.  Mani Kongo’s experience in Brussels becomes an Odyssey, a journey 
of discovery about the pieces of life that tie Belgium with its colonial past and how  
post- colonial Belgium and the Congo are still bound.  Thus, Pièces d'Identités is a story 
about Africans in Europe either searching for or re-discovering some part of their 
identities.  The film is a shot as a collage of incidents involving the king's naïve search 
for his daughter. He is lost, almost Candide-like, in this fast paced, morally loose world 
where his sense of values and self are like a novelty to nearly everyone he meets. This 
film appropriately tackles the psychological and emotional complexities of post-colonial 
Belgium and the Congo.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xv
Une couleur café (Henri Duparc 1997; France) 
 
Une couleur café is a social comedy that entertainingly comments on the 
immigrant experiences of several characters from the Ivory Coast living in Paris, France.  
The film explores how African traditions, typically associated with rural culture, survive 
in urban atmospheres against the pressures of French culture and modernization.  More 
specifically, Une couleur café considers the practice of polygamy; the importance of 
procreation; tradition as an instrument of persuasion and manipulation; traditions as 
genuine cultural artifacts; African identity as an exoticized identity; multicultural 
relationships; the hybridization of African cultures; and the myth of an idyllic France.  To 
illustrate these themes, Une couleur café focuses on the story of a hospital orderly 
nicknamed Doc living and working in Paris who returns to his village in the Ivory Coast 
to procure a second wife, Kada. 
 
 
Xala (Ousmane Sembene 1975; Senegal) 
 
In Xala, Ousmane Sembene posits a humorous yet critical view of neo-
colonialism in Senegalese society as a form of economic control by France.  In Xala, it is 
the dawn of Senegal's independence from France, but as the citizens celebrate in the 
streets we soon become aware that only the faces have changed.  France still controls the 
government economically.  Newly elected as a Senegalese official to the, the main 
character, El Hadji, takes advantage of the money he receives through corrupt practices to 
marry a third wife, Ngone, to the sorrow and chagrin of his second wife, Oumi, and the 
resentment of his nationalist daughter, Rama.  On El Hadji’s wedding night, however, he 
discovers that he has been struck with a "xala," a curse of impotency.  El Hadji goes to 
 xvi
comic lengths to find the cause and remove the xala, resulting in a scathing satirical 
ending in which El Hadji is punished in a spitting ritual conducted by his half-brother, 
Gorgui. 
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1    Race and Identity in Colonial  
   and Early Hollywood Cinema 
 
 
In addition to the location and social environments in which African films are set, 
each character’s actions, beliefs, relationships, and attitudes help construct the overall 
reality depicted in each film.  The reality that is derived from each film creates a narrative 
context through which critics and audiences perceive African cultures and ideas about 
African identities.  This chapter aims to engage in a critical analysis of how nineteenth 
century perceptions of “race” contributed to colonial and early Hollywood cinema in 
preparation for an exploration of contemporary filmmakers’ observations of post-colonial 
African identities and realities.  A discussion of African identities will be narrowed down 
to a focus on filmmakers’ portrayals of African realities drawn from the context of A 
Reasonable Man (Gavin Hood 1999; South Africa), Chikin Biznis:  The Whole Story 
(Ntshaveni Wa Luruli 1998; South Africa), Fools (Ramadan Suleman 1997; South 
Africa/France), Hyènes (Djibril Diop Mambéty 1992; Senegal), Pièces d'Identités 
(Mweze Ngangura 1998; France/Congo/Belgium), Une couleur café (Henri Duparc 1997; 
France), and Xala (Ousmane Sembene 1975; Senegal).   
The authenticity of the characters and cultures in these films is open for question 
by the viewer and other critics, but for this paper’s observation on filmmakers’ 
representations of African identities, all matters of legitimacy and authenticity will be 
derived from within the depicted reality of each film.  These films indicate that instead of 
an overarching, uni-dimensional African identity defined by one set of traditions, one 
language, and one ethnicity, multiple examples of Africans do in fact exist (Ukadike 
1994: 9).  Thus, one supporting premise for this paper is that there is not one essential 
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African culture, but a multitude of African cultures living as communities and practicing 
various sets of traditions throughout the continent of Africa as well as in immigrant 
populations in former colonizing countries such as England, France and Belgium.  This 
argument is supported by language, religious, and behavioral differences among African 
characters displayed in each film.  However, filmmakers also problematize 
representations of African identities based on interpretations and applications of the 
concept of “race.”  Filmmakers present the topic of African identity and explore how 
historical perceptions of “race” and forms of “racism” still exist in contemporary, post-
colonial African communities.  By examining these films, and the context in which each 
film occurs, a range of examples will be offered through which to catch glimpses of 
African identities as observed by filmmakers. 
Before properly addressing how filmmakers reflect African identities through 
characters in African film, several highly problematic topics will be highlighted and 
tackled within the next four chapters:  race, “white” and “black” identities, ethnicity, 
tradition, modernity, modernization, “the West,” Westernization, and cultural hybridity.  
Until working definitions of these concepts are adequately outlined, it would be 
impossible to engage in a well-informed discussion of contemporary African identities 
and realities as depicted in African cinema.  However, it is difficult to pretend that clear-
cut definitions can be surmised.  Without a doubt, when studying such complex subjects 
such as tradition and modernization—just to name a few—one can expect to struggle 
with consistently changing meanings and variations of those same meanings. 
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NINETEENTH CENTURY “RACE” DISCOURSE  
 Exploring the historic applications of the term “race” and the social impact of 
“racial” discourse in European and African communities helps clarify filmmakers’ 
constructions of African identities in film.  The original idea of “race” is not definitively 
a European invention (Banton 1983: 4) as evidenced by the pervasive use of the concept 
in American colonial history as well (Allen 1994: 23-24).  However, this paper will focus 
on European constructions of “race” beginning in the nineteenth century.  This is an 
important starting point in European social history because around the same time 
countries such as Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Portugal, and Spain 
(Roberts 1985: 302; Pfaff 2004: 51; Meredith 2005: 1-5) began to officially colonize 
Africa “for reasons of prestige, strategy, and resource” (1985: 297) based on a sense of 
“racial” superiority promoted by popular “racial” discourses.  It should also be briefly 
noted that only a century before, slave trading among European nations had become a 
lucrative business (Hiro 1973: x).  By the 1750s, Britain became “the leading slave-
trading nation in the world, the foremost ‘slave carrier’ for other European nations, and 
the center of the Triangular Trade” between Europe, West Africa, and Caribbean 
territories (Hiro 1973: x: Ukadike 1994: 29) but ironically, Britain was also the leading 
abolitionist proponent towards the end of the nineteenth century (Ukadike 1994: 29).       
The proposition that humanity is divided into a limited number of distinct “races” 
or “species” based on biological and physical differences originated in the Enlightenment 
era in the early nineteenth century (Jones 1997: 40-41; Thackway 2003: 17) at 
approximately the same point in history that the slave trade and colonization of the 
African continent were unfolding.  Of course, “there have been physical differences 
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between humans for thousands of years, but it is only within the last two centuries that 
these differences were conceptualized as racial” (Banton 1988: 16) and based on 
“scientific” reasoning.  During the Enlightenment era, Europe began to experience an 
increase in empirical philosophical ideas among natural historians and philosophers with 
emphasis on science, the natural world, and skepticism (Roberts 1985: 236).  Thus, in the 
early nineteenth century, the concept of “race” embodied the idea that “human groups 
were essentially distinct, primordial entities, characterized by specific physical qualities” 
(Jones 1997: 41).  Such a proposition significantly transformed the study of humanity and 
influenced the ideology and infrastructure of European societies.       
Charles Hamilton Smith, Samuel George Morton, Joseph Arthur de Gobineau, 
Robert Knox, Josiah Clark Nott, George Robbins Gliddon, James Hunt, and Karl Vogt 
are often identified as the proponents of “scientific racism” more accurately known as 
“racial typology” (Banton 1983: 41; Banton 1988: 19).  In particular, the “racial” theories 
of Joseph Arthur de Gobineau cultivated the myth of the Germanic people and the Aryan 
race—ideology to which the Nazis’ “racist” principles can be traced (Scherrer 2002: 
364).  Typologists maintained that humanity could be divided into “types” or “species,” 
categories which were defined based on assumptions of permanent difference in physical 
appearance (Banton 1983: 44-45).  Examples of physical differences included skin color, 
facial type, cranial profile and size, texture and color of hair (Stocking 1968: 56).  Such 
differences were measured in relation to an ultimate “physical idea, to which the greater 
number of the individuals in the group more or less approach, but which is better marked 
in some than in others” (1968: 58).  Furthermore, racial typologists assumed that the 
world was divided into natural provinces.  For example, kangaroos and marsupials could 
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only be found in Australia.  According to typology theory, this line of reasoning implied 
that Australian Aborigines, one out of a finite number of permanent racial types, 
therefore “corresponded to the marsupials in being the sorts of humans suited to that 
environment” (Banton 1988: 19).    
Sian Jones summarizes Typological Theory as proposing the following: 
1) Variations in the constitution and behavior of individuals are the expression of 
differences between underlying types of a relatively permanent kind, each of 
which is suited to a particular continent or zoological province.   
2) Social categories in the long run reflect and are aligned with the natural 
categories that produce them. 
3) Individuals belonging to a particular racial type display an innate antagonism 
towards individuals belonging to other types, the degree of antagonism 
depending upon the relationship between the two types. 
(Banton 1983: 41)     
According to typology theory, mental and cultural differences could be perceived as a 
direct reflection of a person’s “racially” determined physical structure (Biddiss 1979: 12; 
Odum 1967: 7; Stocking 1968: 56).  Significant physical differences often involved the 
size of the skull and the brain (Stocking 1968: 56: Banton 1988: 20) and reflected the 
supposed “capacity for civilization” (Banton 1988: 20).  Typology theory also suggested 
that different “races” innately feel animosity or a sense of rivalry toward one another.  
Most dramatically, however, typologists insisted on the existence of “pure races” (Banton 
1983: 47; Stocking 1968: 57).  
In 1859, a few years after the circulation of popular typology writing, Charles 
Darwin published The Origin of Species, or The Preservation of Favoured Races in the 
Struggle for Life proposing the groundbreaking theory of natural selection.  Darwin’s 
theories did not end the development of the term “race” but further engaged with its 
meaning as a reference to “sub-species” and “varieties” rather than primordial “types” or 
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“species” identified by typology theorists.  Rather, Darwin used the term “race” to refer 
to “domestic races as the outcome of human breeding” (Banton 1983: 46).  With his 
theory of natural selection, Darwin’s work challenged typologists who proposed that 
there were permanent physical characteristics or forms in human nature that could be 
traced back to one, primordial “race” (Banton 1983: 46).  Darwin instead advocated 
“each species was adapted to its environment by natural selection, so that people of one 
racial type who migrated to a new habitat would there undergo change” (1983: 46).  
Therefore, Darwin’s theory of natural selection revealed the scientific shortcomings of 
the Typology Theory because typologists could not explain diversity and change 
throughout the natural world.  Thus, Darwin suggested that though humanity may have 
descended from a common root in the distant past, natural selection had differentiated 
each “species” into “varieties” and “sub-species” (Stocking 1968: 46; Young 1995: 11).  
The Typological Theory was popular in the 1850s because it offered a structured 
“scientific” but non-specialized explanation for human difference, especially physical, 
mental, and moral differences (Banton 1988: 20).  Scientific racialism was used to 
substantiate convictions that preceded scientific inquiry: 
“The political significance of the doctrine of typology was that it lifted such 
statements onto a plane of greater generality and offered an explanation.  To 
assert that blacks were inferior might convince some people, but to say that blacks 
were one racial type out of a limited range and that the same principles which 
explained the whole range of phenomena also explained the particular 
characteristics of blacks was to advance a thesis of much greater intellectual 
pretension” (Banton 1983: 46).      
 
Typology theories reduced the concept of “race” to the idea of “racial essence” or “pure 
races” (Stocking 1968: 57) and have been at the core of most “racist” thought for over a 
century (Banton 1983: 41).  In particular, “typology had a simplicity and popular appeal 
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that Darwinism could never attain and so it lived on to become the source of the Nazis’ 
racial doctrines” (Banton 1983: 5: Banton 1988: 20) and a general systematic expression 
of Europeans’ belief in their inherent superiority (Banton 1983: 5).  
However, Darwin’s theory of natural selection has also been frequently 
misinterpreted (Banton 1983: 50; Jones 1997: 43), especially his reasoning that “it was by 
natural selection that favored races became species” (Banton 1983: 46).  While it has 
been proven that Darwin’s theories of natural selection accurately applied to animal and 
plant sciences, but overall his determinism about human issues was misplaced (O’Neil 
2006; University of Michigan 2005).  Furthermore, influenced by interpretations of 
Darwin’s writings, especially the use of “race” in the sub-title of The Origin of Species, 
“English writers employed [the term ‘race’] frequently when elaborating their 
philosophies of history, for it was widely believed that the growing economic and 
political strength of the European powers sprang from qualities inherent in the white race, 
or races, and that these promised continuing European supremacy” (Banton 1983: 51).  
The negative portrait of non-European “races” and the inherent superiority of Europeans 
was thus established based on rigid hierarchical methods of classification, which both 
typology and selectionist doctrines reinforced:  “In turn-of-the-century evolutionary 
thinking savagery, dark skin, and a small brain and incoherent mind were, for many, all 
part of the single evolutionary picture of ‘primitive’ man” (Stocking 1968: 132).   
 
“WHITE” AND “BLACK” IDENTITIES 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, a three-stage model of “race” was 
established based on cultural-racial categories instead of only biological and physical 
criteria.  Three stages of cultural progress were identified as “savagery, barbarism, and 
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civilization” (Young 1995: 35) with civilization at the top of the hierarchy and 
“primitives” at the bottom (1995: 94).  John Stuart Mill’s essay Civilization helped 
formalize “the trio not as general categories but as a hierarchy of the historical stages of 
man, bringing geography and history together in a generalized scheme of European 
superiority that identified civilization with race” (1995: 35).  On this hierarchical scale, 
the “white race”—European society—was equated with civilization and all non-white, 
non-Europeans at the lowest ranks of the ladder were linked to “primitives” (1995: 94).  
In fact, Africans were placed “at the bottom of the human family, next to the ape, and 
there was some discussion as to whether the African should be categorized as belonging 
to the species of the ape or of the human” (1995: 7).   
“White” and “Black” identities are not natural categories (Race Traitor 1994: 108) 
but “racial” signifiers based on social, historical, and geographical contingencies 
(Bonnett 1997: 186).  Franz Fanon illuminates this fact: 
“Skin is not just assumed like a mask:  it is god-given even if its meanings are 
social, discursive. What skin and masks have in common is that they mark the 
interface between the self and the world:  they are the border” (Fanon 1967 as 
quoted in Loomba 2005: 148).  
  
Developed from the late medieval period and onwards as the West expanded its imperial 
dominion, “a triple conflation of ‘White,’ ‘Europe’ and ‘Christian’ arose that imparted 
moral, cultural and territorial content to Whiteness” (Bonnett 1997: 175).  This was the 
beginning of the usage of “White” as an “ethnic type (chiefly European or of European 
extraction)” (1997: 175).  James Cowle Prichard’s theory of “racial” difference further 
contributed to the three-stage model of “race” by adding that “the first people had been 
black and identified the cause of subsequent whiteness as civilization itself” (Young 
1995: 35).  White skin, according to Prichard, was therefore “both a marker of 
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civilization and product of it” (1995: 35).  In the same mode of thought, “people in Africa 
became black when they were conquered and defined by European people, who in the 
same move defined themselves as white” (Arnfred 2004: 18).  According to Ania 
Loomba, “black Africans were considered bestial both because of the medieval and 
religious associations of blackness with filth and dirt, and also because this provided a 
justification for colonizing and enslaving them” (Loomba 2005: 64).  The classification 
of “races” by South African apartheid legislation until 1994 serves as further evidence for 
Signe Arnfred’s claim:   
“The Population and Registration Act (in Section 1) identified three basic 
classifications of South Africans: black, coloured, and white. A black (previously 
a Native or a Bantu) was defined as ‘a person who is, or is generally accepted as, 
a member of any aboriginal race or tribe of Africa.’ A white person was defined 
(in extremely hedged language) as:  ‘a person who (a) in appearance obviously is 
a White person, and who is not generally accepted as a Colored person; or (b) is 
generally accepted as a White person and is not in appearance obviously not a 
White person.’ Finally, ‘white person’ excludes those who voluntarily confess 
that they are ‘by descent a Black or a Colored person, unless it is proved that the 
admission is not based on fact.’ The definition of a ‘coloured’ is what remains: ‘a 
Colored is a person who is not a White person or a Black’ (Scheper-Hughes 
2001).  
 
The main method of classification was not only based on physical differences, but 
differences centered on what was not considered “white.”  In other words, “Whiteness” 
was a term used in conceptual opposition to “Blackness” (Bonnett 1997: 177), the 
defining expression of the ‘Other’ (1997: 181). 
Nwachukwu Frank Ukadike outlines several late nineteenth century mentalities 
that attest to the development of social divisions based on negative definitions of 
“blackness.”  Ukadike notes that according to the racist core of psychology originally 
developed by Carl Jung, a Swiss-born psychiatrist, in the early 1900s, “to be black is to 
be ‘primitive’ and ‘savage’” (Ukadike 1994: 39).  Writing at the same time as the rise in 
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National Socialism in Germany, “Jung served Nazi interests well in the early years of the 
Göring Institution.  He co-authored, with Göring, a tribute to a psychologist who early on 
had recognized the ‘importance of genealogy, eugenics, and race’” (Elshtain 2004).  This 
is an ideology that echoes the similarly negative views of “black” Africans and their 
traditional values shared in the famous novel, The Heart of Darkness (1902) by Joseph 
Conrad (Ukadike 1994: 38).  Likewise, Ukadike reminds us of the philosopher David 
Hume’s statement that the “negro” is naturally inferior to the “white” (1994: 39).  In his 
essay, Of National Characters written in 1753, Hume states:   
“I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to the Whites.  There 
scarcely ever was a civilized nation but that of the complexion white, nor ever any 
individual, eminent in action or speculation.  No ingenious manufacturers among 
them, no arts, no sciences.  On the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the 
Whites such as the Germans, the present Tartars, still have some thing eminent 
about them in their valour, form of government or some particular.  Such a 
uniform and constant difference could not happen in so many countries and ages, 
if Nature had not made an original distribution between these breeds of men” 
(Hume 1753 as quoted from Hiro 1973: xiii)   
  
Similar to the typologists who believed in “pure” races, Hume maintained that there must 
have been some original distribution of intelligence and physical qualities by “Nature.”   
Jung and Hume’s writings perfectly reflect the patronizing undertones of the colonial 
mentality:  Not only was “race” an interpretation of physical distinction and visible traits, 
it was a judgment on “black” Africans’ intellectual and moral abilities as well.  In this 
regard, judgments about “race” were intricately tied to cultural worth.  
 
RACE, POWER, AND COLONIALISM 
Though the continent of Africa had experienced intermittent moments of 
colonization a decade before the discovery of the Americas in the late fifteenth century 
(L’Ange 2005: xxvii), the European colonization process reached its peak on the African 
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continent (Diawara 1992: 1) during the same time as the development of “racial” 
typology and Darwin’s natural selection theories in the second half of the nineteenth 
century.  Thus, “colonial conquest was firmly embedded in a racism that gave 
superhuman pre-eminence to white people” (Davis 1996: 1).   
However, “racial” discourse not only justified social power, but economic control 
as well (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2006).  Colonization spread as a “by-
product of its real objectives of trade, economic exploitation and settlement” (Young 
2001: 24).  A significant aspect of colonization was not only the transposition of 
European cultural values, but most importantly, the restructuring of local economies, 
which yielded all raw materials and markets to colonial powers (2001: 24).  As a result, 
restructuring ultimately led to the impoverishment of the local economies (Young 2001: 
24).  In fact, even though the concepts of imperialism and colonialism are significantly 
different, the two terms are often used as synonyms, because similar to colonialism, 
imperialism entailed conquest through political and economic subjugation (2006).  
Furthermore, underlying capitalistic impulses of colonialists was the inevitable need to 
expand in search of new markets in order to avoid economic collapse (2006).  Therefore, 
colonialism inevitably involved imperialistic goals (2006), and overall the colonial 
conquest was a “sordid grab for land and resources” (Davis 1996: 1) and the exploitation 
of the colonized’s means of subsistence and manpower.  
Thus, at the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, European countries officially divided 
the African continent “into colonies and spheres of influence” (Pfaff 2004: 64-65) based 
on a supposed moral “duty to civilize Africans” (Diawara 1992: 1) validated by terms 
such as civilizing, Christianizing, and enlightenment (Davis 1996: 1), and the motivation 
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to economically exploit the continent.  Ironically, at the Berlin Conference it was also 
decided that the practice of slavery and free-market imperialism would cease (Ukadike 
1994: 29).  The new boundaries set by the European powers cut through approximately 
one hundred ninety culture groups, and thereby established the geographical basis for the 
modern states of Africa recognized today (Meredith 2005: 1-2).  In 1895, European 
empires dominated over three-quarters of the earth’s surface and were at the “apparent 
height of their power and influence” (Armes 1987: 9).  By the outbreak of World War I in 
1914, all of Africa except for Liberia and Ethiopia was “under direct European rule, 
occupation or protection” (Roberts 1985: 300).  
Octave Mannoni provides an insightful glimpse at the psychological implications 
of colonization.  The settler mentality is not created by the colonial situation but is a 
prerequisite for it (Mannoni 1990: 11-12).  In other words, the colonial administrator, the 
missionary, and the pioneer chose a colonial career because it feeds their egos (1990: 11-
12): 
“In short, then, what I want the reader to realize is that a colonial situation is 
created, so to speak, the very instant a white man, even if he is alone, appears in 
the midst of a tribe, even if it is independent, so long as he is thought to be rich or 
powerful or merely immune to the local forces of magic, and so long as he derives 
from his position, even though only in his most secret self, a feeling of his own 
superiority” (1990: 18).  
 
Thus, Mannoni points to the straightforward psychological basis for the colonial 
situation—the underlying need for the colonizer to feed his or her super-ego.  On the 
other hand, the colonial situation does not only require a super-ego but the existence of 
the need for dependence (1990: 85).  Albert Memmi also qualifies this argument and 
labels such a relationship an “implacable dependence” (Memmi 1965: ix).  In this way, 
the colonizer is “fulfilled” because he or she is needed by the dependents (Mannoni 1990: 
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20-24; Memmi 1965: ix).  Therefore, “colonial problems stem from conflicts within 
European civilization itself, and the racialist reactions of the white man to the black are 
the product of elements already present in his psyche” (Mannoni 1990: 197).    What the 
colonialist projects onto indigenous populations is not only a lack of civilization but the 
most basic and deeply-hidden fears and desires, “the primal Good and Evil” (1990: 198).           
In the colonial history of Africa, the idea of “race” was a problematic issue 
because physical descriptions such as “black” and “white” were used as mechanisms to 
not only racially categorize people but to create social hierarchies for the sake of power, 
subjugation, and colonial expansion (Berkeley 2001: 5-20; Scherrer 2002: 365; Ukadike 
1994: 43).  The term “Whiteness” represented a narrow Eurocentric vision, which 
degraded and devalued non-White identities: 
“As we have seen, Whiteness has developed, over the past two hundred years, 
into a taken-for-granted experience structured upon a varying set of supremacist 
assumptions (sometimes cultural, sometimes biological, sometimes moral, 
sometimes all three).  Non-White identities, by contrast, have been denied the 
privileges of normativity, and are marked within the West as marginal and 
inferior” (Bonnett 1997: 188). 
 
The emergence of an identification method based on the idea of “races” inevitably led to 
the development of a discriminating belief system in the form of racism.  According to 
Robert Stam and Louise Spence, racism is “the generalized and final assigning of values 
to real or imaginary differences, to the accusers benefit and at his victim’s expense, in 
order to justify the former’s own privilege or aggression” (Stam & Spence 1999: 237).  
More specifically, racial discrimination can mean “any distinction, exclusion, restriction 
or preference based on race, color, descent, or nation or ethnic origin” (Banton 1983: 1).  
Albert Memmi provides an additional perception of such discrimination and identifies the 
underpinning psychological mechanisms of racism.  Memmi suggests that racism is not 
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only founded upon a belief in the inferiority of a detested group, but a belief that “this 
group is truly an aggressor and dangerous” (Memmi 1965: 131).  Therefore, Memmi 
ultimately labels “racism” as “defensive racism” in which fear also accompanies hate and 
scorn (1965: 131).   
Real or imaginary differences such as facial features and skin color based on 
“racial” categories helped the colonizers devalue African cultures and instill Eurocentric 
values:  “So Africa was suffused with the language and racist ideology of the colonizer, 
and it is not surprising then that racism ‘has historically been both an ally and product of 
the colonization process’” (Ukadike 1994: 38).  Thus, one of the main problems with 
colonialism was that “all self-understanding and value [were] based on race” (Hogan 
2000: 77).  The idea of “race” was used to mark boundaries for otherness, a category into 
which Europeans placed Africans:  This ‘Otherness’ then served “as a basis for 
legitimizing exclusion and/or subordination and/or exploitation of the members of the 
collectivity thus labeled” (Yuval-Davis 1997: 193).  In order to define European identity, 
Africans were “classified according to the grid of Western thought and imagination, in 
which alterity [was] a negative category of the Same…The African [had] become not 
only the Other who [was] everyone else except me, but rather the key which, in its 
abnormal differences, specifies the identity of the Same” (Mudimbe 1988: 12).  The view 
of Africa as a savage ‘other’ became the symbol of an inverted European civilization, 
“the European world expressed in upside-down fashion, a primitive version of Europe 
onto which a variety of European fantasies and fears were projected” (Ray 1976: 3).  
Therefore, colonial conquest was directly linked to Europe’s privileged view of itself 
(Davis 1996: 1) and racism was consequently the tool used for Europeans to mimetically 
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rehearse their love-hate relationship embodied in the physicality of the racialized other 
(Taussig 1993: 66-67).  Thus, “one of the most striking contradictions about colonialism 
is that it needs both to ‘civilize’ its ‘others’ and to fix them into perpetual ‘otherness’” 
(Loomba 2005: 145).   
  
RACE, COLONIAL CINEMA, AND THE WESTERN SELF 
Since the inception of cinema in the 1890s until the mid-1900s, film production in 
and about Africa was mainly controlled by European nations (Pfaff 2004: 1).  This claim 
applies to the West, Sub-Saharan, and North regions of Africa.  Before addressing the 
history of colonial cinema in West and Sub-Sahara Africa, it is helpful to mention a few 
details about Arab cultures in North Africa, though Arab African cinema will not be a 
key focal point in this paper.  North Africa consists of territories in the Maghreb, Egypt, 
Sudan, and the Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia).  The Maghreb, 
meaning "western" in Arabic, is the region of Africa north of the Sahara Desert and west 
of the Nile.  Geopolitically, the Maghreb includes Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and 
sometimes Mauritania (Boateng 1978: 85).  North Africa was colonized until at least the 
1950s by France, Great Britain, or Italy, except for Egypt and Ethiopia who gained 
independence in 1922 and 1941 respectively (Wilson 1994: x-xi, 112-113).  As opposed 
to West and Sub-Sahara Africa, North Africa, consisting of predominantly Arab 
populations, was bound together by language (Arabic) and religion (Islam) (1994: 103, 
113) before colonialists entered Africa in the nineteenth century because of strong ties to 
the Middle East.   
Western observers perceived this cultural solidarity as a form of Arab 
nationalism, which paradoxically derived from the West’s own “perception of unity”—a 
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generic lumping together of all Arabs—and not necessarily entirely true social conditions 
(1994: 103).  Nonetheless, despite occasional fragmentary tendencies through leadership 
rivalries, “Arab Africa” was a region with a “certain geopolitical coherence” (1994: 112) 
that West and Sub-Sahara Africa lacked among its multi-lingual, multicultural, non-
European populations.  This fact, therefore, leads to notable differences between North 
African filmmaking and West and Sub-Saharan filmmaking patterns.  For example, the 
first films made by an African were a couple of shorts entitled Zohra in 1922 and Ain el 
Ghezal (The Girl from Carthage) by Chemema Chikly from Tunisia in 1924 (Armes 
1987: 196; Bakari & Cham 1996: 1; Ukadike 1994: 31).  Moreover, Egyptians have been 
making films since 1928 compared to the much later emergence of Sub-Saharan 
filmmaking only in the 1960s (Armes 1987: 196-198; Ukadike 1994: 31).  In fact, from 
1927 to 1945, Egypt produced approximately 170 features (Armes 1987: 198).  Thus, the 
relationship between the colonizer and the colonized in North African countries 
significantly differed from non-Arab Africa, and North Africa and the Horn subsequently 
experienced slightly faster decolonization and filmmaking patterns (Ukadike 1994: 112).   
In West and Sub-Sahara Africa, cinema was used to the advantage of colonizers 
through Eurocentric films intended to spread European values among “black” African 
communities in West and Sub-Saharan Africa.  The invention of the motion picture 
coincided with European imperialism so that cinema was used “as an educational and 
informational tool, as a weapon for propaganda, [and] as a hegemonic device for 
ideological expansionism” (1994: 35).  More specifically, cinema was a potent organ of 
colonialism because of its power as a visual medium “to inordinately influence the 
thinking and behavior of its audience (as the missionaries proved), films proved to be a 
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powerful tool for indoctrinating Africans into foreign cultures, including their ideals and 
aesthetics ” (1994: 31).  Peter Davis remarks that “the invention of the movie camera 
began a second conquest of Africa” (Davis 1996: 2) born out of a hegemonic strategy to 
expand European power.   
Paternalistic and racist film projects and organizations established by colonial 
powers in the early twentieth century included the Bantu Cinema Experiment (1935), 
British Colonial Film Unit (1939), and Africa Films in countries such as Tanganyika 
(present-day Tanzania), Kenya, Uganda, Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe), Nigeria, and 
Ghana (Diawara 1992: 1-3, 12; Barlet 2000: 23).  The Bantu Cinema Experiment 
produced over thirty-five short “educational” films within the year of its establishment.  
Films such as Post Office Savings Bank, Tax, and Progress were created to teach specific 
economic values.  Even the prevention of disease was addressed in films such as 
Anaesthesia, Infant Malaria, and Hookworm (Diawara 1992: 2).  At first the British 
Colonial Film Unit was established to encourage African participation in World War II 
(Barlet 2000: 23) but after the war, it was designated to make British etiquette films “for 
Africans and other unsophisticated colonial audiences” (Ukadike 1994: 44).  Examples of 
films made by the British Colonial Film Unit include films such as Mister English at 
Home (1940), An African in London (1941), Men of Two Worlds (1946), Lusaka Calling, 
and Leprosy (1951).  However, the other goals across this span of films were to 
brainwash the African psyche; impart positive views of colonialism; teach British 
etiquette among Africans; advertise Western-made goods; discredit traditional ways of 
healing in favor of Western medicine; and ridicule African witch doctors (Bakari & 
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Cham 1996: 88; Diawara 1992: 1-3; Ukadike 1994: 44).  Colonial propaganda in such 
films reflects the need to make  
“the subjected people intellectually servile to the system of ideas and values 
introduced to them by the colonial rules, making them think, almost invariably, in 
terms of the conceptual systems of the colonial rules that they have come to know 
and absorb.  It places the subjected people on an intellectual or ideological leash 
from which they are unable, or do not, for some reason, see the need, to release 
themselves.  In the process, so argues the revitalist, colonial rule infects the 
subjected people with a certain mental outlook, a certain pattern of thinking.  This 
pattern of thinking has come to be dubbed ‘colonial mentality’ (Gyekye 1997: 
234)  
 
Overall, one common theme obviously linked each film together—Britain’s view of its 
way of life as a “symbol of progress” that should be imitated and used to replace 
Africans’ “antiquated cultural forms” (Ukadike 1994: 45).     
Colonial powers also permitted missionaries to exhibit Eurocentric films to instill 
feelings of inferiority onto “black” Africans for the sake of power and subjugation 
(Ukadike 1994: 30-48).  This sanction allowed Christian missionaries to simultaneously 
convert “black” Africans through an evangelical crusade as well as spread the colonial 
message of domination and cultural superiority:   
“Christianity in Africa became allied with European colonialism, involving two 
aspects of the same process:  the destruction or deliberate undervaluing of a 
people’s culture and colonial subjugation of the continent” (1994: 30).  
 
Christian missionaries served as a form of intermediary contact between European 
colonizers and “natives” because colonizers wanted to seek out new sources of raw 
materials for Western markets within the newly established colonies without upsetting 
communities of African villagers (1994: 30).  Thus, missionaries were sought to 
“neutralize African antagonism with their preaching—pressing upon the natives the 
acceptance of the European presence” (1994: 30).  Henry S. Wilson notes that by 1910, 
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nearly 11,000 missionaries had been established across African colonies and by 1939, the 
figure had doubled to 22,000 (Wilson 1994: 23).  After almost ninety-five years of 
Christianity, Jon P. Kirby writes that Africa’s Christian population was expected to 
increase from 237 million to 350 million (Kirby 1994: 57).  Like colonialists, 
missionaries also expressed an ethnocentric bias.  African traditional religious practices 
were scorned and viewed as a “morass of bizarre beliefs and practices” (Clarke 1986: 
221) in which Africans failed to grasp Christian values such as “the ideas of a personal 
Deity, a duty in life, [or] a moral code” (Kirby 1994: 60).   
Missionary film organizations such as the Congolese Center for Catholic Action 
Cinema (C.C.A.C.C.) and Saint-Paul Audiovisual Editions (E.P.A.) were established in 
the Belgian Congo (Diawara 1992: 12-13, 19) and produced films like Les Palabres de 
Mboloko, Matamata et Pilipili, Le bon samaritain (The Good Samaritan), and Soeur 
Annuarite, une vie pour Dieu (Sister Annuarite, a Life for God).  Not only was the 
C.C.A.C.C. responsible for converting Africans to Christianity and raising money, the 
films were used to win African compassion toward Belgium and the Church (Diawara 
1992: 14).  Similar to the British Colonial Film Unit, films made the C.C.A.C.C. also 
tried to provide moral lessons on vice and virtue according to standards set by the Church 
(1992: 14).   
 Early Hollywood productions also contributed to the destruction of African 
cultural values in the early 1900s through the distortion of African intelligence, 
appearance, language, and behavior (Bakari & Cham 1996: 3).  Representations of 
Africans reveal a profound racist unconscious among European audiences and 
Hollywood producers (Barlet 2000: 5).  Hollywood productions often highlighted 
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common European archetypes or heroes in the roles of explorers, soldiers, missionaries, 
or colonialists.  These European characters were portrayed in opposition to Africans who 
were frequently depicted as “animals,” “overgrown children,” “natives,” “savages,” 
“servants” and “buffoons” (Barlet 2000: 5; Ukadike 1994: 41).  As characters in films, 
black Africans were merely humble servants, decorative props or savages:  “[Black 
characters] were portrayed either as good-humored servants, a parallel to the Uncle Tom 
figure; as the comedian-buffoon and minstrel; or as knife-carrying savages” (Ukadike 
1994: 41).  Thus, Hollywood films visually projected the three-stage racial-cultural 
model proposed by John Stuart Mill and James Prichard (Young 1995: 7, 35, 94) in 
which social and “racial” oppositions such as European/non-European, white/black, and 
civilized/savage were conceived based on a cultural and racial hierarchy with European 
on the top.  
European audiences helped perpetuate negative stereotypes about “black” African 
identities because African safari melodramas were popular forms of entertainment in the 
early 1900s, and therefore Hollywood willingly continued to feed the demands of its 
audience: 
“Colonial cinema fed the European audience’s appetite for fantasy, escape and 
exoticism with picturesque, sensational material.  An exotic approach is inevitably 
superior and reductive.  Africa is merely a backdrop and the African is an animal” 
(Barlet 2000: 5). 
 
In particular, popular Tarzan movies such as Tarzan of the Apes (Scott Sidney, 1918), 
The Romance of Tarzan (Wilfred Lucas, 1918), and Son of Tarzan (Arthur J. Flaven, 
1920) based on the novel Tarzan of the Apes (Edgar Rice Burroughs, 1914) cultivated the 
stereotype of the heroic white male and the savage black African needing to be tamed 
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(Ukadike 1994: 40-41).  Overall, Hollywood produced approximately forty Tarzan films 
in a seventy-year period (Barlet 2000: 211).  Ukadike observes that        
“Tarzan movies, regardless of their negative impact on African culture as a whole, 
were exhibited with impunity.  The most devastating cultural damage these films 
did to Africa was to instill in the minds of most of the viewers the ‘dominating 
image’ of the white man over the African” (Ukadike 1994: 105). 
 
A brief analysis of the Tarzan narrative reveals profound insight into the European 
psyche and its self-perception.  For one, the main character, John Clayton is the son of a 
British Lord and Lady marooned on the coast of Africa by mutineers.  However, John’s 
parents die when he is an infant, and therefore John is then raised by an unknown ape 
species and given the “ape” name “Tarzan.”  In Tarzan’s twenties, he meets the love of 
his life, Jane, and returns to England with her.  During this time, Tarzan and Jane have a 
son named Jack.  Years later, Tarzan and his family end up moving back to the jungle.  
The premise of the narrative suggests that though Tarzan may have been raised in the 
“primitive” environs of the jungle by apes, he is inherently “European” and thus morally 
capable of returning to “civilization” despite his upbringing among animals.  Such a 
storyline also hypocritically portrays Tarzan’s return to the jungle as some sort of poetic 
ending while also condemning the “wildness” of the jungle and equating it with savagery.  
Clearly, Tarzan is an exotic projection of European identity.   
The psychological projection of Africans as the “Other” was formalized through 
film.  From the late 1890s to 1960s, “black” Africans did not have the means to produce 
counter-representations of African cultures and identities.  Therefore, stereotypes about 
“black” African identities were propagated by Western control of film production:   
“Since film production, exhibition, and distribution were in the hands of the 
colonial powers, Western aesthetic and ideological concepts prevailed.  African 
influence was only superficial, limited to the utilization of the continent as 
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background, sometimes exotic and with action alien to African culture based on 
the preconceptions of the people who made the films” (Ukadike 1994: 32). 
 
Tarzan movies were just some of the examples of African safari melodramas that 
appealed to the imagination of Western audiences in both Europe and the United States 
because of the heroic, dominating role that white characters played:   
“In a romantic age, when the function of romance seems in large degree to have 
been to varnish over the desperation and degradation of masses of people, not 
least in Europe itself, the preference was for emotional invocation of ‘heroism,’ of 
‘patriotism,’ and of ‘national destiny’” (Davis 1996: 1). 
   
In addition, Hollywood melodramas such as The Wooing and Wedding of a Coon (1905), 
The Kings of the Cannibal Islands (Wallace McCutcheon, 1908), The Zulu’s Heart (D.W. 
Griffith, 1908), King Solomon’s Mines (Robert Stevenson, 1937), Trader Horn (W. S. 
Van Dyke, 1931), Congorilla (Martin Johnson, 1932) also imparted negative 
representations of African identities.   In these melodramas, Africa was portrayed as a 
“reservoir of wild animals and impenetrable jungle, reducing Africans to wild natives, all 
part of an attempt to appeal to and satisfy the taste of cinema audiences for exoticism” 
(Ukadike 1994: 40-41).  By downplaying the role of “black” African characters in film 
and representing “black” African characters as merely side props, Hollywood cinema 
fostered negative images that were shared with both African and Western audiences.  
  
INDEPENDENCE AND POST-COLONIAL TRANSITIONS 
In the 1950s and early 1960s, most nations across the African continent gradually 
gained formal independence from its colonizers (Davis 1996: 3; Pfaff 2004: 1, 241) with 
the exception of Zimbabwe (1980), Namibia (1990), and South Africa (1994) who were 
released from colonial control and structures of oppression much later (Wilson 1994: xi). 
It is important to note that “the post-colonial state is first and foremost a product of 
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colonialism” and does not simply refer to Africa’s independence but to “the legacy of 
colonialism which was fundamental to [African nation-states’] very development and 
evolution” (Ahluwalia 2001: 71).  As will be discussed in chapter 2, the effects of 
colonialism still pervade African societies in the form of neo-colonialism and the 
continuation of negative “racial” discourse.  Filmmakers address the implications of 
colonial power, especially its impact on perceptions of “race” on contemporary African 
societies.   
For the purpose of contextualizing the social environments in which the films A 
Reasonable Man (Gavin Hood 1999; South Africa), Chikin Biznis:  The Whole Story 
(Ntshaveni Wa Luruli 1998; South Africa), Fools (Ramadan Suleman 1997; South 
Africa/France), Hyènes (Djibril Diop Mambéty 1992; Senegal), Pièces d'Identités 
(Mweze Ngangura 1998; France/Congo/Belgium), Une couleur café (Henri Duparc 1997; 
France), and Xala (Ousmane Sembene 1975; Senegal) occur, a brief description will be 
offered of the colonial and post-colonial histories of the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(Pièces d'Identités), the Ivory Coast (Une couleur café), Senegal (Hyènes & Xala), and 
South Africa (A Reasonable Man, Chikin Biznis & Fools).   
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)  
The DRC was hastily granted independence by Belgium on 30 June 1960 
(Boateng 1978: 143; Gugler 2003: 46) when Belgium was under the rule of King 
Baudouin I (Meredith 2005: 93).  The new prime minister, Patrice Lumumba’s speech on 
the day of independence in 1960 offers insight into the DRC’s brutal colonial past: 
“We have known sarcasm and insults, endured blows morning, noon and night, 
because we were ‘niggers’….We have seen our land despoiled under the terms of 
what was supposedly the law of the land but which only recognized the right of 
the strongest.  We have seen that the law was quite different for a white than for a 
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black:  accommodating the former, cruel and inhuman for the latter.  We have 
seen the terrible suffering of those banished to remote regions because of their 
political opinions or religious beliefs; exiled within their own country, their fate 
was truly worse than death itself…And finally, who can forget the volleys of 
gunfire in which so many of our brothers perished, the cells where the authorities 
threw those who would not submit to a rule where justice meant oppression and 
exploitation” (Meredith 2005: 94). 
 
The DRC was originally known as the Congo Free State from 1870-1908 (Birmingham 
1998: 1; Meredith 2005: 95) under the colonial regime of King Leopold II.  An area of 
almost 1 million square miles, seventy-five times the size of Belgium, and one-thirteenth 
of the African continent, Leopold considered the Congo Free State his personal empire 
(Meredith 2005: 95).  For personal wealth and profit, Leopold greedily established 
development companies for the exportation of the Congo Free State’s natural resources 
such as ivory and rubber (Hochschild 2002: 64-77; Meredith 2005: 94-97).  To collect 
ivory, Leopold allowed paid agents to raid villages and go on hunting expeditions to 
secure ivory “employing ever more ruthless means” (Meredith 2005: 95).  Leopold 
stripped the equatorial forests of its wild rubber using a system of slave labor.  Villages 
were “flogged [with a whip known as a chicotte], imprisoned and even mutilated” if 
quotas were not met (Hochschild 2002: 116-139; Meredith 2005: 96).  In the end, the 
terror perpetuated by Leopold depopulated the country “to a degree unseen in all 
European colonies—with the exception of the early and ruthless colonization of Latin 
America by the Iberians” (Scherrer 2002: 332).  The death toll was and still is 
unprecedented in Africa, reported to have declined at this time from twenty to thirty 
million to eight million (2002: 332).  Thus, the economic exploitation of the Congo and 
“Leopold’s subjugation” lead to the death of almost half of the population (2002: 332).        
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In 1908, before Leopold’s death in 1909, international outrage about the horrors 
of Leopold’s regime in the Congo Free State, forced Leopold to transfer his powers to the 
Belgian government (Scherrer 2002: 332).  The Belgian government then took over the 
colony until the Congo’s formal independence in 1960.  Replacing King Leopold II, a 
small management group in Brussels, the Catholic Church, and business corporations 
began to control the colonial state (Meredith 2005: 96).  Though power was transferred 
power from King Leopold II to the Belgian government, the Congo continued to be 
stripped of its natural resources and suppressed by the new colonial state:  Under the rule 
of the Belgian government, “the Congolese had no political voice, no rights to own land 
or to travel freely.  They were subject to curfews in urban areas; in rural areas, forced to 
labor” (2005: 97).   
The Congo was “ill-prepared” after the Belgian government abruptly relinquished 
its power in 1960, and thus the newly independent Congo experienced its first civil war 
directly thereafter (Copson 2001).  In the midst of on-going political turmoil, Joseph 
Kasavubu became the Congo’s first elected president until 1965 when Joseph Désiré 
Mobutu, a Lieutenant General of the army, overthrew Kasavubu in a coup d'état.  As the 
succeeding president, Mobutu rebaptized the country Zaire (1965-1997) “in the name of 
Africanization” (Gugler 2003: 187).  However, under the corrupt leadership of Mobutu, 
the DRC suffered rapid economic decline (Birmingham 1998: 98-99) and widespread 
fear and intimidation through the practices of ethnicization (Scherrer 2002: 369) that 
continued the Congo’s long history of violent governments (Birmingham 1998: 111).  In 
May 1997, the Alliances des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire 
(AFDL) chased away the corrupt Mobutu regime located in Kinshasa, the capital of the 
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Congo (Scherrer 2002: 327).  Though other presidents have succeeded Mobutu, ethnic 
strife and economic ruin still plague the country.    
Ivory Coast and Senegal 
 France is “traditionally assimilationist both in its colonial history and in its 
immigration policy” (Barlet 2000: 118).  French colonial policy was based on direct rule 
and political assimilation:  
“The idea of assimilation was based on the revolutionary doctrine of the equality 
of man and the assumption that French culture was superior to that of the African, 
while the policy of direct rule was a necessary adjunct of the policy of 
assimilation” (Boateng 1978: 62-63).  
 
Thus, after approximately seventy years of colonial rule and a post-colonial relationship 
with its former colonies, French values and the French language have been firmly 
embedded in West African societies.     
 In almost a successive wave, the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Dahomey (later Benin), 
Niger, Chad, the Central African Republican, the French Congo (Brazzaville) and Gabon 
were granted independence from France in August 1960—in particular, the Ivory Coast 
on August 7th and Senegal on August 20th (Meredith 2005: 69).  Thus, in a quick sweep 
of independence, Francophone West Africa had officially gained its freedom from French 
control.  However, the newly independent countries were critically poor and lacked 
viable economic structures (Meredith 2005: 70).  Immediately following the 
“independence” of West Africa, therefore, changes were mainly ceremonial, and France 
was still able to assert control over the Ivory Coast and Senegal, for example, through 
neo-colonial policies (Crozier 1964: 74).  
Therefore, Brian Crozier distinguishes between Francophone African countries’ 
“independence” and “sovereignty” (1964: 74).  He argues that directly after the 
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sovereignty of Francophone West African countries in 1960, France maintained its 
colonial relationship with its former territories through economic aid and neo-colonial 
policies:  “Colonial rule established institutional structures that would perpetuate Western 
domination for decades following colonialism’s formal demise” (Ukadike 1994: 60). 
Crozier notes that the idea behind the term “neo-colonialism” comes from Lenin’s 
argument that political independence is incomplete unless accompanied by economic 
independence (1964: 7).  In this way, economic dependence becomes another form of 
imperialism (1964: 7).  In particular, General Charles de Gaulle helped protect French 
interests by signing agreements that allocated continuing financial and technical 
assistance to its former colonies (Meredith 2005: 70).  Forms of neo-colonial control at 
this time included the permanent station of French troops in African capitals; the support 
of a monetary union in which the French treasury controlled a stable and convertible 
currency known as the CFA Franc (which used to be directly linked to the French franc 
but now has a fixed rate compared to the Euro); the continued French domination of 
industry, banking, and trade; and a French-controlled administration in which elites, 
“long accustomed to collaborating with the French and well attuned to French systems of 
management and culture” were given high-ranking positions in the new government 
(Meredith 2005: 70).  Western donor institutions such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) have also played roles in indirectly controlling 
African countries through economic aid.  In 1979, Senegal became the first African state 
to receive assistance from the World Bank in the form of a structural adjustment loan 
(2005: 369).  The subject of Western donor institutions will be investigated in more depth 
in Chapter 4.      
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South Africa and Apartheid 
   Though the majority of African nations gained independence, “as the tide of 
African nationalism swept throughout Africa, white-minority governments in southern 
Africa tightened their control” (Meredith 2005: 117).  In particular, apartheid 
jurisdictions were tightened in South Africa, a system of power that “comprehensively 
and strictly enforced control by the state over Blacks in their movement to urban areas 
and in their employment and residential opportunities” (Smith 1982: 20).  The founding 
legislative structures of apartheid were first established when Afrikaner Nationalists came 
to power in 1948 (Meredith 2005: 117).  Through an “ideology of separation” (Michael 
& Nuttal 2000: 1), the system of apartheid dominated South Africa’s political and social 
history from 1948-1994 by classifying “races” as White, Black, Indian, and Coloured 
groups.  However, the apartheid system of “race” classification often involved 
contradictory bureaucratic loopholes and the concept of “race” ultimately became 
muddled and confusing:   
“The apartheid system of race classification was a hodgepodge of contentious and 
problematic indicators, further complicated by the possibility of formal 
reclassification through appeal to the government bureaucracy, the despised Race 
Classification Board. Each year the Board sat and reviewed the cases of all those 
who believed they had been wrongly classified.  Martin West (op.cit.) Martin 
West (op.cit.) reports that in 1986 no less than 1,624 South Africans sought 
reclassification, and of these 1,102 were successful.  About half of the petitioners 
were Cape Coloureds seeking reclassification as whites, and half were Blacks 
seeking reclassification as Coloureds.  Those requesting reclassification were 
subject to humiliating physical "tests" such as whether a pencil inserted into the 
hair would stay in place (black and coloured) or fall to the ground (white)” 
(Scheper-Hughes 2001).    
 
The “black” and “coloured” populations were gradually transformed by apartheid 
regulations:  Strict segregation policies were initiated and more than three million people 
were re-located from their homes in a massive wave of forced removals.  Squatter camps 
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also known as “informal settlements” and “townships” began to emerge across South 
Africa on the outskirts of its major urban centers such as Johannesburg and Cape Town 
(Smith 1982: 21-22).  Thus, the old colonial mentality of superiority had not yet vanished 
from the social fabric of South African society.  The Prime Minister in 1956, Hans 
Strijdom, articulated this pervasive and continuing colonial mentality in a speech given 
on behalf of apartheid:  “The only way the Europeans can maintain supremacy is by 
domination….And the only way they can maintain domination is by withholding the vote 
from Non-Europeans” (Meredith 2005: 117).     
 As hard as the apartheid government tried, it could not ensure the survival of 
apartheid in the face of international pressure and sanctions.  For example, in 1985 the 
U.S. government was persuaded by growing international pressure to pass what is known 
as the Anti-Apartheid Act, which prohibited new investment in South Africa, loans and 
computer sales to the government, and the importing of Krugerrands (L’Ange 2005: 391).  
In December 1985, the apartheid government banned TV coverage of widespread riots 
and demonstrations that began to arise in direct political reaction to government 
oppression, poor working conditions, and unfair living situations.  Despite strict 
censorship regulations, this coverage managed to reach audiences abroad, perhaps 
through alternative press in South Africa.  U.S. audiences were infuriated to such an 
extent that economic sanctions were initiated (L’Ange 2005: 391).  Therefore, according 
to Gerald L’Ange, “the cost of implementing apartheid [began] to exceeds its economic 
benefits” “leaving as chief rationale only the element of ethnic separation” (2005: 390).  
In addition to increasing economic pressure, though white segregation and supremacy 
had found its “clerical approval” by the Dutch Reformed Church in earlier years, 
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members of the church eventually started questioning the moral legitimacy of apartheid 
(2005: 391) as evident from the Belhar Declaration, an expression of liberation theology 
in which the church believes “God sides with the ‘oppressed’ in political and social 
confrontations (Adams 2005).  To top this, in 1984 an economic recession and leading to 
high unemployment and inflation rates sources sparked “a mood of tension” among 
townships leading to the beginning of a long series of township uprisings and riots 
(Meredith 2005: 430).  Thus, in 1994 after years of increasing political, social, and 
economic pressures, the system of apartheid was finally dismantled (L’Ange 2005: 488) 
and Nelson Mandela was appointed as democratic South Africa’s first president, thereby 
finally liberating the entire continent of Africa from white domination (2005: xxv).  
Though South Africa has been a democracy for approximately twelve years, the country 
still faces social, political, and economic challenges. 
      
POST-COLONIAL AFRICAN CINEMA 
During the 1960s, a mobilization across Africa had taken place in which “the need 
to build a new revolutionary culture became imperative” (Ukadike 1994: 5) for “the most 
serious blow suffered by the colonized was ‘being removed from history and from the 
community’” (Armes 1987: 12).  French-speaking African filmmakers such as Gaston 
Kabore (Burkina Faso), Ousmane Sembene (Senegal) and Med Hondo (Algeria), to name 
a few, helped launch a revolutionary phase in the history of African film, in which the 
voice of “black Africa” began to express itself cinematically (Barlet 2000: 71-104).  Une 
nation est née (Paulin Soumanou Vieyra, 1961), L’Afrique en piste (Yves Diagne, 1961), 
Grand magal a Touba (Blaise Senghor, 1962), and Borom Sarret (Ousmane Sembene, 
1963) were some of the first films to be made by “black” Africans.  In this cinematic 
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effort, African filmmakers hoped to dispel myths about traditions, “blackness,” and 
African cultures in order to re-characterize “black” African identities: 
“In order to decolonize the screen, the African audience had to be offered a new 
vision of its own space.  Andre Gardies has shown to what extent the early film 
cultures of Black Africa attempted to recast the African space in the image of the 
new sovereignties.  Colonialism had been a dispossession of space, a deprivation 
of identify.  The aim was to reclaim the territory so that the audience could 
identity with it.  By showing them images of home, the cinema helped them to 
recover their cultural identity” (2000: 39). 
       
Common trends expressed by early post-colonial cinema involved the reflection on 
poverty (particularly the contrast between urban rich and urban poor); reflection on 
historical, pre-colonial African history; the re-evaluation of tradition; the moral emphasis 
on individual rather than institutional change; neo-colonialism; modern versus traditional 
medicine; philosophical dilemmas of Westernized Africans; the Westernized woman 
compared to a woman respecting traditions; and the conflict between the city and village 
(Boughedir 2000: 109; Pfaff 2004: 2-3; Wynter 2000: 38).  Film became an instrument to 
reassert “black” African identities through the re-evaluation of African cultures and the 
negation of stereotypes that arose during colonial times. 
“Taking on historical subjects in the cinema thus makes it possible to restore a 
personal view of one’s history and culture.  Correcting the myths trafficked by 
Western images can help to change the view Westerns have of the continent and 
of black culture—and also the views of Africans themselves” (Wynter 2000: 48).     
 
Just like the colonizers had originally used films for didactic purposes, black African 
filmmakers also realized that film could be used as an educational tool to target black 
audiences and thus recover black African cultural identities:   
“Aspiring black African filmmakers wanted to make their perceptions of Africa 
(from centuries of colonial oppression to neocolonial repression) the themes of 
their work.  More than this, they also learned from colonial examples that the film 
medium had enormous potential and that in the postcolonial African situation its 
potential for communication and the opportunities it could offer for projecting a 
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new self-image, especially to a society predominantly illiterate, was indeed a 
blessing.  It is from this perspective that black African filmmakers, since 
independence, have striven for the need to work for African culture on African 
terms” (Ukadike 1994: 68).  
 
Thus, “for thirty-five years African filmmakers have rejected the dual Western gaze with 
its opposing components of abject poverty and exoticism” (Barlet 2000: 4) first espoused 
in early colonial, missionary, and Hollywood productions.      
A brief overview of African film history testifies to the radical transfer of 
production control from Western sources to local African hands:   
“Contemporary black African film practice emerged out of the excitement of 
nation-building and a quest for the revivification of Africa’s lost cultural heritage 
and identity, a quest that has inspired innovative and creative diversification in the 
cinema and throughout the arts” (Ukadike 1994: 304).  
 
Emerging “black African” film production, however, was not entirely liberated 
economically, socially, or politically despite an overall breakthrough for African 
filmmakers.  Even after independence, for example, the French “wanted to retain 
influence over its newly liberated people” (Davis 1996: 3), and therefore provided 
assistance to African filmmakers to maintain an economic and cultural link to its old 
colonies (Barlet 2000: 25; Ukadike 1994: 69-70).  Because the newly rising African 
filmmakers lacked technical skills and the economic resources, France was able to 
indirectly manipulate local African film production.  Furthermore, one of the most 
difficult problems that suppressed the emergence of African cinema was the “exploitation 
by foreign-owned distribution companies” (Ukadike 1994: 62).  African filmmakers 
lacked their own local and international circulation network.  Secondly, Hollywood was 
still ever-present as a cinematic distribution powerhouse through an organization known 
as the American Motion Picture Export Company (AMPEC-Africa, 1961) and continued 
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to exert its influence in the Anglophone regions of Africa even after official 
decolonization (1994: 62).  Despite the constraints placed on the emerging cinematic 
voice, other filmmakers from Third World territories such as Latin America and Asia 
began working cooperatively to meet and create festivals for Third World filmmakers:   
“Intellectuals and cultural workers in Africa, Latin America, and Asia recognized 
the commonality of their struggles and embraced the concept of unity among so-
called ‘Third World’ peoples fighting to free themselves from neocolonial, 
capitalist structures and relations” (Pfaff 2004: 242).    
 
For example, in 1973 African film professions organized the Third World Film-Makers 
Meeting in Algiers.  The meeting was a great beginning for Third World filmmakers who 
wished to create a forum for Third World filmmaking concerns (2004: 243).  
  
PROPOSING A FLUID SOCIO-CULTURAL MODEL OF IDENTITY  
Progressive thought in the 1960s revealed that the classification of humanity into 
“races” based on biological phenomena was ultimately shortsighted and limited.  This 
increasing awareness coincided with the independence struggles across Africa, the 
emergence of a “black” African cinematic voice, and even the Civil Rights movement in 
the United States.  George Stocking comments on the limits of “racial” discourse:       
“As anthropologists moved from the classification of primary to secondary races, 
the number of morphological peculiarities necessary to separate races increased, 
and these were more and more subject to quantification.  Color alone would 
usually distinguish Negro from Caucasian; but to separate Nordic and 
Mediterranean one must observe—and measure—not only pigmentation, but 
stature and headform as well.  Paradoxically, the more precise and extensive the 
observation and the measurement of mankind, the more tenuous was the ‘reality’ 
of the races they served to define.  The natural variability of biological 
phenomena combined with the laws of particulate inheritance to make it 
increasingly difficult to maintain in practice the view that race is a phenomena 
expressed in the individual human being” (Stocking 1968: 57-58).   
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The use of the term “ethnicity” to describe culturally defined groups became popular 
during the late 1960s and early 1970s due to increasing political and social awareness of 
existing taxonomic categories (Jones 1997: 51).  The idea of ethnicity was used in 
reference to groups of people distinguished by cultural or national features, rather than 
descent from common ancestors that “racial” discourses presupposed (Baker 1974: 4).  
Sian Jones defines ethnicity as all of the “social and psychological phenomena associated 
with a culturally constructed group identity” (Jones 1997:  xiii).  This distinction is based 
upon ethnic groups, or more specifically, any group of people “who set themselves apart 
and/or are set apart by others with whom they interact or co-exist on the basis of their 
perceptions of cultural differentiation and/or common descent” (1997: xiii).   Ethnic 
groups are typically formed as social solidarities based on common cultural, behavioral, 
linguistic, or religious practices.  In this sense, an ethnic group is also a cultural 
community.  Therefore, an ethnic identity is “that aspect of a person’s self-
conceptualization which results from identification with a broader group in opposition to 
others on the basis of perceived cultural differentiation and/or common descent” (1997: 
xiii).   
However, ethnic-based categorizations are not completely immune from 
problematic interpretations because “self-conceptualization” is not always voluntary 
(Jones 1997: 57).  Just as “race” was used to separate and distinguish peoples based on 
superficial reasoning, outside-imposed definitions of “culture” (1997: 57) have also been 
used to create ethnic stratifications and social stigmas about certain “ethnic” groups 
(1997: 76).  Furthermore, definitions of ethnicity are not always clearly removed from 
“racial” connotations (Banton 1988: 25).  Even to this day after the end of colonial rule, 
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ethnic conflict persists throughout Africa due to negative consequences of neo-colonial 
practices (Berkeley 2001: 5-20).  The 1994 genocide in Rwanda between the Hutus and 
Tutsis (Barlet 2000: 9; Berkeley 2001: 245-285; Birmingham 1998: viii; Gugler 2003: 
46, 109; Meredith 2005: 485-523; Scherrer 2002: 365) in which approximately 800,000 
Tutsis were killed in a short span of 100 days (Wilson 2005: 523), and the civil war in 
Liberia from 1989-1999 between the Grio and Krahn peoples (Berkeley 2001: 21-25) are 
just a few examples of severe ethnic conflicts that have occurred in Africa through 
Western support (Gugler 2003: 110) and as a result of class, religious, and political 
disputes among ethnically defined social groups (Jones 1997: 70).  Christian P. Scherrer 
highlights the intricate historical factors involved in the ethnicization of the Tutsi and 
Hutu populations:   
“The devaluation of a complex system of precolonial mechanisms of 
reconciliation and conflict resolution and the desacralization or dissolution, 
without replacement, of the monarchial order, resulted in a devastating 
ethnicization of class differences, which then assumed momentum of its own. A 
Tutsi was anyone who owned more than ten cows.  The politically manipulated 
dichotomization and the rigid social segregation by means of racial and ethnic 
classification became a source of internal social conflicts.  German and Belgian 
colonialists actively pursued a policy of ethnicization from above and of the 
preferential treatment of the Tutsis as the allegedly natural ‘master race,’ a policy 
that could not but have a highly destructive impact on postcolonial development 
in Central Africa.  Racial theories based on biology provided the justification for 
the policy of segregation” (Scherrer 2002: 364). 
 
Thus, ethnic categorization as well as “racial” signification can be used politically as 
instruments for not only subjugation but to create internal conflict among a country’s 
own people.   
Homi K. Bhabha more accurately articulates a relevant ideological model for 
contemporary cultural (re)-identification and analysis: 
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“What is striking about the theoretical focus on the enunciatory present as a 
liberatory discursive strategy is its proposal that emergent cultural identifications 
are articulated at the liminal edge of identity—in that arbitrary closure, that 
‘unity…in quotation marks’ (Hall) that the language metaphor so clearly enacts.  
Postcolonial and black critiques propose forms of contestatory subjectivities that 
are empowered in the act of erasing the politics of binary opposition—the 
inverted polarities of a counter-politics (Gates).  There is an attempt to construct a 
theory of the social imaginary that requires no subject expressing originary 
anguish (West), no singular self-image (Gates), no necessary or eternal 
belongingness (Hall).  The contingent and the liminal become the times and the 
spaces for the historical representation of the subjects of cultural difference in a 
postcolonial criticism” (Bhabha 1994: 179).  
  
According to Bhabha’s argument, the “enunciatory present”—i.e. current historical 
moment—is a “liberatory discursive strategy” in that history can always be liberated, so 
to speak, from forms of “arbitrary closure” such as the signifier, which are used to 
“enunciate” and “close” the present because of a political desire to create clarity out of  
“ambivalence” (1994: 179).  History, as such, is a construction and a “discursive 
temporality” (1994: 25).  Thus the enunciation of history, or culture, should be a 
“performative act” open for re-enunciation and re-identification instead of “closed” by 
“signification,” “empiricism,” and “mastery of the ‘author’” (1994: 179).   The goal, as 
time progresses and history advances, is to “negotiate” contradictions within the 
historical present “that open up hybrid sites and objectives of struggle” and to “destroy 
those negative polarities between knowledge and its objects, and between theory and 
practical-political reason” (1994: 25).  In other words, Bhabha radically suggests that we 
go “beyond theory”:  “This ‘beyond theory’ is itself a liminal form of signification that 
creates a space for contingent, indeterminate articulation of social ‘experience’ that is 
particularly important for envisaging emergent cultural identities” but “without the 
transparent reality of empiricism and outside the intentional mastery of the ‘authory’ 
(1994: 179).  Bhabha’s “beyond theory” discourse is a complicated way to conceive 
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cultural temporality and hybridity and will therefore be addressed in more depth in the 
third chapter.  A brief introduction of Bhabha’s theories is simply meant to offer an 
alternative model of thinking to “racial’ and “ethnic” signifiers before moving on to the 
next chapter, in which examples of African identities depicted in film will be offered.  
CONCLUSIONS  
The colonization and general exploitation of the African continent dramatically 
changed the basic infrastructure of African societies.  Foundations for new languages, 
customs, religions, and politics were gradually erected by imperialists—sometimes side-
by-side or in place of pre-colonial African cultural forms.  In particular, “racial” ideology 
profoundly affected the way Europeans approached and related to African societies.  
Though not excusing such ideology, “racial” philosophy is not an easy looking-glass for 
Western societies to set down because of its entrenchment in the Western psyche: 
“The outside worlds encountered by European travelers were interpreted by them 
through ideological filters, or ways of seeing, provided by their own cultures and 
societies” (Loomba 2005: 64).    
 
For the past two hundred years, explorers, colonialists, settlers, economists, experts and 
political scientists have seen the people of the African continent only through such a 
culturally biased mirror (Chabal 1996: 45).  This is a reflection that Europeans and other 
Western societies have enjoyed seeing: 
“‘Politics of the mirror,’ therefore, in that the main effect of such a teleogical 
perspective has been to search in Africa for an image of the African that would 
confirm our developmentalist assumptions about ourselves.  The consequences 
have been as inevitable as they were predictable.  First, we have perennially been 
disappointed in that the reality of Africa has never matched our expectations.  
Second, and more ominously, we have failed to look at Africa as it is (in its local 
and historical context) rather than as we imagine it to be.  Third, and as a result, 
we have confined Africa to the dustbin of history; that is, as a continent the 
history of which we cannot be expected to understand and on which we 
eventually ‘give up’ (1996: 45-46).   
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Ingrained patterns of thinking have slowly evolved among Western societies, but neither 
do discourses on ethnicity completely solve the problem of “signification” and “arbitrary 
closure” (Bhabha 1994: 179).  In a world influenced by the rational, “scientific,” and 
taxonomic habits of the West, it is not easy to approach differences without diametrically 
categorizing them—for example, if not by race, then by culture; and if not by culture, 
then by nation.  This paper does not imply that a substitute for categories will always be 
created, but that a change in this manner of thinking will be revolutionary for it would 
require a complete overhaul of Western discourse.  The next chapter will explore the 
ways in which contemporary filmmakers’ continue to represent “race.”   
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2 Race and the Treatment of Stereotypes  
 in Post-Colonial African Cinema 
 
 
The films A Reasonable Man (Gavin Hood 1999; South Africa), Chikin Biznis:  
The Whole Story (Ntshaveni Wa Luruli 1998; South Africa), Fools (Ramadan Suleman 
1997; South Africa/France), Hyènes (Djibril Diop Mambéty 1992; Senegal), Pièces 
d'Identités (Mweze Ngangura 1998; France/Congo/Belgium), Une couleur café (Henri 
Duparc 1997; France), and Xala (Ousmane Sembene 1975; Senegal) offer varying 
descriptions of African identities based on economic, political, and social changes that 
have occurred throughout African countries since the 1960s.   
According to this list of films, differences in traditions, languages, politics, and 
geography distinguish African identities from one another:  For example, Xala (Senegal 
1975) is set among a community in Senegal where Wolof and French are spoken and the 
Muslim faith is practiced in addition to traditional healing using marabouts; Chikin Biznis 
(South Africa 1998), in contrast, takes place in the township of Soweto in South Africa 
where Afrikaans, English, and Zulu are spoken and both Christian and traditional 
practices are referenced.  However, the colonial past and its implications are not far-
removed from what is referred to as “the black cultural fabric”:   
“While black Africans in general increasingly recognize that colonialism is 
becoming outworn as a catchall excuse for all their misfortunes and failings, they 
do see good reason to believe that its deleterious effects persist.  Certainly the 
humiliation and exploitation of colonialism and apartheid are woven forever as a 
bitter thread in the black cultural fabric” (L’Ange 2005: 500). 
 
Consequently, filmmakers cannot easily abandon a “racialized” understanding of African 
identities because, to use Bhabha’s line of reasoning discussed in Chapter 1, a 
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“racialized” mindset has already been authored and signified (Bhabha 1994: 179) among 
African societies starting in the nineteenth century.   
However, African societies are not necessarily doomed by the past.  A shift in 
cultural power has allowed contemporary filmmakers to supply new representations of 
African cultures in response to past “racial” assumptions.  African filmmakers thus offer 
critical reflections and opinions on the changing meanings of “black,” “white,” and 
“mixed” identities espoused by “racial” discourses, colonial film, and Hollywood cinema.  
As observed through these works, African filmmakers present the topic of African 
identity and explore how historical perceptions of “race” and forms of “racism” still exist 
in contemporary, post-colonial African communities despite progressive changes in 
society.  This is often done through the reversal of “racial” stereotypes and the re-
evaluation of power structures identified with either “white” or “black” cultural spheres.   
Therefore, for three main reasons it is not simply a coincidence that most of the 
films produced after the 1960s draw attention to primarily “black” characters.  First, the 
previous portrayal of “black” characters was often in the form of ridicule and 
degradation.  Secondly, constituting 85-90 percent (Eze 1997: 202) of the total population 
of the African continent, “black Africa” obviously outnumbers non-black Africa (i.e. 
European, Jewish, and Arab populations) in terms of “racial” demographics.  Finally, a 
common experiential thread was formed among “black” Africans through a sense of 
shared suffering (Werbner 1997: 235).  “Blackness,” however, is not the only challenging 
“racial” construct represented in African films.  “White” and “mixed” identities are also 
depicted in challenging ways.  Whereas “white” characters like Tarzan once dominated 
the screen and represented the heroicism and authority that colonizers wished to project 
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onto themselves, “white” characters in the films this paper will explore typically play 
minor roles and often serve as reminders of a past dominant European presence, with the 
exception of Sean Raine, the main character in A Reasonable Man and Maria, Doc’s 
Parisian mistress, in Une couleur café. 
  
THE “WHITE” AFRICAN 
 To understand the entire picture of post-colonialism, it is not only important to 
critically engage with “black” Africa’s future but the future of millions of “white” 
Africans scattered across the African continent, the majority of whom are centralized in 
southern Africa, particular South Africa.  Though the independence of African nations 
from colonial rule marked a great moment in history, independence also had significant 
implications for “white African” societies.  In a certain way, most “white” Africans, 
though historically privileged, became disenfranchised.  With the inauguration of Nelson 
Mandela as president of South Africa in 1994, the end of “white domination”—as distinct 
from “white” presence—was finally official, but both “white” and “black” Africans were 
left to live side-by-side on new terms.  In particular, “white Africans” born and remaining 
in Africa were faced with a minority status in terms of demographics, a new political 
impotency, and a crisis of identity (L’Ange 2005: xxvi): 
“The native whites now live—not always uncomfortably, it must be said—among 
the debris of their power, their polities displaced, their administrations disbanded, 
their cultures endangered, their privileges waning, their histories revised and their 
heroes sometimes reviled, their cities and streets in some cases renamed.  Most of 
this they must accept as part of the process of indigenization that is essential for 
them to have a viable future in Africa” (2005: 500). 
   
This entails quite a dramatic psychological and political shift for “white” Africans:   
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“Living now in a state of existential anxiety, [African-born whites] know only 
that they must find fortitude and hope with which to replace the comfortable 
certainty once seemingly conferred by segregation and supremacy” (2005: xxvi). 
 
Unlike the “ethnic residuum” left by European migration and colonial practices in 
countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, “whites” in 
Africa are outnumbered and “face the possibility of cultural extinction, of an obliteration 
of custom and identity” (2005: xxvii).  Therefore, accompanying fear has further 
decreased the number of “white” Africans driving thousands to emigrate but most have 
remained because they do not have the option to leave, or out of a “readiness to embrace 
African identity” (2005: xxvii).  Thus, in order for “white” Africans to completely adjust 
to their changing circumstances, they must re-evaluate their own identity as Africans and 
work co-operatively with fellow Africans:         
“The whites have no option, however, but to accept that the milieu in which they 
are seeking acceptance of their African identity places them not in the First World 
of their forebears but in the Third World of their fellow Africans, not in the 
development world of their cultural heritage but in the developing world of their 
political inheritance.  It is on the African continent, with all its perceived 
disadvantage, that the native whites must find their future.  They must now fight 
Africa’s fights, not Europe’s or America’s.  They must join their fellow Africans, 
for instance, in their battle against the legacy of debt that Europe has left them and 
against the exploitation of Africa that is still exacted by the Western nations 
through unfair trading practices” (2005: 489)  
 
It is within this context that post-colonial “white” African identities may also be 
conceived and not only under the heavy weight of colonial guilt. 
  
WESTERN STEREOTYPES IN POST-COLONIAL AFRICAN CINEMA 
Though colonial and early Hollywood cinema perpetuated mainly negative 
stereotypes about “black” African identities, on the other hand, stereotypes about “white” 
identities can also be derived from contemporary African films.  In particular, the “white” 
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character is no longer the star, so to speak, of African film, no longer the hero.  Films 
such as A Reasonable Man, Pièces d'Identités, Fools, and Xala offer counter-versions to 
stereotypes of Western identity formulated in colonial and early Hollywood cinema.   
Judge Wendon in A Reasonable Man (Gavin Hood 1999; South Africa) 
 
 Judge Wendon in A Reasonable Man is an intricate character because he 
represents the sincere Eurocentric belief in the superiority of Western civilization.  In the 
context of post-apartheid South Africa, the judge proves that despite a shift in political 
power, Western culture is still entrenched in South Africa’s systems of government and 
administration.  However, such feelings of superiority are subtle and are not openly 
disclosed until the end of the film.  Throughout the beginning of A Reasonable Man, 
Judge Wendon is composed, articulate, and commands respect as an elevated authority 
figure representing and defending justice.  In this regard, the judge is portrayed as a 
model of “objectivity.”  However, towards the end of the film, Judge Wendon’s 
composure breaks after the main character, Sean Raine, confronts the judge and questions 
his and definition of “a reasonable man.”   
 Sean:   “That is ridiculous.” 
 Judge:  “I beg your pardon.”   
 Sean:   “I said that is ridiculous, my lord.”  
  
In this moment of courtroom discourtesy, Judge Wendon abruptly stops the trial and 
summons Sean to his private chambers.  Then, we witness a sudden outburst from the 
judge while being questioned by Sean:   
 Judge:  “Who the hell do you think you are?” 
 Sean:   “I apologize, my lord, but the standard you suggest is that of an urban man  
with a Western education”  
 Judge:  “I was in the middle of my judgment.” 
 Sean:   “Your judgment is based upon the standards of a society with which the  
accused is completely unfamiliar.” 
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 Judge:  “Well it’s high-time that he adopted a modicum of civilized behavior.”     
 Sean:   “Your job is not to teach civilized behavior at the expense of one  
individual.”    
 
It is soon realized that the judge’s composure and moral understanding is grounded in the 
Eurocentric belief that Western rationale is the only standard for civilization and an 
objective sense of justice: 
Judge:  “Our legal system is based on rational thought.  There is no place for  
belief in the law”   
 
Ironically, however, the judge’s outburst reveals the hypocritical fact that there is a place 
for belief in the law but only if such beliefs conform to Western values.  Therefore, the 
judge is not truly an objective character, but rather, the very definition of Eurocentrism, 
which perceives its values as objective principles.  Furthermore, the judge perfectly fits 
into the nineteenth century three-stage hierarchy first articulated by John Stuart Mill and 
James Cowles Prichard (Young 1995: 7, 35, 94) mentioned in Chapter 1.  For Judge 
Wendon, Western civilization exists at the top of the hierarchical model, and all other 
systems of belief that are inferior to Western civilization rest at the bottom.  However, as 
Judge Wendon’s personal conviction suggests, this is a given fact and not merely an 
assumption until Sean exposes the hypocrisy of the judge’s views.    
Ex-Colonialists and Belgium in Pièces d'Identités (Mweze Ngangura 1998; 
France/Congo/Belgium) 
 
In Pièces d'Identités, Mweze Ngangura provides shallow contextual information 
on the history of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), thus a brief overview of the 
DRC’s colonial and post-colonial history was offered in Chapter 1 (Birmingham 1998: 1; 
Hochschild 2002: 64-77; Gugler 2003: 187; Meredith 2005: 94-97; Scherrer 2002: 327, 
332, 369).  Only short and intermittent sequences of black and white archival footage 
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remind the audience of the DRC’s past in the Pièces d'Identités; and this past, as it is 
shown in the film, is generally depicted as a peaceful and cooperative relationship 
between the Belgian government and local Congolese.   
However, one of Mani Kongo’s flashbacks hints at the political unrest felt by 
Congolese nationalists in Belgium during a parade held for King Baudouin I, the king of 
Belgium at the time of the DRC’s independence.  The flashback occurs almost 
immediately after Mani Kongo is about to temporarily pawn his royal headdress and staff 
to Mr. Jos, the owner of Le Katanga bar, and thereby temporarily lose his sense of 
identity that is associated with the royal headdress and staff.  Of course, the experience is 
disorientating, and thus while in Mr. Jos’ antique shop surrounded by African masks 
hanging on the walls, Mani Kongo drifts into a reverie of the past in which he recollects 
the announcement of DRC’s independence on June 30, 1960.   
Though Mani Kongo is about to lose his identity and independence, so to speak, 
the history of the DRC is transformed by its new independence from Belgium.  Mani 
Kongo narrates the flashback of events represented as black-and-white archival footage 
in the film.  An unnamed man, who seems to be of Congolese origin, jumps from the 
crowd of onlookers into the streets upon which King Baudouin and his parade pass.  
Wielding what appear to be wooden sticks in each hand, symbolizing the sword of which 
Mani Kongo speaks, a man from the crowd runs onto the street and screams:  
Unnamed Man:  “Independence!”    
Mani Kongo:      “Another king almost lost his sword.  June 30, 1960.  King  
    Baudouin announced the independence of the Congo.  A man        
    tried to steal his sword.  I cannot forget the scene.”   
Belgian police:   “Freeze!  Hands up! 
 Unnamed man:  “Independence, complete freedom.  Long live the free Congo.”   
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The Congolese nationalist who jumps out from the crowd into the street reminds the 
audience that the relationship between the Congo and Belgium was a violent one, in 
which Belgium used vicious mechanisms to control and rule the Congo.  Therefore, in 
Pièces d'Identités “Europe is represented by a group of recrudescent white mercenaries 
and freebooters who meet at the Katanga Bar to reminisce about the good old days of 
colonial exploitation” (California Newsreel n.d.). 
A brief account of the Congo’s history offered in the first chapter helps 
contextualize Ngangura’s representation of Jefke, a Belgian police inspector in Brussels, 
who once lived in the former Belgian Congo as a colonial administrator.  In Pièces 
d'Identités, Jefke represents the former colonialist haunted by his past.  Furthermore, he is 
portrayed as a troubled character with unresolved issues, especially due to his desire for 
African women.  In particular, the film suggests that Jefke’s unresolved issues are 
connected to his affair with a Congolese woman, Anastasia, when he was a colonial 
administrator in the Belgian Congo: 
 Jefke:      “Anastasia told me she was pregnant, but I didn’t believe her.” 
 Unnamed man:  “You’ll see her again someday, your Negress.”       
 
Pièces d'Identités does not explicitly state the reason for the breakup of the relationship, 
but the film does explain the historical circumstances under which all Belgian civilians 
and the Belgian army were quickly removed from the Congo.  Therefore, due to 
perceived political and cultural differences, Jefke could not be with Anastasia because of 
his status as a “white” Belgian colonial administrator and her status as a “black” 
Congolese citizen.   
The implied affection for Anastasia prevents Jefke from being represented as 
merely a one-dimensional colonialist.  However, Jefke’s tough character and troubled 
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emotions overpower his sensitivity.  Overall, Jefke remains a rough-edged, primitive 
“white” character with a drinking problem.  In fact, “Jefke continues to harass Africans 
politically and sexually in Matongue, the Congolese district of Brussels. The film is 
unflinching in showing the daily indignities Africans face at the hands of racist police and 
ordinary citizens” (California Newsreel n.d.).   
Jefke, and the drunken ex-colonialists in Le Katanga bar, are represented in stark 
contrast to Mani Kongo, the King of the Bakongo, who is dignified and refined.  This 
comparison, likewise, suggests a reversal of stereotypical roles perpetuated by colonial 
cinema and early Hollywood safari melodramas in which “white” colonialists were 
portrayed as heroes and native “black” Africans as primitive savages (Barlet 2000: 5; 
Ukadike 1994: 41). 
The Afrikaner in Fools (Ramadan Suleman 1997; South Africa/France) 
The representation of the Afrikaner towards the end of Fools is a reflection upon 
apartheid relationships between “black” and “white” South Africans, particularly within 
male South African society.  Of particular relevance, though the specific cause has not 
been identified, it has been found that violence is typically a “male phenomenon” 
(http://faculty.ncwc.edu/toconnor/psy/psylect08.htm).  The portrayal of the unnamed 
Afrikaner is important because such a depiction reflects the association of Afrikaner 
culture with apartheid (L’Ange 2005: 501-502) and the underlying hostility of the 
Afrikaner as an agent of oppression.  Significantly, the Afrikaner is among one of the few 
“white” characters who enters the “black” township of Charterston portrayed in Fools. 
The “white” characters that do interact with the township represent the controlling 
mechanisms of apartheid:  the school inspector, policemen, and the Afrikaner all in some 
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way control or try to control the “black” South Africans in the township (Magogodi 2003: 
188).   
While driving by the Charterston township on Dingaan’s Day, also known as the 
Battle of Blood River, a historically decisive battle between the Boers and the Zulu, the 
Afrikaner becomes infuriated when the headmaster of the school—aiming for Zani—
accidentally throws a stone at his car while driving by.  The unnamed Afrikaner angrily 
steps out of his car, walks to the trunk, and conveniently removes a sjambok, a leather 
whip typically associated with colonial oppression and the lashing of slaves.  While 
confronting the headmaster for his “transgression,” the Afrikaner holds the sjambok 
across his chest as a symbol of power and a warning of impending physical punishment: 
Afrikaner:  “And who are you to discipline others?  What do you people know  
       about order, tell me?!” 
 
The Afrikaner gives the headmaster a warning and then turns to walk back to his car, but 
he sees Zani across the street and becomes angry again.  As quoted in the film’s sub-
titles, the Afrikaner exclaims:   
 Afrikaner:  “You, black asshole!” 
 Zani:  “What?  Black asshole!  Fuck off!”   
 
After Zani returns the insult, the Afrikaner becomes infuriated and starts chasing Zani 
around the car.   
The Afrikaner eventually chases Zani into the stadium area where the township is 
holding the Dingaan’s Day picnic.  While pursuing Zani, the township crowd disperses in 
fear, but Professor Zamani remains standing in his spot and thereby catches the 
Afrikaner’s attention.  Yet again, the Afrikaner attempts to wield his power with verbal 
abuse and threats: 
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Afrikaner:  “And you, why are you not running…hey?  What’s your  
        problem…huh?  Talk to me. blinking eyes.  What are you doing  
        here?  Why don’t you run into the trees where you belong… huh?   
        You deaf?  I’ll open your bloody ears!”     
In all of the Afrikaner’s spoken engagements, first with the headmaster, then with Zani, 
and lastly with Professor Zamani, he resorts to some form of verbal, racist abuse.  
Memmi notes that racism is an intricate part of colonialism and one of the “highest 
expression[s] of the colonial system” in which a “fundamental discrimination is 
established between colonizer and colonized” (Memmi 1965: 74).  The Afrikaner 
attempts to demean the headmaster, Zani, and Professor Zamani with pejorative name-
calling to establish himself as a superior authority figure, but out of fear, only the 
headmaster submits to the Afrikaner’s racist vehemence.  Memmi explains that “if [the 
colonizer] is more rude, he will say that the colonized is an ape.  The shrewder the ape, 
the better he imitates, and the more the colonizer becomes irritated” (Memmi 1965: 124).  
As can be interpreted from the Afrikaner’s reaction to Zani and Professor Zamani, the 
Afrikaner does indeed become increasingly aggressive and rude, and eventually implies 
that Professor Zamani should “run into the trees" like some sort of animal.   
Needless to say, the Afrikaner’s expression of verbal anger eventually turns into 
physical violence.  The Afrikaner unleashes his rage upon Professor Zamani because he 
refuses to move from his spot and allows the Afrikaner to beat him with the sjambok.  
This moment highlights the psychological implications of colonialism in which fear of 
the “other” perpetuates violence:  “Violence is initiated by those who oppress, who 
exploit, who fail to recognize others as persons…” (Freire 1993: 37).  The character of 
Professor Zamani and the emotional implications of this violence will be discussed in 
further depth towards the end of the chapter.   
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After the Afrikaner repeatedly lashes Professor Zamani with the whip, the 
Afrikaner is brought down to his knees.  Instead of gaining power from his aggressive 
actions, the Afrikaner is reversely disempowered since his power is derived only from the 
lack of power of the “colonized”:     
“As the oppressors dehumanize others and violate their rights, they themselves 
also become dehumanized” (Freire 1993: 38).   
 
Realizing he is outnumbered and lacks real authority, the unnamed Afrikaner breaks 
down, falls on his knees, and goes mad with hate: 
Afrikaner:  “Don’t laugh at me.  Don’t laugh at me, you bastard.  I hate you.  I  
        hate you.  I hate you.”  
 
John Schafer and Joe Navarro suggest that hate can be divided into rational or irrational 
categories (Schafer& Navarro 2003).  Schafer and Navarro note that to hate a person 
because of race or ethnicity, for instance, constitutes an irrational hate (Schafer & 
Navarro 2003).  Though it could be argued that no feeling of hate is ever rational, “both 
rational and irrational hate mask personal insecurities.  Everyone experiences personal 
insecurities in varying degrees throughout their lives.  The more insecure a person feels, 
the larger the hate mask” (Schafer & Navarro 2003).  Thus, though the Afrikaner 
expresses hate, he also communicates insecurity in the form of racism:  “All racism and 
all xenophobia consist of delusions about oneself, including absurd and unjust 
aggressions toward others” (Memmi 1965: 130).  As Memmi proposes, “oppression is the 
greatest calamity of humanity.  It diverts and pollutes the best energies of man—of 
oppressed and oppressor alike.  For if colonization destroyed the colonized, it also rots 
the colonizer” (Memmi 1965: xvii).   
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Therefore, when the Afrikaner falls down to his knees, though he is expressing 
hate, he is finally at a lower level, so to speak, and no longer in a high and superior 
position.  The Afrikaner finally realizes the contradictions of his situation and the roots of 
his anger, which are not linked to Professor Zamani’s inferiority, but the Afrikaner’s own 
worth:    
“[The colonizer] is fed up with his subject, who tortures his conscience and his 
life.  He tries to dismiss him from his mind, to imagine the colony without the 
colonized.  A witticism which is more serious than it sounds states that 
‘Everything would be perfect…if it weren’t for that natives.’  But the colonialist 
realizes that without the colonized, the colony would no longer have meaning.  
This intolerable contradiction fills him with a rage, a loathing, always ready to be 
loosed on the colonized, the innocent yet inevitable reason for his drama…” 
(Memmi 1965: 67). 
 
In the last scene, the Afrikaner is confronted with a portrait of the colonizer and the 
colonized.  The Afrikaner’s last words interestingly reveal underlying insecurities 
expressed as hate and aggression toward the “black” South Africans in the township.   
The Afrikaner’s underlying insecurity is a symptom of the contradictions of the colonial 
system:         
“Constantly confronted with this image of himself, set forth and imposed on all 
institutions and in every human contact, how could the colonized help reacting to 
his portrait?  It cannot leave him indifferent and remain a veneer which, like an 
insult, blows with the wind.  He ends up recognizing it as one would a detested 
nickname which has become a familiar description.  The accusation disturbs him 
and worries him even more because he admires and fears his powerful accuser” 
(Memmi 1965: 87).    
 
Ironically, the underlying vulnerability of the oppressor’s psyche and the portrait the 
Afrikaner seems of himself is at the root of the violence revealed in this scene.  As the 
Afrikaner repetitively emphasizes, “I hate you,” his final words echo the common 
sentiment of hate that is never articulated as a justification for apartheid yet nonetheless 
felt by the apartheid regime and its supporters as a generic, hollow emotion projected 
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onto “black” South African populations because of perceived differences that threaten 
“white” South African society: 
“One of the more interesting attributes of hate crime is the role of uncertainty, 
what researchers call the ‘actuarial’ dimension. For the perpetrator, it doesn't 
matter what specific race or nationality the victim is, only that they're different or 
a stranger.  It's the absence of information, the uncertainty about the social status 
of the victim that is important. There is also some kind of actuarial or accounting-
like thinking going on in the perpetrator's mind. The victim is seen as ‘the last 
straw’ in a long-imagined count of many insults, economic defeats, or lost 
opportunities the perpetrator (and his or her social group) have had. The manner 
and methods used in the violent attack usually tell whether the crime was 
expressive (satisfying for the perpetrator) or instrumental (to teach ‘those people’ 
a lesson)” (http://faculty.ncwc.edu/toconnor/psy/psylect08.htm). 
 
The Afrikaner is not simply an individual character in Fools; he also represents the 
overall aggression of most “white” South Africans toward “black” South Africans during 
apartheid.  Thus, the “you” the Afrikaner addresses is not only Zani, but the Afrikaner 
projects hate towards him since Zani happens to be the “last-straw” in a long series of 
supposed insults by general “black” South African society.    
French Bureaucrats and Neo-Colonialism in Xala (Senegal 1975) 
 
In Xala (Senegal 1975), set in post-independent Senegal during the 1970s, the 
silent French bureaucrats serve as official representatives of France: 
“If the advisor is deferential, this deference conceals his effective power as a 
representative of the French government which dominates newly independent 
Senegal, a small and desperately poor country, which accepted dependence on 
economic and technical assistance and even welcomed a French garrison” (Gugler 
2003: 132). 
 
The presence of the “white” French bureaucrats throughout the film is an important 
reminder that though the French may have been removed politically after the 
independence of Senegal in 1960, the French government uses its economic resources to 
control the country: 
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“It happens that the French-speaking African countries are even more heavily 
dependent on outside help than most other underdeveloped territories, and that—
again, with the sole exception of Guinea—French economic and technical aid 
continued without a break and undiminished after independence” (Crozier 1964:  
74). 
 
Brian Crozier writes that French economic aid was motivated by three main historical 
forces:  General de Gaulle and the Ministry of Cultures; the need to provide an attractive 
financial and economic framework for French companies operating in Africa; and the 
desire to maintain trade relations with Africa (1964: 76).  Ania Loomba argues that “the 
economic relations of dependency and control ensure both captive labour as well as 
markets for European industry as well as goods” (Loomba 2005: 11).   
The French bureaucrats in Xala are not merely the remnants of an old colonial 
system but the symbol of a reincarnation of power in the form of neo-colonialism.  
Robert Young provides a well-articulated definition of neo-colonialism as a “continuing 
economic hegemony that means that the postcolonial state remains in a situation of 
dependence on its former masters, and that the former masters continue to act in a 
colonialist manner towards formerly colonized states” (Young 2001: 45).  Thus, directly 
after so-called independence, neo-colonialism emerged as a subversive effort “to attain 
the same aims of exploitation as the old colonialism, using new methods which outwardly 
appear to be more in line with the spirit of the age.  In this domain, military pacts are 
directed more against internal fronts of nations seeking to free themselves…than against 
foreign aggression.  In the same way aid and trade were used as a veil to dominate the 
resources of nations and exhaust them to the benefit of the exploiters.  The policy of 
economic and monopoly blocs was equally directed towards this end” (Crozier 1964: 21).   
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Neo-colonialism is suggested from the very beginning sequence of Xala in which 
briefcases full of money are handed to the new bourgeois elite of the Senegalese 
Chamber of Commerce in exchange for what appears to be political compliance and 
cooperation.  The installation of puppet governments is a standard feature of neo-
colonialist practices (1964: 21).  Thus, the director of Xala, Ousmane Sembene, presents 
a negative image of Senegalese independence and French bureaucracy: 
“The Curse [Xala] is very much a critique of this ‘kleptocracy’ and its subsequent 
consequences for the whole Senegalese society.  Sembene constructs his critique 
by creating a typical character, El Hadji Abdoukader Beye, whose function is to 
embody neocolonial Africa” (Petty 1996: 69).   
 
Ironically, to produce Xala, Sembene had to rely on French funding (Harrow 1999: xvi).  
In 1973, Xala was one of the first films to be sponsored by the Société de Cinéma (SNC), 
a film division within the Ministry of Culture (Diawara 1992: 61).  Therefore, Xala 
serves as an example of a self-aware critique of the contradictory nature of neo-colonial 
Senegal during the early 1970s. 
 
EMULATING THE COLONIZER 
 
The Headmaster in Fools 
 
The film Fools suggests that the character of the headmaster, while racially 
“black,” is not culturally African in the same way as Professor Zamani.  Unlike Professor 
Zamani, it is the headmaster who represents the archetypal “Uncle Tom” figure that bows 
down to authority and regulations of the apartheid regime.  Paulo Freire proposes that the 
act of internalizing the image and behavior of the oppressor is due to a fear of freedom:   
“The oppressed, having internalized the image of the oppressor and adopted his 
guidelines, are fearful of freedom.  Freedom would require them to eject this 
image and replace it with autonomy and responsibility” (Freire 1993: 29).   
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For instance, the headmaster prefers to speak Afrikaans—the so-called language of 
apartheid (L’Ange 2005: 501-502).  Secondly, the headmaster is portrayed as a puppet 
for the apartheid regime in order to indoctrinate members of the township through its 
schools.  Mokubung Nkomo sheds light on the use of education as a way to politically 
oppress  non-“white” South African society by the creation of segregated schooling 
during apartheid:       
“In the education domain, segregated and inferior schooling was legislated for 
Africans (1953), coloreds (1963) and Indians (1965) providing an ideological 
cornerstone for the social segregation, economic exploitation and political 
oppression of these groups, calibrated according to their location on the racially 
hierarchical social system” (Nkomo 1990: 1).   
 
Thus, to be more specific, education was seen as an instrument to socially control all 
oppressed groups such as “black” Africans, coloreds, and Asian/Indians and to ensure the 
domination of such groups (1990: 1).   
In one revealing scene, school has just begun and the headmaster initiates what 
appears to be the daily morning ritual in the township school—to sing the national 
anthem during apartheid,“Die Stem van Suid-Afrika” (The Voice of South Africa) in 
Afrikaans.  The “Die Stem” anthem was a powerful ideological tool representing one of 
apartheid’s educational aims to “socialize black students so that they [could] accept the 
social relations of apartheid as natural” (Nkomo 1990: 2).  After the formal end of 
apartheid, a new anthem was established in 1997, which incorporated “Nkosi Sikelel’ 
iAfrica” (God Bless Africa), the African National Congress’ anthem since 1925, and “Die 
Stem van Suid-Afrika.”  Employing Xhosa in the first stanza, Zulu in the first stanza and 
last two lines, Sesotho in the second stanza, Afrikaans in the third stanza, and English in 
the final stanza, South Africa’s current national anthem is the only anthem in the world 
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that begins in one language and ends in another.  Andrew Worsdale, who has interviewed 
Director Ramadan Suleman about this scene, comments on Suleman’s use of “Die Stem” 
in Fools:        
“In one scene an assembled school throng sings Die Stem as Mabaso waves them 
on.  In this so-called ‘black’ movie there's no Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrica.  Suleman is 
ardent about his use of the one-time national anthem and the sakkie-sakkie 
sequence.  [Worsdale quotes Suleman as saying:]  ‘Why no Nkosi Sikelele?  It's 
like saying it's a western and has to have the right ingredients.  I think using that 
is like the film-maker looking for a PC pat on the back,’ Suleman says.  ‘The use 
of Die Stem, as much as it may appear a mockery, is actually part of the ingrained 
seriousness of the time,’ as Suleman says, ‘it was really a life and death thing’ 
(Worsdale 1998). 
 
After the singing of the anthem, the “white” school inspector gives the 
headmaster a gift, which we later find out is a framed color photograph of the 1989 
president of South Africa, Pieter Willem Botha, a long-time supporter of South Africa's 
National Party and a firm advocate of “racial” segregation and the apartheid system 
(L’Ange 2005: 348, 372).  In a manner of devotion, the headmaster proudly hangs the 
picture of Botha next to the long row of other famous “white” South African “heroes” 
lining his wall:      
“The memory which is assigned to him is certainly not that of his people.  The 
history which is taught to him is not his own. He knows who Colbert or Cromwell 
was, but he learns nothing about Khazanadar; he knows about Joan of Arc, but not 
about El Kahena.  Everything seems to have taken place out of his country.  He 
and his land are nonentities or exist only with reference to the Gauls, the Franks 
or the Marne.  In other words, in reference to what he is not…” (Memmi 1965: 
105). 
 
In this way, the headmaster reveres the colonizer’s history over his own as the colonized.  
By hanging up the picture of Botha, the headmaster accepts the practices of apartheid.  
Through this act of admiration for the colonizer, “one can infer approval of colonization” 
(Memmi 1965: 121) from Botha’s behavior.   
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In another expression of acceptance for the apartheid situation, the headmaster 
continually reprimands Zani, a young political activist, for “defiant” behavior and protest 
against the apartheid regime.  In particular, after Zani’s attempt to boycott the township 
school’s celebration of the Battle of Blood River, the headmaster vehemently comments:    
Headmaster:  “I’m going to teach you that this isn’t Soweto.” 
The headmaster suggests that there is no room for insurgency in the township against 
apartheid, and that such insurgency in a way is an “insult.”  Josef Gugler contextualizes 
what came to be known as the “Soweto Uprising” in apartheid South Africa’s history:   
“The Soweto Uprising strengthened the opposition in three major ways.  The 
ANC was able to emerge from the underground and re-establish a public presence 
in the African townships.  Large numbers of students went into exile, and many 
joined the ANC’s military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) or Spear of the 
Nation.  And foreign opinion turned increasingly against the apartheid regime” 
(Gugler 2003: 68). 
 
Though as many as 575 people were killed (2003:68), the Soweto Uprising helped 
advance the cause of the liberation struggle and challenge the hegemony of the apartheid 
state.    
The headmaster’s behavior and complaisance, of course, is a social product of the 
system of apartheid.  Though written in a different context, the headmaster’s subservient 
mentality is clarified by Memmi’s observation of the colonized, specifically under French 
oppression:  “As long as [the colonized] tolerates colonization, the only possible 
alternatives for the colonized are assimilation or petrification” (Memmi 1965: 102).  In 
order to survive, so to speak, as a “black” South African during this critical time in South 
Africa’s history, the film suggests that assimilating into the Afrikaans culture helps the 
headmaster “fit in” or “belong.”   
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Memmi’s analysis of the French colonial situation further states that “the first 
ambition of the colonized is to become equal to that splendid model [of the colonizer] 
and to resemble him to the point of disappearing in him” (Memmi 1965: 120).  Therefore, 
in an attempt to fit into Afrikaans culture, the headmaster “hides his past, his traditions, in 
fact all his origins which have become ignominious” (1965: 122).  Commenting later 
upon the same phenomena of conformity amongst the colonized, Freire’s further clarifies 
the headmaster’s behavior by suggesting that the oppressed “prefer the security of 
conformity with their state of unfreedom to the creative communion produced by 
freedom and even the very pursuit of freedom” (Freire 1993: 30).  This is why the 
headmaster is shown proudly singing the “Die Stem” anthem, joyfully hanging up the 
picture of Botha on his office wall, and constantly reprimanding Zani for upsetting the 
so-called order of the status quo.      
Furthermore, the headmaster is a characteristic elite used as a buffer between the 
apartheid regime and “black” South Africans in the township:    
“It is also worth mentioning that, in the region of contact, the relations between 
the colonizers and the colonized are often partially mediated by some third group, 
which is also often considered racially intermediate.  Mulattos and other mixed-
race people often fill this role.  Privileged relative to people of fully indigenous 
ancestry, they can aspire to a higher station than ordinary ‘natives’ and can be 
used by colonizers as a sort of buffer.  Indeed, the mixed-character who strives to 
be white and who collaborates with the colonizer is a common figure in much 
postcolonization literature” (Hogan 2000: 5). 
 
Though such groups are typically “racially” intermediate, for example, “coloured” to use 
the historical apartheid classificatory term for non-black, non-white South Africans 
(Scheper-Hughes 2001), or “mulatto,” a term generally describing a person of mixed 
European and African descent (Pizarro-Eckert 2006), Fools proves that collaborators 
with the colonizers are not always from a “mixed” “racial” group but may also be 
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“black.”  Such is also the case with the character of El Hadji, a Western-educated “black” 
elite in Xala.  Thus, the colonized and the colonizer are linked by an “implacable 
dependence,” which dictates their behavior (Memmi 1965: ix).      
However, even though the headmaster has bureaucratic power within the school 
and strives to be a good apartheid citizen, his real powerlessness is revealed at the end 
when he cowardly begs the Afrikaner to forgive him and repeatedly addresses the 
Afrikaner as “master”:    
Headmaster:  “Oh my master, I owe you an apology.”   
Afrikaner:      “An old man like you, a stone thrower?  Have you people got no     
             shame?” 
Headmaster:  “I’m not an agitator, Master.” 
Afrikaner:      “That’s what Mandela says as well.”   
Headmaster:  “Master, I was teaching the boy some discipline.  It was a  
misunderstanding.”   
 
Up until this point in the film, the headmaster had served as an authority figure 
exemplified by his constant criticism of Professor Zamani and his maintenance of 
supposed social order by attempting to curtail Zani’s protests.  When confronted with the 
Afrikaner, an agent of oppression, however, instead of being an authority figure, the true 
colonial situation of the headmaster’s powerlessness is revealed.  The headmaster then 
resorts to self-depreciation, shame, and humility to pacify the Afrikaner.  Self-
depreciation represents the internalization of the negative opinions the colonizer holds of 
the colonized.  Because the colonized often hears “that they are good for nothing, know 
nothing and are incapable of learning anything—that they are sick, lazy, and 
unproductive—that in the end they become convinced of their own unfitness” (Freire 
1993: 45).  Therefore, through this act of self-depreciation, the headmaster rejects his 
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self-worth:  “Love of the colonizer is subtended by a complex of feelings ranging from 
shame to self-hate” (Memmi 1965: 121).   
No matter how assimilated into Afrikaans culture the headmaster appears to be, 
nor how obedient he is to apartheid regulations, the headmaster’s “racial” identity, as 
classified by apartheid legislation (Scheper-Hughes 2001), and economic disadvantage 
(Memmi 1965: xii), prevent him from ever having power and a privileged social status 
under the system of apartheid.  Thus, the colonized realizes that “he can never attain the 
whiteness he has been taught to desire, or shed the blackness he has learnt to devalue” 
(Loomba 2005: 148).  Authentic assimilation, therefore, is ultimately refused to the 
colonized despite his or her attempts (Memmi 1965: 102): 
“All that the colonized has done to emulate the colonizer has met with disdain 
from the colonial masters.  They explain to the colonized that those efforts are in 
vain, that he only acquires thereby an additional trait, that of being ridiculous.  He 
can never succeed in becoming identified with the colonizer, nor even in copying 
his role correctly” (1965: 124).   
 
As an observer of the headmaster’s devoted behavior at the beginning of the film, his 
submissive confrontation to the Afrikaner is undoubtedly humiliating.  Though the 
headmaster may be perceived as a sort of “bad guy” at first, his social rejection at the end 
of the film, especially in contrast to his sincere devotion to Afrikaan’s culture and 
political obedience, is a poignant expression of the contradictions of former apartheid 
South Africa.      
 
DISCOURSES ON POWER AND MORAL BEHAVIOR 
 
“White” Behavior as a Power Discourse in Une couleur café (France 1997) 
 
Just like ideas about “blackness” are not limited to simple racial definitions, films 
such as Une couleur café comically point out that opinions about “whiteness” are linked 
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to views on what certain “black” African characters believe are imperialistic, dominating, 
and controlling forms of behavior.  For instance, in Une couleur café, Awa, Doc’s first 
wife, scolds Doc and tells him to stop acting like a “white” boss.  Alluding to colonial 
stereotypes associated with “white” dominance and power, Awa categorizes such 
behavior as being specific to “whiteness.”   
Doc also consistently complains that since his second and younger wife, Kada, 
has moved from her rural village in the Ivory Coast to Paris, she has become too “white”:   
Doc:  “Look at Kada.  She’s white now.  She’s even lost her accent.  And Awa  
copies everything she does.” 
 
In a later scene before Doc, Awa, and Kada arrive at Fatim’s house for a small gathering, 
Kada suggests that Doc bring gifts to Fatim’s house to be polite.  Doc vehemently replies, 
“Your white woman behavior annoys me!”  What a Western audience may perceive as 
Kada’s liberation and feminist consciousness, Doc insists is “white” behavior that is 
subversive to his interpretation of “men’s rights” and definitions of manhood.  In all of 
these examples, “whiteness” is linked with the expression of power; implicitly, therefore, 
as Doc sees it, the more authoritative and superior-like qualities that Kada and Awa 
assume, the closer they come to adopting cultural “whiteness.”  Ironically, though Doc 
encourages Maria when she embraces elements of African identity, Doc denounces his 
first wife, Awa, and second wife, Kada for what he deems “white” behavior.  In Chapter 
4, it is suggested that instead of seeing such behavior as simply “white” behavior, a more 
objective evaluation points to the effects of Westernization, urbanization, education, and 
modernization as the main sources of Awa, and in particular, Kada’s attitudes.   
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“White” and “Black” as Moral Compasses in Pièces d'Identités 
 After being tricked by Viva-wa-Viva, a petty thug who escorts the unsuspecting 
Mani Kongo, King of Bakongo, to a prostitute where his wallet is stolen, Mani Kongo 
solemnly departs and muses to himself in while walking down an empty street at night in 
Brussels:     
Mani Kongo:  “Mani Kongo, son of Mani Kongo and grandson of Mani Kongo.   
All descendants of the great and invincible Kongomani.  Your clan 
has never harmed anyone, but the one who insults you will die 
with no descendants.  His barns will be struck by lightning.  I have 
spoken!  All are evil.  All are white.  All are black.  King Mani 
Kongo sees whites blacker than the blackest of black.” 
 
In this scene, Mani Kongo introduces a profound and complicated discussion of “white” 
and “black,” not defined by either racial or cultural discourses discussed in Chapter 1 
(Arnfred 2004: 18; Bonnett 1997: 175, 177, 181; Scheper-Hughes 2001; Young 1995: 
35), but delineated in moral terms.   
Similar to the significance of the color white in Herman Melville’s Moby Dick 
(1851), Mani Kongo suggests that unlike the practice of nineteenth century thinking, 
which distinguished “white” races as superior and “black” races as inferior (Young 1995: 
7, 35, 94), “white” and “black” are equal measurements of a moral aptitude shared by all 
of humanity regardless of racial background.  Even if one is not entirely familiar with 
Moby Dick, Melville’s discussion of the whiteness of the whale throughout the book 
helps clarify Mani Kongo’s perception of evil in terms of “black” and “white.”  
According to Jeffrey Downard’s analysis of Moby Dick, “the color white simultaneously 
stands for what is most noble and pure, and at the same time also stands for what is most 
deadly that is the source of the special terror that Ishmael claims to experience when 
confronted with Moby Dick” (Downard 2006).   
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The same double meaning of “whiteness” is relevant to Mani Kongo’s perception 
of evil.  Though “white” is typically associated with peace and purity (Kohl 1998), and 
the color black is equated with evil “because of the medieval and religious associations of 
blackness with filth and dirt” (Loomba 2005: 64), since “the color white is, at one and the 
same time, both the lack of all color and the concrete manifestation of all colors” 
(Downard 2006), it is related, so to speak, to the color “black.”  Downard also writes that 
natural philosophers such as John Locke and Immanuel Kant propose that “all colors are 
merely properties that are laid onto the objects of our experience as they appear to us in 
perception.  Consequently, all colors are but ‘deceits’ and ‘all deified Nature absolutely 
paints like the harlot’” (2006).  In Mani Kongo’s monologue, though good and evil may 
have been historically perceived in metaphors associated with the colors “black” and 
“white”, above all, morality is a unified whole defined by universal laws:  No man or 
woman, whether or racially “black” or “white,” can escape moral responsibility.  It is 
“moral humanity that is the root of our nobility” (Downard 2006) and not one’s race.  
The importance of moral unity is supported by the categorical imperative defined by 
Kantian philosophy (Kemerling 2001), and the Yin-Yang theory, in which balance and 
harmony are only preserved through the relationship of yin and yang. 
Robbed, homeless and penniless on the streets of Brussels, far away from his 
home in the Congo, Mani Kongo realizes that Belgium is not the “perfect” country he 
remembered from the past:   
Mani Kongo:  “Belgium, such a fascinating place.  The idea of efficiency and  
progress.  The perfect spot for my little Mwana to finish her  
studies.  I couldn’t imagine a better future for her.”   
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Instead, Mani Kongo experiences the true “black” evils—i.e. harm, fear, manipulation—
that occur in Brussels under the guise of “white” Western society.  “Black” and “white” 
may be used to characterize “racial” identities, but Mani Kongo plays with the 
assumptions associated with such “racialized” dichotomies.  Though “white” is typically 
linked to goodness and “black” with evil (Kohl 1998), Mani Kongo suggests that 
everyone is of the same moral color.    
THE REVERSAL OF STEREOTYPES IN AFRICAN CINEMA 
 
Sean Raine in A Reasonable Man 
 
Thus far, we have seen that filmmakers’ representations of “white” characters in 
African film are predominantly critiques of “white” identities that are associated with 
political, social, economic, and cultural power, and more importantly, the abuse of such 
powers.  On the other hand, not all “white” characters are represented negatively in post-
colonial African films.  Unlike the Afrikaner in Fools, Commissioner Jefke in Pièces 
d'Identités, or the French bureaucrats in Xala, Sean Raine in A Reasonable Man (South 
Africa 1999) is a well-developed, humane, culturally sensitive, and empowered character.   
To save his client Sipho, an adolescent herdsman living in the rural area of Kwazulu-
Natal, from accusations of murder, Raine passionately defends Sipho’s cultural 
perceptions against the dominating Western rationalities of “white” South African 
society.  As a lawyer from Johannesburg, Sean Raine assertively challenges the 
Westernized legal system of post-apartheid South Africa to defend the non-Western 
beliefs of Sipho.  Though Sean Raine is unfamiliar with traditional Zulu medicinal 
practices, he visits a sangoma, a traditional healer, for the first time.  The film implies 
that such an experience is unlike Sean’s normal encounters with Western medicine and 
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not a standard “white” South African experience.  Although also an African, the film also 
suggests that his character as a “white” South African, in particular, is somehow 
broadened and transformed by his experience of sangoma practices.  In a certain way, his 
African identity becomes validated by not only this act but also his sincere defense of 
Sipho who mistakenly kills a one-year old baby believing it to be a dwarf-like evil spirit 
known within Zulu mythology as a tikoloshe: 
“It is only in full acceptance of their Africanness that the whites can find self-
realization and security” (L’Ange 2005: 503). 
 
Of course, the A Reasonable Man is written and directed by Gavin Hood, a 
“white” South African who also plays Sean Raine, so this may be taken into 
consideration by outside critics when evaluating the content of the film.  However, as a 
South African, Hood’s perspective is important and equally revealing of “racial” and 
cultural representations in contemporary African film.  Hood also includes critical 
perspectives of his character to downplay Sean’s heroicism and emphasize the inability 
for “white” South Africans to truly escape the guilt of apartheid.  When speaking to Sam 
Linde, the prosecution lawyer, about Sipho’s case, Linde sarcastically questions Sean’s 
absence during the final years of apartheid:   
 Linde:  “How long were you out of the country?” 
 Sean:   “Nine years.”  
 Linde:  “So, you came back to be a part of the new democracy then?”   
 
Sean is also scolded by Sipho’s original defense lawyer, Mrs. Ngwenya, the Legal Aid 
Administrator, for asking why her past cases were lost: 
Mrs. Ngwanya:  “Mr. Raine, I didn’t just crawl out of the bush, I qualified ten  
years before you did.  I was raised an Anglican.  The head of the  
Anglican Church in this country is a black man.” 
 Sean:       “Oh for God’s sake…” 
 Mrs. Ngwanya:  “And if I needed for the sake of the client to understand the  
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details of the Christian faith, I wouldn’t rely on the first white  
person I’ve met.” 
 
Thus, Sean Raine ultimately represents the socially conflicted “new South Africa”— 
democratic yet not completely relieved of its apartheid restrictions, negative associations 
of power and dominance linked to “white” identities, and haunting historical memory.   
The sangoma, Rachel, points out refers to “white” Africans’ guilt in her 
conversation with Sean:   
 Sangoma:  “You think I can help him?” 
 Sean:         “I’d just like you to talk to him.” 
 Sangoma:  “You think he’s cursed?” 
 Sean:         “No.” 
 Sangoma:  “What about you?” 
 Sean:         “What about me?” 
 Sangoma:  “You live in Africa, you are white—you are cursed.”   
 
The sangoma blatantly tells Sean that he is cursed simply because he is “white.”   
Memmi’s analysis of the colonial situation helps explain the sangoma’s comment.  
Memmi argues that “in the eyes of the colonized, all Europeans in the colonies are de 
facto colonizers in some ways.  By their privileged economic position, by belonging to 
the political system of oppression, or by participating in an effectively negative complex 
toward the colonized, they are colonizers” (Memmi 1965: 130).  Even though Sean had 
no direct part in the application of apartheid laws, he is in a privileged position (1965: 
17), and therefore it is not easy for him to “escape mentally from a concrete situation, to 
refuse its ideology while continuing to live with its actual relationships” (1965: 20).  This 
is why the “white” African, deprived of “all coherence and all tranquility” (1965: 20) in 
the face of contradiction, is cursed according to the sangoma’s observation.  Despite the 
curse, she suggests, however, Sean is ultimately a culturally sensitive character and 
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represents optimism for mutual understanding among “black” and “white” South 
Africans.    
Zani and Empowerment in Fools 
 
 The representation of Zani, an 18-year old political activist, proves that despite an 
oppressive system, the “black” Africans in the township can collectively raise their 
voices through protest to question and confront apartheid.  Zani is a prime example of an 
situationally oppressed person who has committed himself to unveil and transform the 
world of the oppressor (Freire 1993: 36).  Freire refers to the educational efforts of the 
oppressed to achieve liberation as the pedagogy of the oppressed (Freire 1993: 36).  Zani 
even lectures Professor Zamani on his powerlessness, which Zani equates with cowardly 
behavior: 
“Zani, a young activist, verbally abused [Zamani], from which we learn that 
Zamani’s sharpness as a young man has been blunted.  Zani calls the likes of 
Zamani ‘masters of avoidance’ who have abandoned the struggle against 
apartheid for drink” (Magogodi 2003: 188).   
 
Unlike Zani’s activism, Professor Zamani’s complaisant behavior merely represents how 
“[the colonized] has forgotten how to participate actively in history and no longer even 
asks to do so.  No matter how briefly colonization may have lasted, all memory of 
freedom seems distant; he forgets what it costs or else he no longer dares to pay the price 
for it” (Memmi 1965: 92-93).   
In an effort to spread the message of “the Struggle,” Zani hands out fliers, 
attempts to speak to Zamani’s class, and boycotts Dingaan’s Day.  In particular, Zani 
directly protests Dingaan’s Day, the annual, countrywide commemoration of the Battle of 
the Blood River in which the Zulu were defeated.  As one part of Zani’s efforts to boycott 
Dingaan’s Day, he asks Professor Zamani to speak in his class.  As Zani’s behavior 
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evidences, “knowledge is an instrument in the struggle either to salvage the 
[children]/student from school domination or to free an oppressed people from a foreign 
transplanted form of schooling that keeps them in perpetual domination and bondage” 
(Eze 2005).  Knowledge is a key factor in the liberating education required to advance the 
pedagogical mission of the oppressed (Freire 1993: 36).  Professor Zamani introduces 
Zani by engaging the class’ participation and discussion of knowledge in a Socratic 
dialogue:     
Zamani:  “Children…this here is Mr. Zani Vutela.  Mr. Vutela has had the  
privilege of reading many, many books.  And anyone who has had the 
privilege of reading many books, what does he have? 
Class:      “He has knowledge and the truth of light.” 
Zamani:  “Hah, he has knowledge and the truth of light.  Now, anyone who has  
     knowledge and the truth of light, what can he do?  Yes, son—” 
Student:  “He can lead his people, sir.”   
Zamani:  “Speak up, son!” 
Student:  “He can lead his people, sir.”  
Zamani:  “He can lead his people.  What can he do?!” 
Class:      “He can lead his people.” 
 
Though Zani passionately attempts to address Professor Zamani’s students in the 
classroom, he also spreads knowledge of the struggle in the township.  Even though the 
security police arrest Zani after Zani tries to spread his message while driving through the 
township with the bottle collector on his donkey cart, Zani returns to his protesting efforts 
the next day.  Thus, as Zani proves, “the colonial condition cannot be adjusted to; like an 
iron collar, it can only be broken” (Memmi 1965: 128), and therefore, it is “always 
through action in depth that the culture of domination is culturally confronted” (Freire 
1993: 36).   
For Zani and many voiceless “black” South Africans living in the township, the 
celebration of the Zulu’s loss perpetuates Afrikaner pride and nationalism at the expense 
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of the inferiority of Zulus.  The celebration of the Zulu’s loss in and of itself is a 
significant action, but the most important problem is that such a “social and historical 
mutilation gives rise to the most serious consequences.  It contributes to bringing out the 
deficiencies in the other aspects of the colonized’s life and, by a countereffect which is 
frequent in human processes, it is itself fed by the colonized’s other infirmities” (Memmi 
1965: 97). 
 
After Zamani finishes introducing Zani to the class, Zani introduces a brief piece of 
information on the historic battle before being interrupted by the headmaster:   
Zani:  “Now, I want to talk to you about the Day of the Covenant.  Now as you  
know from your history books, on the sixteenth of December 1838, there  
was the Battle of the Blood River, where thousands and thousands of our 
people were murdered by the Boers.  Now, this day is called Dingaan’s 
Day, and we are being made to celebrate this day as a day of victory where 
justice was done.” 
 
As Zani clarifies, the celebration of Dingaan’s Day, as forced by the apartheid regime, is 
a one-sided commemoration.  In Zani’s efforts to boycott this battle, Zani communicates 
that “the most serious blow suffered by the colonized is being removed from history and 
from the community” (Memmi 1965: 91).  Therefore, overall Zani represents action and 
initiation, qualities that eventually lead to the dissolution of apartheid by political 
activists. 
 
DISEMPOWERMENT AND RE-EMPOWERMENT 
Professor Zamani 
 
Even though filmmakers have worked aggressively to achieve power over 
production and to promote positive images about “black” African identities, not all 
“black” African narratives deal with positive social issues.  Contemporary films still 
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address issues of power and “race” that continue to affect postcolonial African 
communities.  In Fools, Professor Zamani is a character that represents the “relationship 
between racism and sexism in the process of domination” (Magogodi 2003: 187) that 
arose as a result of apartheid structures of power.  In particular, Professor Zamani is 
portrayed as an emasculated figure that rapes one of his pupils, Mimi, in order to validate 
his own masculinity (Magogodi 2003: 188).  However, “although the film is set in 1989, 
against the background of police suppression of political activities in the township, 
Zamani’s rape does not have political motives; the rape in Fools is political only insofar 
as it shows the consequences of oppression on the powerless Zamani, who can only 
victimize those weaker than himself” (2003:188).  Instead, it is Professor Zamani’s 
temporary sexual impotence that can be conceived in political terms (2003: 190), 
whereby a lack of virility is equated with a lack of political power.   Thus, Professor 
Zamani raped Mimi to oppress her, and thereby regain his masculinity:   
“During the initial stage of the struggle, the oppressed, instead of striving for 
liberation, tend themselves to become oppressors, or ‘sub-oppressors.’  The very 
structure of their thought has been conditioned by the contradictions of the 
concrete, existential situation by which they were shaped.  Their ideal is to be 
men; but for them, to be men is to be oppressors” (Freire 1993: 27).   
  
Professor Zamani’s overall lack of virility is demonstrated when he is not able to 
“perform” with a prostitute whom he solicits in Johannesburg.  The prostitute casually 
replies, “Let’s just blame it on the weather.”  Likewise, Professor Zamani’s emasculation 
is also evidenced by his obedience to “white” authority at school despite his insistence on 
his manhood at home (Magogodi 2003: 194).  In effect, Suleman poses the idea that 
“African nationalism [during the apartheid era] was constructed around masculinity, that 
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the success or failure of a nation depended on its abundance or lack of virility” (2003: 
194).       
Professor Zamani’s chastisement from the community eventually leads him to 
“introspection and consequent rehabilitation” (2003: 188).  In a moment of re-baptism, so 
to speak, Professor Zamani confronts an obviously hateful Afrikaner at Dingaan’s Day.  
The Afrikaner leashes out at the township crowd because he is infuriated when the 
headmaster of the school accidentally throws a stone at his car while driving by.  
Everyone runs away, but Professor Zamani remains standing in the same location.   
In a sort of aloof way, Professor Zamani overcomes his disempowerment and 
guilt from over-powering Mimi through rape by allowing the Afrikaner to beat him.  
Professor Zamani does not bravely defend himself against the Afrikaner, but stands still 
and hysterically laughs in defiance while the Afrikaner whips him with a sjambok.  In 
this moment of confrontation, Professor Zamani’s feelings of inadequacy as a powerless, 
“black” South African are redeemed; he is no longer represented as a stereotypical 
“Uncle Tom” figure nor a perpetrator of violence.    
Thus, in Fools it is significant that Professor Zamani is “black” but only to the 
extent that his “blackness” is linked to disempowered township culture and his lower 
social status due to lack of political, economic, and social power within the context of 
apartheid South Africa.  Given the fact that Fools is a post-apartheid production set in the 
context of a once-lived historical past, Professor Zamani’s empowerment towards the end 
optimistically foreshadows the eventual dissolution of apartheid South Africa in 1994 and 
the rise in power of disenfranchised “black” South Africans. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 The independence of African nations in the 1960s significantly altered 
accompanying cinematic trends among emerging “black” African filmmakers.  From a 
glance at the representation of African identities in later post-colonial cinema, it has been 
shown that filmmakers have not abandoned colonial perceptions of “race.”  Given 
Africa’s colonial past, the “racial” content of contemporary African cinema is relevantly 
portrayed.  Filmmakers may not have abandoned “racialized” discourse, but a sincere 
attempt to counter clichés and re-formulate stereotypes has been undertaken in earnest 
defense of “black” African identities.  In some films, the colonial mentality persists, as 
evidenced by the examples of Judge Wendon in A Reasonable Man, Jefke in Pièces 
d'Identités, and the Afrikaner in Fools, but in other cases, stereotypes are overturned by 
representations of empowered “black” and culturally sensitive “white” African characters 
such as Zani in Fools and Sean Raine in A Reasonable Man.  However, perhaps even this 
approach may be considered problematic since the reversal of old stereotypes simply 
perpetuates new ones.   
The question that may be asked in regards to African cinema, therefore, is not 
when “racial” boundaries will be completely abandoned in the construction of African 
identities, but how they will be surpassed.  In general, the main treatment of African 
identities in the films discussed by this paper is not based on only “racial” definitions but 
cultural differences as well.  Such cultural differences will be highlighted in the 
upcoming chapters.   
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3 Understanding Tradition, Modernization, and 
Westernization Processes in African Societies 
 
As an audience concerned with understanding the multiple dimensions of African 
cinema, it is important to identify relevant contemporary issues, especially as such topics 
pertain to and influence film narratives, dialogue, and character psychology.  To 
understand the diverse range of cultural experiences among African societies, this chapter 
will define several fundamental concepts linked to the development of contemporary 
African identities—tradition, modernity, modernization, “the West,” and Westernization.  
Filmmakers’ attitudes toward the role of traditions, the process of modernization, and the 
effects of Westernization in African societies contribute to multi-layered constructions of 
social situations and characterizations of African identities in A Reasonable Man, Chikin 
Biznis:  The Whole Story, Fools, Hyènes, Pièces d'Identités, Une couleur café, and Xala.  
These films reveal how filmmakers believe the processes of modernization and 
Westernization have affected rural and urban communities in Africa and thereby altered 
conditions for the development of traditional African values and identities. 
The following list is a set of common traditional structures and values within 
African societies as depicted in the previously mentioned films:  language, traditional 
medicine, patriarchy and masculinity, polygamy, and traditional religion.  The breakdown 
of discourse on tradition will be aided by an exploration of tradition dynamics such as 
historical accident and internal innovations (Vansina 1990: 191-196).  The dynamics of 
tradition will be examined to help explain political, social, and economic influences that 
impact the survival of traditions in African societies.  
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MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT TRADITION  
For the purpose of this paper, a discussion of African traditions will be presented, 
but it should be clarified that “traditions are historical phenomena which occur 
everywhere” (Vansina 1990: 257) and are not just specific to African cultures.  All 
traditions, though specific to a particular culture also maintain universal characteristics, 
“goals that can be said to be shared by all human beings irrespective of their cultures and 
nationalities, and with social and cultural experiences and problems some of which may, 
in some sense, be said to be peculiar to the African people” (Gyekye 1997: 33).       
The debate on the meaning of tradition in Africa, which is in no way a 
straightforward matter, begins with binary divisions typically distinguished as a conflict 
of “past versus present,” “continuity versus change,” “tradition versus modernity,” or 
quite simply, a clash between the “old and new” (Boughedir 2000: 112; Bhabha 2004: 
35; Friedman 1994: 214; Gyekye 1997: xi, 217-218; Vansina 1990: 7).  Melissa 
Thackway, in particular, writes:  “What has commonly been referred to as ‘traditional’ 
African culture in the past has generally been understood in opposition to ‘modern’ 
culture” (Thackway 2003: 50).  Binary divisions such as “tradition” and “modernity” 
suggest that in order to survive traditions must be isolated and removed from cultural 
evolution.  Kwame Gyekye indicates that a polarity between tradition and modernity 
“derives from a different sense given to the notion of the traditional—depicted by 
sociologists and anthropologists as rural, agrarian, prescientific, resistant to change and 
innovation, and bound by the perception of the past.  By contrast, the modern is 
characterized as scientific, innovate, future oriented, culturally dynamic, and industrial 
and urbanized” (Gyekye 1997: 217).   
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The concept of tradition, according to this line of reasoning by anthropologists 
and sociologists, suggests a certain perspective on temporality and technological 
progress:  Traditions belong to the past and cannot exist in the future while progress can 
only exist in the future or the modernization of the past (Gyekye 1997: 217).  Jean-Marie 
Makang, however, points out that binding tradition to the past and excluding it from the 
present process of modernization is an inaccurate observation of traditions:   
“human traditions [are] processes and ‘historical phenomena which occur 
everywhere’ and in all stages of societies’ development.  Traditions are not frozen 
in time, but are in continual development, adapting themselves to new historical 
circumstances” (Makang 1997: 325).   
 
Gyekye qualifies Makang’s statement by adding that the “dichotomy between tradition 
and modernity cannot be well founded because there are many traditional elements 
inherited, cherished, and maintained by modernity” (Gyekye 1997: xi).  Traditions are 
not fixed in the past nor separated from processes of change:  “Elements of so-called 
‘traditional’ culture are also still very much alive today, whether in their ‘original’ or 
updated forms and are not simply relics of an unchanging past” (Thackway 2003: 50).  
Instead, traditions are “fundamental continuities which shape the futures” (Vansina 1990: 
258) based on their ability to adapt to new historical circumstances such as modernization 
and Westernization.       
These opposites go hand in hand with other binary associations such as 
tradition/rural and modern/urban.  This idea is supported by James Ferguson who states 
that rural space is viewed “as the locus of tradition and continuity with the past” 
(Ferguson 1997: 137).  However, Josef Gugler labels such a view as an “urban-bias” 
grounded in “modernization theory” (Gugler 2003: 158).  Urbanization will be discussed 
in further detail when modernization is addressed, but it is important to explore the 
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assumptions underlying the relationship between the traditional/rural and the 
modern/urban dichotomies offered by Gyekye and Gugler.   
African policy makers describe the “urban-bias” approach as the “favoring of the 
urban over the rural sector” (Gugler 2003: 162).  According to the “urban-bias” theory, 
resources have been disproportionately allocated to cities, especially capitals, leading to 
rural-urban migration by peasants seeking “greater economic rewards, better educational 
opportunities, and a modicum of medical facilities” (2003: 158).  This “urban-bias” has 
lead to the negative portrayal of rural dwellers:  
“Derogatory images of town life and townsfolk are usually balanced by contrary 
images in which cities are perceived as the centers of development and change.  
In terms of this image the countryman is the ignorant and the backward yokel as 
against the urbane and progressive townsman.  The countryman is thus morally 
upright but unprogressive, the townsman is degenerate but an agent of change and 
development.” (Mitchell 1987: 102) 
 
Thus, urban space is associated with not only modernization and industrialization but also 
a particular moral compass—in the city, development and progress justify “urban moral 
decay” (Ferguson 1997: 141).  Rural space, on the other hand, though associated with 
moral respect—“authenticity, virtue, and connectedness” (1997: 141)—is limited to non-
development and a lack of progress, and therefore ultimately considered unfavorable in 
this view of tradition/rural and modern/urban dichotomies.   
The “urban-bias” may be a legitimate phenomenon, which impacts rural-urban 
migration patterns, but the reality of African cultural values in the city is misunderstood.  
First, “the dividing line between urban and rural realities, ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ 
worlds, or the local and the global, can no longer be drawn in a self-evident way.  In 
many ways, ‘city’ and ‘village’ have become qualities of mind, rather than spatial 
realities” (De Boeck 1996: 93).  Secondly, urbanization does not cause the demise of 
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traditional cultural systems within the city.  Cultural systems may still endure in urban 
communities:                
“The assumption that urbanization per se leads to the dissolution of traditional 
cultures is an untenable one.  In a symposium on urbanization at the 1959 
American Anthropological Association meetings, reports from Nigeria, Indonesia, 
India, and Mexico all seemed to point to the conclusion that traditional values can 
persist in an urban setting, in one case because the cities are themselves 
traditional, in another because of the formation of ghetto communities and in yet 
another because of traditional relations between village and city.  This may be a 
short-range phenomenon but it a striking one.  Urbanization combined with the 
political competition of new nationhood sometimes intensifies interethnic rivalries 
and hostilities that had been dormant in the rural setting.”  
(LeVine 1963: 285) 
In fact, such traditions may even be intensified in urban spaces because of the need to 
assert one’s identity in the face of other cultures.  To be investigated in Chapter 6, the 
immigration community of Montreuil that exists in the urban spaces of Paris in Une 
couleur café is a perfect example of how traditions may survive in the city.  Likewise, 
distinct traditional cultural values and practices are also maintained in the urban settings 
portrayed in Chikin Biznis, A Reasonable Man, and Xala.  The characterization of 
traditions in African film will be explored in more depth in the next chapter. 
      
RE-DEFINING TRADITION 
Understanding tradition as a polar opposite of modernity and urban spaces, 
therefore, is severely limited theoretically because it prevents the formation of a 
definition of tradition based on relationships between the fluidity of urban and rural 
spaces, the function of time (past and present), internal change, and historical processes 
such as modernization and Westernization.  The problem, therefore, is that inherited 
cultural traditions must be reappraised “to help come to terms with the cultural realities of 
the times and, thus, to hammer out a new modernity on the anvil of African people’s 
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experience of the past and vision of the future” (Gyekye 1997: viii).  Thus, Gyekye 
proposes that tradition is  
“…any cultural product that was created or pursued by past generations and that, 
having been accepted and preserved, in whole or in part, by successive 
generations, has been maintained to the present (Note that ‘present’ here means a 
certain, a particular present time, not necessarily our present, contemporary 
world)” (1997: 221).   
 
This analysis is based on Gyekye’s observation of the etymology of tradition stemming 
from the Latin word traditum, which means, “that which is handed down from the past”  
(1997: 219).  
  
DYNAMICS OF TRADITION—HISTORICAL ACCIDENT & INTERNAL 
INNOVATIONS  
 
In Gyekye’s definition of tradition, an important relationship between the past and 
the present is established.  Traditions exist because of a temporal continuum between the 
past and the present depend upon a successive generation’s maintenance of traditions:  
The past refers to “previous generations, to the times of our forbears or ancestors:  thus, a 
tradition is anything that has endured through generations” (1997: 219).  What is 
considered “the present” for a particular generation continually changes.  Each 
subsequent “present” is thus distinguished by unique political, social, and economic 
circumstances that may impact a generation’s cultural values:  
“The forebears—the previous generations—do not ‘transmit’ their cultural 
creations as such; what they do, rather, is to place them at the disposal of 
subsequent generations of people.  But the subsequent generation may, on 
normative or other rational grounds, either accept, refine, and preserve them or 
spurn, depreciate and, then, abandon them” (1997: 221).  
  
Gyekye’s explanation provides a basic structure for the definition of tradition and a 
helpful clarification of the role of the past and the present as well, but Jan Vansina is able 
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to clarify the dynamics of tradition such as historical accident and internal innovations 
that affect the preservation of traditions despite or in favor of successive generations’ 
influence of the present.   
Vansina elaborates and describes traditions as “self-regulating processes” that are 
determined by a collective set of inherited and changing cognitive and physical 
representations that are shared among members of a society (Vansina 1990: 259-260). 
Gyekye labels the “members of a society” (Vansina 1990: 259-260) to whom Jan 
Vansina refers as a “generation,” members of a society living in the contemporary 
present, or depending upon the order, a “subsequent generation” (Gyekye 1997: 219, 
221) if the generation in question succeeds or follows the forebears.  For the sake of 
clarification and consistency, Gkekye’s term “generation” will be used throughout the 
paper, even when applied to Vansina’s analysis.   
By distinguishing between mental and physical representations, Vansina implies 
that traditions are based on a generation’s cognitive understanding of the physical 
world—hence traditions are interpretations of a generation’s social environments.  
Traditions are thus mental evaluations and responses to changing physicalities:  
Traditions “inform the understanding of the physical world and develop innovations to 
give meaning to changing circumstances in the physical realm, and do so in terms of the 
guiding principles of the tradition.  Such innovations in turn alter the substance of the 
cognitive world itself” (Vansina 1990:  259-260).  The dynamics of traditions can be 
explained by Vansina’s distinction between internal and external forces that voluntarily 
or involuntarily lead to the innovation of a tradition.  These are causal factors of cultural 
change, or rather, the transformation of traditions (Gyekye 1997: 222).  Vansina labels 
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external forces as historical accident and internal forces as internal innovation.  These 
terms have been identified to facilitate the investigation of meanings of tradition 
according to political, social, and economic change in contemporary African societies.  
The internal innovation of a tradition is based upon internal criticism from a given 
generation and is a voluntary form of cultural change.  Traditions are open for question 
by successive generations:    
“…the beliefs, values, practices, or institutions of a tradition are almost invariably 
grounded in some conceptions.  But the conceptions themselves may not, from the 
perspective of subsequent generations, have been adequately rationally grounded.  
Consequently, subsequent generations may discover them to be simply false, 
inconsistent, morally unacceptable, or inadequate to the realities of their times” 
(Gyekye 1997: 222). 
 
Despite common misconceptions, tradition is founded upon its flexibility:  
“A tradition…[is] not blind, a mere collection of precedents, but a form of 
inquiry…an unplanned but rigorous communal science constantly tested and 
revised against the harsh reality of life” (Parekh 1989: 19). 
 
In another respect, an internal innovation is a new feature derived from an older form 
(Vansina 1990: 13) but this is dependent upon the will or desire of successive generations 
to induce an innovation.   
Historical accident, on the other hand, as the name suggests, is a form of 
innovation that happens neither voluntarily nor involuntarily but incidentally (Vansina 
1990: 195).  This type of innovation occurs by accident and provokes change (1990: 
195).  Historical accident may be susceptible to social processes such as modernization, 
Westernization, or previous colonial influence.  Gyekye offers one way of looking at 
historical accident: 
“An indigenous cultural tradition, however, can also come into possession of 
elements of an alien tradition by having them foisted upon it by the external 
practitioners of the alien tradition.  The imposition immediately deprives the 
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indigenous tradition of the opportunity to appraise and select such elements of the 
encountered tradition as it would consider worth appropriating” (Gyekye 1997: 
225). 
 
However, Vansina notes that even though historical accident may incite change in the 
physical world, for the innovation to permanently stick, so to speak, it requires the 
generation or society to consciously accept the innovation cognitively (Vansina 1990: 
195).  
 
THE DEATH OF TRADITIONS   
   
The key point in this manner of looking at tradition as a set of dynamics is that 
while the physical world may change and be affected by transformative processes such as 
modernization or Westernization, the collective mind of a generation can be a reservoir 
for preserving traditions in the face of change.  Despite adjustments to the physical world, 
traditions can be maintained in the collective mind of a society because this is where 
traditions “exist,” so to speak—not in the physically shifting world.  This is how 
traditions are able to transcend the past and carry forth into the future.  
Though traditions are not limited to the past or the physical world, this does not 
mean they are invincible and free from the dangers of extinction:   
“A tradition is harmed when it loses its ability to innovate efficiently.  If the 
situation perdures, it will die.  A tradition dies when its carriers abandon its 
fundamental principles to adopt those of another tradition.  This happens only 
after a society has become aware of a state of major incongruence between the 
cognitive and the physical worlds of its tradition, and is also aware of an alternate 
paradigm” (1990: 260). 
 
Thus, while traditions are highly flexible social phenomena with the ability to adapt to 
change, they are still susceptible to disappearance if abandoned by the carriers of the 
tradition.  Due to historical accident or internal innovation, Vansina notes, a “major 
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incongruence” between the mental and physical realms in which a tradition persists can 
easily cause a successive generation to desert its original traditions.  An individual from 
the successive generation or even the entire society itself may begin to question the 
principles of the tradition in the face of other options.  This is what Gyekye labels 
internal criticism.  
The conclusion, therefore, is that in the wake of rapid economic, political, and 
social change, African communities experience threats to traditional moral and social 
values that stem from the internal and external forces Vansina categorizes as historical 
accident and internal innovation.  Therefore, traditions are not cut off from societal 
influences such as modernization or Westernization.  Vansina points out that major 
incongruences such as loss of political, social, and economic control can lead to the 
abandonment of certain traditions (Vansina 1990: 235).  The ultimate abandonment of a 
tradition will result in its “death” since a carrier or successive generation is needed to 
pass on the tradition (1990: 247-248). 
  
DEFINING MODERNITY AND MODERNIZATION 
According to Everett Rogers, modernization is “the process by which individuals 
change from a traditional way of life to a more complex, technologically advanced, and 
rapidly changing style of life” (Rogers 1969: 14-15).  Patrick Colm Hogan’s definition 
helps describe modernization “as the adoption of practices, which, by the broad principles 
of traditional thought, count as advances on traditional ideas or practices, either for 
empirical or moral reasons (Hogan 2000: 11).  Modernity is the outcome of this process, 
a historical stage constructed by modernization (Canclini 1995: 11).  More specifically, 
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while modernization is the socio-economic process by which individuals or societies 
technologically progress, hence, become modern:     
“…being modern or becoming modern must somehow be related to 
modernization: becoming modern is perhaps the outcome of the process of 
modernization; to be modern is to have successfully gone through the process of 
modernization.  In consequence, ‘being modern’ and (becoming) ‘modernized’ 
would, in the final analysis, be considered co-extensive terms” (Gyekye 1997: 
274). 
 
Therefore, the forging of a modern society is directly linked to the process of 
modernization that transforms such a society. 
Anthropologists John Poggie and Robert Lynch qualify Roger’s definition of 
modernization and comment on what Rogers considers misconceptions about 
modernization.  First, modernization is “not necessarily synonymous with 
‘Europeanization’ or ‘Westernization’” (Poggie & Lynch 1974: 4).  This can be 
explained because the conditions for modernization change in each new environment 
(1974: 4).  Secondly, modernization is not always a positive process (1974: 4).  As 
Poggie and Lynch note, modernization often “brings a mix of constructive and 
destructive effects depending on the situation and on the perspective of the observer” 
(1974: 4).  Most importantly, modernization is a complex multi-dimensional process 
consisting of complicated variables, and therefore cannot be easily quantified or 
evaluated.  The variables of which Poggie and Lynch speak include, for example, 
standards of living, aspirations, literacy, education, and political participation (1974: 4).   
 
DEFINING FEATURES OF MODERN SOCIETIES 
 Stuart Hall and Bram Gieben appropriately expand upon the common features of 
a modern society.  The modern nation-state typically operates within defined territorial 
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boundaries and is controlled by “secular forms of political power and authority and 
conceptions of sovereignty and legitimacy” (Hall & Gieben 1992: 6).  The presence of 
secular beliefs in the political environment of the modern-nation state is directly linked to 
the “decline of the religious world view typical of traditional societies and the rise of a 
secular and materialist culture” in which new values such as individualism and 
rationalism are exhibited (1992: 6).  The materialist culture to which Hall & Gieben refer 
is based upon a monetarized exchange economy defined by “large-scale production and 
consumption of commodities for the market, extensive ownership of private property, and 
the accumulation of capital on systematic, long-term basis” (1992: 6).  In general, the 
new presence of a materialist culture often leads to “the decline of the traditional social 
order, with its fixed social hierarchies and overlapping allegiances, and the appearance of 
a dynamic social and sexual division of labor” (1992: 6).  As a result, however, new 
classes are eventually formed (1992: 6).   
However, Hall and Gieben’s list of the defining features of modern societies is not 
absolute.  Gyekye adds that modernization can also apply to other spheres of “human 
enterprise” such as architectural style, commercial practices, scientific outlook and 
beliefs, and the political, social, or education system (Gyekye 1997: 274).   
Whether or not modernization is a “major incongruence” (Vansina 1990: 235, 
260) that disrupts or eventually “ruins” traditions, so to speak, is not absolutely clear.  
Because both tradition and modernization phenomena are on-going processes, it is 
difficult to calculate the exact displacement or collapse of one process in confrontation 
with the other.  Likewise, as mentioned earlier, traditions are highly flexible and may 
adapt to new circumstances (Parekh 1989: 19).  Thus, when evaluating tradition, without 
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the intellectual space for retrospection such a discussion is open-ended.  Therefore, the 
ultimate concern is not whether or not modernization processes will completely eradicate 
traditions, but how forebears of those traditions and subsequent generations will confront 
modernization.  A cultural hybridist theory will be addressed in Chapter 5 to help 
conceptualize the simultaneous presence of tradition, modernization, and Westernization 
forces in African societies.  For now, it is merely important to establish clear definitions 
of tradition, modernization, the concept of “the West,” and Westernization before we can 
understand how each process affects the other.   
 
DEFINING THE WEST  
 The concept of “the West” originally emerged in western Europe towards the end 
of the fifteenth century.  After a long period of cultural and geographic confinement 
during the Middle Ages, Western Europe consolidated its identity, as what we call “the 
West,” based on the awareness of new worlds different than itself (Hall & Gieben 1992: 
276-289).  The consciousness of external worlds such as the Far East and America 
created conflicts and contrasts with the outside world that consequently lead to the 
development of internal cohesion among Western European nations:  “All collectivities 
become more self-aware in the presence of an external challenge, and self-awareness 
promotes cohesiveness” (Roberts 1985: 122).  Therefore, growing internal cohesion and 
cultural difference originally helped forge a sense of identity known as “the West.”  
 Hall and Gieben note that “the West” as a category no longer refers to only 
European-based development and identities.  In fact, the expression “the West” does not 
even apply to all areas of what is now considered Europe.  Therefore, the notion of “the 
West” is an ideological identity rather than simply a fact of geography (Hall & Gieben 
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1992: 276).  It is a term used to create organization in a system of global power relations 
and ways of thinking.  The idea of “the West” is merely a historical and linguistic 
construct that can change over time and therefore is not specific to a unified or 
homogenous place with one view about other cultures (1992: 279).  In fact, internal 
differences also exist within the broad category of “the West” about non-European 
cultures.  For example, Hall and Gieben claim that Eastern Europe “does not yet or never 
did belong properly to ‘the West’” (1992: 276).  Moreover, the United States, obviously 
not situated in Europe, is considered a part of “the West” because of the United States’ 
hegemonic role in economic and technological development.  Even Japan belongs to “the 
West” despite its location in the Far East and its retention of Eastern cultural values 
because of its high-speed progress as a technologically advanced nation.   
 Roy Armes provides a contemporary definition of “the West” based on what 
United Nation statistics define as “the developed countries with market economies” such 
as the United States, Canada, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and 
arguably, Israel and South Africa (Armes 1987: 10).  During the 1960s, “the West” 
“compromised one-fifth of the world’s population but enjoyed almost sixty percent of the 
world’s gross domestic product” (1987: 10).  “The West” is further identified by 
geopolitical structures.  Three relevant geopolitical spheres reflect the economic 
significance given to the Western world:  the capitalist First World (Western Europe, 
U.S. Australia, Japan), the Second World socialist bloc, and the Third World (Stam 2000: 
93).  Thus, the definition of “the West,” which was once distinguished by geographic 
exclusivity and internal cohesion, now includes non-European identities who share 
similar hegemonic roles in the global economy.   
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Hall and Gieben suggest that discourse using “the West” as a label functions in 
four ways.  First, the description, “the West,” allows us to classify societies into different 
categories such as “western” and “non-western” (Hall & Gieben 1992: 277).  Secondly, 
according to Hall and Gieben, “the West” functions as a “system of representation” 
linked to a composite picture of what different societies, cultures, peoples, and places 
resemble (1992: 277).  Hall and Gieben label “the West” as a “system of representation” 
because “the West” is not associated with merely one idea but is instead dependent upon 
a set of images and ideas that work in conjunction with one another.  For example, 
“Western” is associated with “urban” and “developed” images, whereas “non-western” 
alludes to “non-industrial,” “rural,” “agricultural,” and “under-developed” societies 
(1992: 277).  In this sense, “the West” is an image or set of images—a variety of 
characteristics condensed into one picture.  Thirdly, “the West” is used as a standard or 
model of comparison.  Non-western societies evaluated by this model, therefore, can be 
measured based on how close or far away they are from “the West.”  Fourth, “the West” 
provides criteria of assessment against which other societies are ranked and around which 
positive and negative feelings cluster (1992: 277).   
As will be explored throughout the rest of the paper, this feature of the model of 
comparison problematizes characterizations of contemporary African identities because 
value judgments are placed on the ranking of societies according to how close or far they 
come to the standards of “the West.”  Overall, the most problematic fact, therefore, is that 
the discourse of “the West and the Rest” “draws crude and simplistic distinctions and 
constructs an over-simplified conception of ‘difference’” (1992: 280). 
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DEFINING WESTERNIZATION 
Similar to the relationship between modernity and modernization, Westernization 
is the outcome of becoming associated with or a part of “the West,” i.e. “Westernized.”  
According to Gyekye, Westernization means “taking on the values, ideas, and institutions 
(political, economic, technological, etc.) of the West” (Gyekye 1997: 274).  Gyekye 
points out that it is possible for a society to become Westernized without becoming 
modernized, just as it is feasible for a society to become modernized without becoming 
fully Westernized (1997: 274).  As Rogers reminds us, this is possible because 
modernization is a change from a traditional way of life to a more technologically 
advanced one (Rogers 1969: 14-15).  Such a change has direct implications for 
technological progress but not necessarily for the cultural fabric of a community.  In this 
sense, a society can retain its own cultural values and thus remain “non-Western,” so to 
speak, while still becoming a more technologically advanced nation.   
Japan and Africa are cited as examples to clarify the distinction between 
modernization and Westernization.  While Japan is a modernized nation, “it is not wholly 
Westernized, having preserved many of its own traditional cultural values and 
institutions” (1997: 274).  Gyekye comments that many traditional structures within 
African communities have been in continual contact with “Westernism,” and have even 
voluntarily or involuntarily assumed Western values and institutions without becoming 
modernized (1997: 274).  Therefore, modernization and Westernization are not identical 
and should be considered as two distinct processes. Thus, modernization cannot be 
exclusively defined in terms of Westernization (1997: 274).     
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADITION, MODERNIZATION, AND 
WESTERNIZATION 
  
Despite popular misconceptions about tradition being the opposite of 
modernization, modernization is actually a multidimensional phenomenon that involves 
tradition.  Tradition and modernization are inter-dialectic forces of cultural evolution.  
Even though the process of modernization implies that traditions will eventually evolve, 
this does not mean that complex and technologically advancing societies must give up 
traditions:   
“The spread of modernity around the world and the intellectual construction of a 
traditional-modern continuum has, sometimes, erroneously been interpreted as 
though traditionality and modernity are mutually exclusive and that modern 
societies are traditionless.  The experience of other societies has demonstrated that 
modernization does not mean that societies undergoing change relinquish their 
traditions, or that there is no attachment to customs and ways of the past or to 
symbols of collective identity.  On the contrary, modernity has been shown to 
affect only one specific aspect of traditionality, namely the legitimation of the 
social, political and cultural orders in terms of traditional symbols, while it has 
given rise to a continuous process of reconstitution of the other aspects of 
tradition.” (Dreyer 1989: 95) 
 
Furthermore, it has already been shown how modernity and modernization are products 
of “the West.”  Based on this assumption therefore, since it is possible to be modernized 
and retain traditions, it is also possible to be modernized, Westernized, and traditional all 
at the same time without any fundamental contradiction of identity.  Though one should 
remember, as Gkekye clarifies, that being modernized does not necessarily imply 
Westernization (Gkekye 1997: 274), it is nonetheless possible. 
However, though Westernization cannot be defined in terms of modernization 
simply because Western nations are industrialized (1997: 274), the advancing 
proliferation of “the West” is perhaps symptomatic of modernization and globalization 
processes.  According to Gyekye, Western societies “have become the quintessence of 
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modernity” (1997: 263).  Modernity is considered to stem from “the West” (1997: 263).  
Western societies are “the mecca to which peoples from non-Western societies go for 
inspiration and knowledge as to models of thought and action in pursuit of the 
development of their societies and transition to modernity” (1997: 264).  For a more 
specific understanding of this relationship, modernity can be defined as:  
“…the ideas, principles, and ideals covering a whole range of human activities 
that have underpinned Western life and thought since the seventeenth century.  
The constitution of modernity makes it a philosophical doctrine, and, as such, it is 
essentially linked to Western cultures; it was, and is, culture dependent, even 
though this fact does not in any way confine the appreciation of the notion, and 
the exploitation of its practical implications and consequences, to the West.  But it 
cannot be defined that those characteristics that cohered into what is called 
modernity evolved endogenously in societies of Europe, even though it cannot be 
denied either that some non-European cultural inventions or institutions may have 
been appropriated or exploited by Europe, but uniquely developed by it” 
(Gyekye1997: 264). 
 
Though modernization and Westernization are two distinct processes, Gyekye 
provides a distinction between modernity in general and Western modernity.  The 
distinction is important because it shows how Westernization has impacted 
modernization instead of confusingly using the two terms synonymously.  The central 
characteristics of Western modernity are industrialization, advanced forms of science and 
technology, urbanism, individualism, the ascendancy of reason, the emergence of nation-
state secularism and the relegation of religion to the private sphere of life (1997: 275).  
African modernity on the other hand “tends to revolve around the overtly political 
questions of liberation and decolonization” (Thackway 2003: 23). 
         
CONCLUSIONS 
Though tradition, modernization, and Westernization are all distinct social 
phenomena, it is possible for elements from each process to overlap in the formation of 
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contemporary African identities.  Vansina constructs a definition of tradition based on 
historical accident and internal innovation (Vansina 1990: 191-196) because traditions do 
not exist in a vacuum.  In the face of change, traditions can be abandoned or altered to 
meet the new needs of a successive generation (Gyekye 1997: 221; Vansina 1990: 260).  
The alteration of a tradition suggests several possibilities.  Either the tradition is 
preserved in its “original” form or elements of the tradition are given up or traded in 
(Gyekye 1997: 221).  Therefore, in order to understand the meaning of tradition in 
contemporary society, it is critical to articulate which elements of modernization and 
Westernization are being absorbed by the tradition and how such elements affect the 
overall content of the “new” tradition.   
Consequently, there are both positive and negative implications of the 
hybridization of tradition, modernization, and Westernization elements, which arise as 
themes in African films.  To use Vansina’s term, common “incongruences” (Vansina 
1990: 235) include the conflict between town and village; the Westernized woman 
against a woman respecting traditions such as patriarchal leadership; modern versus 
traditional medicine; and tradition as a commodity and an object for consumption 
(Boughedir 2000: 109).  These are some of the discrepancies that occur because alternate 
paradigms such as modernization and Westernization call traditions into question.  In the 
next chapter, specific examples of tradition, modernization, and Westernization will be 
offered based on examples derived from a close inspection of the films A Reasonable 
Man, Chikin Biznis:  The Whole Story, Fools, Hyènes, Pièces d'Identités, Une couleur 
café, and Xala.  Thereafter, the remaining chapters will be devoted to exploring the 
hybridization of African identities in the same films.  
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4 The Representation of Tradition, Modernization, 
and Westernization in African Film 
 
 
Thus far in this analysis, the discussion of tradition, modernization, and 
Westernization processes in Africa societies has been mainly theoretically.  The main 
concern of this chapter, therefore, is to provide a critical analysis of African identities 
based on filmmakers’ observations of the influence of tradition, modernization, and 
Westernization among African communities.  Traditions differ between African 
characters depending upon the film being viewed.  Filmmakers have captured both 
positive and negative examples of how traditions within African culture are perceived 
and approached by African and non-African characters.  Identifying and analyzing 
African traditional systems such as language, traditional medicine, patriarchy and 
masculinity, polygamy, and traditional religion found in A Reasonable Man, Chikin 
Biznis:  The Whole Story, Fools, Hyènes, Pièces d'Identités, Une couleur café, and Xala 
can help shed light on common cultural values among African societies.  Each traditional, 
modernized, and Westernized structure mentioned in this chapter will be elaborated upon 
as it applies to specific African films.  
   
LANGUAGE  
 
 According to Gyekye’s definition of tradition (Gyekye 1997: 221) introduced in 
Chapter 3, language can also be considered a tradition because it is a cultural product 
created and passed on by previous generations.  More specifically, Maria Tymoczko and 
Colin Ireland argue that “tradition can be discerned in written as well as oral cultures, in 
high culture as well as folk culture and popular culture; it can be traced in literature and 
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other verbal arts, in conceptions of history, and in material culture” (Tymoczko & Ireland 
2003: 2).  The importance of language as a tradition among African societies is 
particularly relevant because of Africa’s oral history: 
“Relying heavily on the cultural codes of the people, vis-a-vis the value of the 
word for meaning and nuances, oral narrative serves as the genesis of 
communication influencing all aspects of community concern…” (Ukadike 1994: 
23).  
 
Ironically, one of the main “historical reason[s] for the European contempt for Africa and 
the denial of its civilization is the lack of writing and written records in most parts of the 
African continent at the time of the European incursion” (Biakolo n.d.).  However, oral 
tradition was an important method of expression against colonial oppression (Loomba 
2005: 202).  Oral tradition typically includes stories, epics, and songs (Fanon 2000: 47) 
and is often directly linked to low levels of literacy, especially in isolated rural areas 
(Tymoczko & Ireland 2003: 3).  Fanon notes that in Algeria during its experience of 
colonialism, African storytellers were systematically arrested (Fanon 2000: 47) because 
of the typical anti-colonial content of the storyteller’s message.     
As shown by Joseph Greenberg’s groundbreaking study, there are four major 
language families native to Africa:  Afro-Asiatic, Nilo-Saharan, Niger-Congo, and 
Khoisan languages (Greenberg 1983: 3-20).  The Afro-Asiatic languages are a language 
family of about 240 languages spoken throughout East Africa, North Africa, the Sahel, 
and Southwest Asia (Greenberg 1966: 42-65).  The Nilo-Saharan language family 
consists of more than 100 languages.  Nilo-Saharan languages are mainly spoken in 
Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, and northern Tanzania (1966: 130-160).  The 
Niger-Congo language family covers much of Sub-Saharan Africa and is probably the 
largest language family in the world in terms of different languages (1966: 6-41).  A 
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significant number of Niger-Congo languages are the Bantu languages spoken in sub-
Saharan Africa.  Lastly, there are approximately 50 Khoisan languages spoken in 
Southern Africa (1966: 66-84).   
 With a few notable exceptions in East Africa, nearly all African countries have 
adopted official languages that originated outside the continent and spread through 
colonialism or human migration.  For example, in numerous countries English and 
French are used as the main form of communication in the public sphere such as 
government, commerce, education, and the media (1966: 1-10).  Arabic, Portuguese, 
Afrikaans and Malagasy are other examples of originally non-African languages that are 
used by Africans today both in the public and private spheres. 
The Use of French and Wolof in Xala (Ousmane Sembene 1974; Senegal) 
Language in Africa has been a problematic tradition because of colonial 
influence.  For example, “whereas the Belgian and British colonialists had accepted 
African languages in their primary schools, the French had chosen their language as sole 
vehicle of education, strictly excluding African languages” (Barlet 2000: 199).  The 
subject of language is of particular importance in Xala as a sign of social status, 
assimilation into elite French culture, and a general indication of cultural changes and 
challenges (Petty 1996: 137).   
El Hadji, the main character of Xala, critiques Rama, his oldest daughter, because 
she insists on speaking Wolof—a native Senegalese language—instead of French to him.  
Whereas El Hadji represents the arrogance of a Westernized elite, Rama counters his 
French pride with defiant Wolof nationalism:    
“Rama is a Wolof cultural nationalist, affirming the cultural, moral and linguistic 
values that have sustained Wolof society through wars, colonialism, famine and 
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many other trials.  It is a context in which family pride and dignity are honored” 
(Petty 1996: 100).   
 
El Hadji’s behavior towards Rama within Xala suggests that French is culturally superior 
to Wolof:  “[El Hadji] is as important as he can make himself, and it all depends upon 
expressing himself in the French idiom” (Pfaff 2004: 135).  Roy Armes investigates the 
colonizer’s control over the “native” tongue:   
“Given the colonizer’s economic hold over the country, it is possible within a 
comparatively short time to downgrade native languages and substitute the 
colonizer’s tongue as the language of commerce, law, and government.  As a 
result, all non-European languages are regarded with contempt and deprived of 
any influence on social or economic life” (Armes 1987: 11).  
   
Thus, for El Hadji, whose privileges and corrupt capitalistic practices have culturally and 
financially shaped him into an Western-educated elite of Senegalese society, speaking 
French is a matter of social status and expression of power—an exclusive, elitist power 
(Petty 1996: 120).  For Rama, on the other hand, speaking French is a form of social 
control, the degradation of Wolof culture, and “a measure of a character’s complicity in 
the neocolonialist system” (Armes 1987: 289).  Significantly, and to be explored in 
Chapter 6, having undergone tertiary education, Rama is perfectly capable of 
participating in Westernized society, but overall, she rejects its privileges and exclusivity 
out of choice (Bakari & Cham 1996: 183).  Thus, the conflict between Rama and El Hadji 
portrays to the audience “a strong charge of political, social, and cultural tension” based 
on the use of language (Ukadike 1994: 118).     
However, towards the end of the film, an assembly among the newly elected 
bureaucrats of the Chamber of Commerce is called to judge El Hadji’s transgressions of 
“corruption, malfeasance, and of endangering the positions of the other members of the 
Chamber” (Pfaff 2004: 137).  In a moment of newfound pride for Wolof, and distaste for 
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the French language and its colonial associations that have been building up throughout 
the film, El Hadji addresses the assembly in Wolof.  The president of the Chamber of 
Commerce quickly reprimands El Hadji for speaking Wolof just as El Hadji had once 
critiqued Rama and notes that the only language of business is French (Barlet 2000: 201). 
Thus, the President of the Chamber of Commerce declares:  “Even insults must be 
addressed in the purist French tradition.”   
In Memmi’s discussion of the colonizer and the colonized, he notes that “the 
entire bureaucracy, the entire court system, all industry hears and uses the colonizer’s 
language” (Memmi 1965: 106).  Therefore, when El Hadji speaks Wolof instead of 
French to the assembly, he undermines the legitimacy of the French language as an elite, 
bureaucratic idiom.  Sembene highlights the use of mother tongues to project national 
sentiment against colonial and neo-colonial structures of control such as “official 
languages” in business and commerce:     
“In modern Africa, mother-tongue aspirations have sometimes provided an 
impetus and vehicle for expressions of national sentiment and certainly have been 
bulwarks in the fight against colonialism and against political, economic, and 
cultural imperialism.  Literacy in the mother tongue has often been—and 
continues to be—a factor in indigenous renewal and the pluralist dispensation in 
Africa” (Sanneh 1994: 29).    
 
Though El Hadji finally enters the struggle for the soul of the people—for African 
identity (Pfaff 2004: 137)—he is denied the right to speak Wolof.  This scene ultimately 
highlights an “ironic refusal” in which language becomes not only a vehicle of meaning, 
but also a structure for specific meanings, particularly nationalist sentiment, which may 
be verbalized in French but cannot be fully “expressed,” so to speak, because of French’s 
colonial associations:  “A Senegalese truth, a Wolof truth” “cannot be articulated in the 
foreign dress of the Other, much less the language of the colonizers” (Pfaff 2004: 137).  
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Thus, only Wolof can be used to articulate El Hadji’s rebuttal and accusation of the 
corruption of the Chamber of Commerce even though the assembly devalues Wolof: 
“[T]he colonized’s mother tongue, that which is sustained by his feelings, 
emotions and dreams, that in which his tenderness and wonder are expressed, thus 
that which holds the greatest emotional impact, is precisely the one which is least 
valued” (Memmi 1965: 107).     
 
After his impassioned speech, El Hadji is then fired and replaced by a petty thief, Mr. 
Thieli, who earlier in the film robs a villager.  The appointment of the thief is a 
hypocritical gesture, which furthers the entire theme of neo-colonialism and forces of 
corruption within the Chamber of Commerce. 
 
TRADITIONAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICES 
 
Jon P. Kirby uses the term “traditional religions” to refer to tribal or indigenous 
religions in Africa “as opposed to those imported through missionaries or by culture 
contact” (Kirby 1994: 71).  The use of the term “traditional” “is not meant to suggest that 
these religions are static and unchanging, but is simply one way of distinguishing them 
from the major world religions which have spread themselves more widely across many 
different cultures and which tend to be, therefore, less confined to and by any one 
specific socio-cultural matrix” (Clarke 1991: 63).  This definition still leaves quite a large 
amount of room for multiple interpretations, but at least for now, a discussion can 
exclude religions such as Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, which have also impacted the 
traditional religious practices of African communities.   
Dennis Thomson adds that indigenous religions in Africa can be seen as systems 
of “rites, rules, and practices that [aim] at preserving and strengthening the fellowship of 
the people, the tribe, and the family, and at increasing its power” (Barrett 1968: 123).  
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Benjamin C. Ray recognizes three major themes fundamental to traditional African 
religions:  archetypal symbols, ritual, and community (Ray 1976: 16-17).  Archetypal 
symbols refer to sacred images such as gods, ancestors, and sacred actions or things, 
which make up the traditional universe (1976: 17).  Ritual is considered the sphere of 
traditional religious life “where the world as lived and the world as imaged become fused 
together, transformed into one reality” (1976: 17).  According to Ray, African ritual is “a 
salvation event in which human experience is re-created and renewed” (1976: 17).  
Further clarifying the concept of ritual in African societies, Elizabeth Zelman proposes 
that ritual is a form of communication that is used to make statements to oneself and to 
other people within a community “about the nature of their society and its classifications 
and about their places in the society” (Zelman 1977: 716).  Most importantly, while 
beliefs, creeds, symbols and myth inspire action, “they themselves are not activities,” 
while ritual, on the other hand, is a direct performative expression of such conceptual 
orientations (Bell 1992: 19).  Lastly, the notion of community is an important element of 
traditional religions because it is a unique aspect of how most African social structures 
are organized (Ray 1976: 17).     
Reproduction Ritual in Xala  
In Xala, the mother of El Hadji’s young third wife, Ngone, escorts the new bride 
and groom to the bedroom.  Before leaving, she tells El Hadji to perform this ritual:   “El 
Hadji, take your clothes off.  Put this caftan on and sit in the mortar with the pestle 
between your legs.”  El Hadji refuses to perform the ritual because he believes it is 
“nonsense.”  However, the mother-in-law insists:  “It’s the tradition.  My daughter is too 
young to have bad luck.”  Though the reason for the ritual is never clearly revealed, based 
 99
on general themes in Xala, the ritual the mother-in-law wishes El Hadji to perform is 
most likely connected to the importance of reproduction.  Zelman argues that “the male 
ritual associated with the female reproductive cycle is seen as a device for minimizing 
[gender differences]” between men and women (Zelman 1977: 714).  More specifically, 
reproductive rituals in which males are involved relieve women of exclusive 
responsibility in case of childlessness (1977: 714).  Thus, in this way gender differences 
are minimized because reproduction is not only a female-specific duty but a man’s 
responsibility as well.  Therefore, to ensure successful reproduction, the mother insists 
that El Hadji straddle the mortar and perform the entire ritual as a way to prevent “bad 
luck.”    
Ironically however, the next day we learn of El Hadji’s xala, a Wolof word often 
mistranslated into English as “curse,” but more closely meaning “impotency” (Pfaff 
2004: 135).  El Hadji is not sure why he has been cursed, but the audience cannot help 
but recall the moment in which the mother-in-law foreshadowed El Hadji’s “bad luck” 
because he would not perform the ritual she recommended.  Therefore, sole blame lies 
completely with El Hadji and not with Ngone.  This adds to the comic effect of El Hadji’s 
later search for a “cure,” in which he desperately consults two marabouts.  Of course, at 
the end we learn that the xala was placed on El Hadji by his half-brother, Gorgui, and is 
not derived from refusing to complete the ritual suggested by El Hadji’s mother-in-law. 
Ritual and the Tikoloshe in A Reasonable Man 
 While investigating Sipho’s belief in a dwarf-like evil spirit known throughout 
southern Africa as a tikoloshe, Sean returns to Sipho’s village and questions the headman 
who is a village elder and top authority figure.  When Sean mentions to the headman that 
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Sipho believes he killed a tikoloshe, and not a one-year old child as Sipho is accused, the 
headman pauses and intently asks Sean to repeat himself:     
Headman:  “He says what?” 
 Sean:         “That he killed a tikoloshe.” 
 Headman:  “Then he’s bewitched.” 
 Sean:         “Who has bewitched him?” 
 Headman:  “Perhaps an enemy of ours, I don’t know.  This has brought much  
trouble.” 
 Sean:         “What are you going to do?” 
 Headman:  “The blood will satisfy him.  He’ll leave us alone.” 
 Sean:          “Who will leave us alone?” 
 Headman:  “The tikoloshe.” 
 
The headman reveals to Sean that Sipho has been cursed and then beckons to one of the 
other villagers.  The headman whispers into the fellow villager’s ear to retrieve a goat for 
ritual.  The goat is quickly presented to the headman.  Then the headman cuts the goat’s 
neck with a knife and allows the blood to trickle into a bowl, which is then carried away 
by a female villager.  The ritual is held to satisfy the tikoloshe with the goat’s blood in 
hopes that the tikoloshe will not return.   
The ritual is carried out efficiently and swiftly in a manner that suggests such 
situations occur frequently within the village.  The ritual is a conditioned response to 
what the village perceives as a threat by the tikoloshe’s presence.  However, when Sean 
attempts to explain to Sam Linde, the prosecutor, Mrs. Ngwenya, Sipho’s original 
defense attorney, and Judge Wendon that Sipho was acting sincerely in accordance with 
his faith and believes he killed a tikoloshe and not a baby, no one listens.  This scene 
highlights the existence of two separate value systems within South African society in 
which Westernized systems of belief, predominantly Christianity, conflict with 
indigenous traditional religions.  In the traditional value system, a strong belief in the 
tikoloshe is held; in the Westernized value system, on the other hand, a tikoloshe is 
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viewed as a ridiculous myth.  This reflects the early nineteenth century missionary 
perceptions of traditional African religions: 
“The Protestant missionaries of the nineteenth century were men committed to 
modernizing change—to the trinity of Christianity, Commerce and Civilisation. 
They saw African religion as a powerful force holding Africans locked into an 
impoverished past. To many of them it hardly deserved to be called a religion at 
all, and if it were to be considered as a religion then it was only a very primitive 
and immature one” (Ranger 1991: 106).  
 
However, even though traditional religion may often be conceived as “primitive” or 
“immature” by Christian observers, while the Westernized values that Sam Linde, Mrs. 
Ngwenya and Judge Wendon are asserted as self-evident truths, the village’s belief in a 
tikoloshe is also legitimate and real as evidenced by Sipho’s fear and the headman’s 
prompt ritual action.       
Ancestor Veneration in Pièces d'Identités  
Within African traditional religions, a common practice is ancestor veneration 
(Gyekye 1997: 257-258; Thomson 1994: 95).  Geoffrey Parrinder argues that the 
veneration of ancestors is a common aspect of traditional religious practice all throughout 
Africa (Parrinder 1954: 57).  In particular, Parrinder cites examples of  “ancestral 
priority” in countries such as South Africa, Sierre Leone, Nigeria, and Rhodesia 
(contemporary Zimbabwe) (1954: 57).  Of particular importance, ancestors are 
considered part of the tribe and are consulted on important occasions.  Dennis Thomson 
outlines a series of commonalities specific to ancestor veneration.  Thomson notes that 
“ancestors are a major ‘source and sanction of morality in dealings with kinsfolk’” 
(Banton 1963: 49 as quoted in Thomson 1994: 95).  First, ancestors are associated with 
the soil or place of residence (Thomson 1994: 95).  Secondly, a relationship with 
ancestors involves constant interaction with the spirits of the dead (1994: 95).  This 
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relationship may be either one of love or fear, and sometimes even both emotions.  The 
living individual’s concern is mainly for ancestors of one’s own lineage (Pauw 1963: 34 
as quoted in Thomson 1994: 95) or the lineage of one’s spouse.  Most importantly, the 
relationship between ancestors and the living is one of dependency, “a kinship obligation 
that does not stop at death” (Thomson 1994: 95).  Therefore, ancestors would not be 
properly revered if a living kinsman did not maintain his or her relationship with the 
ancestors and he or she could possibly be punished for such a lack of effort.  
Ancestors are frequently referenced in Pièces d'Identités as a source of blessing 
and even to initiate curses.  At the beginning of Pièces d'Identités, Mani Kongo’s counsel 
blesses his journey with the approval of the ancestors:  “The spirits have spoken.  Our 
ancestors do not oppose this journey.”  However, after Mani Kongo is left penniless in 
the streets of Brussels, he curses those who have harmed him:    
Mani Kongo:  “Mani Kongo, son of Mani Kongo and grandson of Mani Kongo.   
All descendants of the great and invincible Kongomani.  Your clan 
has never harmed anyone but the one who insults you will die with 
no descendants.”    
 
Thus, Mani Kongo proclaims that a mythical force in which he believes will punish those 
who practice moral evil and harm against him.  To die without ancestors is to ultimately 
lose one’s immortality since, according to the principles of ancestor veneration, the life of 
ancestors only continues through successive, living relatives (Thomson 1994: 95). 
 In another scene in Pièces d'Identités, after awaking from a dream, Mani Kongo 
meets a prophetic young woman named Noubia.  Mani Kongo gazes at Noubia in 
disbelief:          
Noubia:          “I saw your dreams.” 
Mani Kongo:  “Who are you?”  
Noubia:          “My name is Noubia, prophet of Black Renaissance.  My body was  
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                          born here…but my soul is from Black Africa.” 
Like an ancestor, Noubia’s role in the film is prophetic.  She serves as a communicator 
between the ancestor world and actual reality.  In fact, even though Noubia is clearly an 
African woman who was born and raised in Europe, Mani Kongo perceives Noubia’s 
presence in a spiritually invigorating manner.       
Furthermore, Noubia reminds the audience that even though Mani Kongo is far-
removed from the Congo while in Belgium, his ancestors are ubiquitous and protect him 
wherever he may go.  Noubia eventually takes Mani Kongo to the forgotten graves of a 
group of Congolese men who were brought to Belgium a century ago in order to amuse 
King Leopold II.  The ancestors are referenced in order to bless the tombs of the 
Congolese who died because they were left without clothes or food once in Belgium.  By 
seeing the unmarked gravesites and the Belgian government’s disrespect, Mani Kongo 
finally recognizes that his positive view of Belgium is false.  Ultimately, Noubia’s 
character helps Mani Kongo re-connect to his profound belief in ancestors during a bitter 
struggle to cope with the Congo’s colonial past and a tiresome search to find his 
daughter, Mwana.  
Superstition in Chikin Biznis: The Whole Story (Ntshaveni Wa Luruli 1998; South 
Africa, 1998 
 
Instead of validating and confirming traditional religious practices, Sipho, the 
main character of Chikin Biznis:  The Whole Story, laughs at what he considers 
“superstitions” that fall under the more politically correct category of traditional healing 
described in the previous section.  Overall, Chikin Biznis is a comedy that treats the 
subjects of tradition, modernization, and Westernization light-heartedly.  Sipho’s 
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dismissal of “superstition” that is associated with traditional religious beliefs, therefore, is 
part of his jovial character.   
When Sipho starts selling chickens in the local street market in the township, he 
angers a territorial chicken vendor, Uvali, who has been running his “business” there long 
before Sipho arrived.  To teach Sipho a lesson, while chanting an incantation, Uvali 
plants an object underneath Sipho’s stand when no one is around in an act of 
“bewitchment,” though neither the item nor the meaning behind the act is ever clearly 
articulated.  Though the item is never revealed, to an African audience familiar with 
bewitchment, it is important that the name of the object, and the object itself, not be 
disclosed.  This scene in Chikin Biznis does not fail to highlight the item because of its 
lack of importance, but on the contrary, because it is important and embodies the “curse” 
that Uvali attempts to establish against Sipho: 
“It is obvious that, as with all ritual artifacts, those employed in African systems 
of divination are instruments, utensils. They have their meaning in the context of 
ritual performance, used in executing prescribed gestures, prayers, chants, and 
dances.  They are analogous to a crucifix, which is not simply an ornament or a 
religious symbol, but has its essential meaning in the context of the Catholic 
Mass. The object is informed by the words of the liturgy and, in this instance, by 
an elaborate narrative known to those participating in the rite” (Pemberton 2006).     
 
Ironically therefore, not knowing the object or even seeing it actually places an African 
audience in closer social proximity to its meaning.   
However, unbeknownst to the rival vendor, the woman from Sipho’s neighboring 
stand has seen the act, but not the object, from afar.  She reveals the information to Sipho 
and warns him to be careful: 
 Market woman:  “Don’t sell from your spot.” 
 Sipho:      “Why?” 
 Market woman:  “Uvali has planted something…” 
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Sipho laughs and shrugs off the warning.  Sipho’s response to the market woman’s 
sincere fear is characteristic of Christian missionaries and Westerners who encountered 
traditional African religions and labeled such beliefs as “primitive” or “superstitious” 
(Ranger 1991: 106).  After being warned by the market woman, Sipho leaves the market 
to speak to his mechanic friend for a favor.  Sipho pays his friend to pose as a Christian 
priest to exorcise the “cursed” spot and to scare Uvali.  While in the township, the 
mechanic, posing as a charismatic priest, marches around and proclaims:  “I sense evil in 
this place.  The evildoer is nearby.”  The “priest” then points discriminately to Uvali.  
Though Uvali is practicing bewitchment, which is typically considered outside Christian 
value systems, ironically, he responds to the indictment of a Christian priest.  This scene 
echoes Father James’ perception of evil as a universal phenomenon in A Reasonable 
Man:   
Sean Raine:     “What is the purpose of exorcism?”     
 Father James:  “It is resorted to when the church has firmly established a case of  
 demonic possession.  Its purpose is to cast out the demon.”  
Sean Raine:     “By demon, you mean some kind of evil spirit?” 
Father James:  “Yes.”   
Sean Raine:     “Is the belief in demonic forces a uniquely Catholic notion?” 
Father James:  “No, not at all.  You will find cases of demonic possession   
                          reported in all the works of the great faiths including Judaism,   
                          Islam, Hinduism, even Buddhism.”    
 
Though the text is pulled from another film, it offers relevant insight into Uvali’s reaction 
to the “priest’s” accusation.  Out of religious fear, or possible reverse bewitchment, Uvali 
quickly runs to the spot where the object was buried under Sipho’s stand and frantically 
unburies it.  Thus, Sipho comically thwarts Uvali by exposing him in front of the entire 
street market by playing on Uvali’s own “superstitious” beliefs and not submitting to 
them himself. 
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TRADITIONAL HEALING AND MEDICINE 
 
The World Health Organization (WHO) states that traditional medicine refers to 
“health practices, approaches, knowledge and beliefs incorporating plant, animal and 
mineral based medicines, spiritual therapies, manual techniques and exercises, applied 
singularly or in combination to treat, diagnose and prevent illnesses or maintain well-
being” (World Health Organization 2003).  More specifically, Mordecai Gumede defines 
African traditional medicine as a body of knowledge and set of techniques “based on the 
socio-cultural and religious bedrock of African communities” (Gumede 1990: 208).  Such 
practices are “founded on personal experience and observations handed down from 
generation to generation, either verbally or in writing, and are used for the diagnosis 
prevention or elimination of imbalances in physical, mental or social well being” (1990: 
208).   
As well as providing a general definition of traditional medicine, Gumede 
supplies a basic comparison of the goals of modern and traditional healers:    
“Both modern healers and traditional healers have the same goal, namely, to help 
the sick and the ill-at-ease.  The aim is to cure the illness if they can.  They both 
do sometimes.  If not, to relieve pain and suffering which both often do, but also, 
to comfort the sufferer and the relatives”  (1990: 153). 
 
Though the tools and means used to cure an illness differ between a traditional and 
modern healer, both intend to treat a certain ailment.  Fundamental differences between 
modern and traditional healers are outlined as followed.  While modern medicine is 
Western in origin, having been founded by Hippocrates, the ancient Greek physician 
living from 460 BC–380 BC, traditional healing is of indigenous African sources and was 
founded approximately four and a half thousand years ago (1990: 153-155).   Secondly, 
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and most significantly, modern healers are distinguished from traditional healers based on 
a binary observation in which each method is placed in either a rational or irrational 
category.  Modern healers are considered rational, while on the other hand, traditional 
healers are described as irrational (1990: 153-155).  This distinction is also founded upon 
a common misconception that modern healing is scientific, and reversely, traditional 
healing is unscientific.  Even the idiom of approach differs between modern and 
traditional healers:  While a modern healer may use such terms as “aetiology, 
symptomatology, diagnosis, epidemiology, endemiology, curative, preventive, prognosis, 
rehabilitation, morbidity…” to express his or her methods, on the other hand, the “idiom 
of approach of the traditional healers is social, political, economic, moral, religious, and, 
even recreational and change of environment e.g. in hysteria” (1990: 153-155).   
An explanation of diagnosis practices helps elaborate upon this point.  Unlike a 
modern healer’s diagnosis, which entails what germ causes the illness of a patient, a 
traditional healer addresses not only the root of the illness (what modern healers diagnose 
a “germ”), but who causes the illness (1990: 153-155).  For example, in Chikin Biznis 
mentioned earlier, if Sipho had believed in bewitchment and consulted a traditional 
healer about a “curse,” the healer would have eventually concluded that Uvali was the 
cause of bewitchment, or rather, the “illness.”  Therefore, in an attempt to address a 
disease or affliction, a modern healer’s treatment is “specific, individualized, [and] 
streamlined” in the sense that a presented problem such as a broken bone, for instance, 
will require a visit to an orthopedist, or an aching tooth will require a visit to the dentist.  
In contrast, the traditional healer will holistically approach the patient and treat the body, 
mind, and soul as an entirety:  “…healing is a total process involving the living and the 
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dead, the ‘natural, preternatural and the super natural,’ in addition to the patient” (1990: 
153-155).  This includes examining the patient’s environment, particularly his or her 
physical, spiritual, and emotional past and present (1990: 153-155).     
 Even though “both modern healers and traditional healers have the same goal, 
namely, to help the sick and the ill-at-ease” (1990: 153), the key point in Gumede’s 
observations of perceived differences between modern and traditional healers is the 
implicit articulation of value judgments placed upon such differences.  As Gumede’s 
analysis indicates, modern healing is more socially accepted among science-oriented, 
Western societies.  However, statistics supplied by the WHO verify that traditional 
medicine services at least 80% of the African population’s health needs (World Health 
Organization 2003).  Even though modern healers are associated with “science,” the 
reality is that overall traditional systems of medicine account for the health care of more 
than two thirds of the total world population (Gumede 1990: 203).   
Of course, there are social and financial reasons that traditional medicine is used 
among at least 80% of the African population.  First, traditional medicine is more 
affordable compared to western medicine services (1990: 226).  According to Gumede, 
very few “black” Africans can afford Medical Aid Schemes because of the high cost of 
technology and other resources utilized in such healthcare facilities.  Secondly, only 10% 
of the Third World’s two thousand million people, lives near modern health centers 
(1990: 225).  Thus, even though Gumede suggests that modern and traditional healing 
ultimately have the same goals, traditional healing is favored by the majority of “black” 
Africans for political, economic, and social reasons.  
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Two important types of traditional healers among African nations—sangomas and 
marabouts—appear in A Reasonable Man, Une couleur café, and Xala.  The subject of 
traditional healers is also highlighted in Pièces d'Identités and will be discussed in the 
next section.    
Rachel the Sangoma in A Reasonable Man 
A sangoma is considered a practitioner of herbal medicine, divination and  
counseling in traditional Nguni (Zulu, Xhosa, Ndebele and Swazi) societies of Southern 
Africa (Gumede 1990: 71-76).  Andrew Wines writes that even Westernized “black” 
South Africans often seek the advice of traditional healers before consulting Western-
trained doctors (Wines 2004).  More specifically, it has been recorded that there is 
perhaps fourteen times the amount of traditional healers than there are Western 
physicians in South African and that “8 in 10 South Africans turn to traditional healers 
for help with both medical and personal problems, even if they also see a Western-
educated doctor” (Wines 2004).         
Professor MacKenzie in A Reasonable Man points out that sangomas are also 
known as witchdoctors.  As an expert in traditional healing, Professor MacKenzie 
clarifies the definition of a witchdoctor for Sean:        
 
Professor MacKenzie:  “A witchdoctor is a doctor in the fight against witches.  He  
  or she has the power to cast out evil, to relieve you of    
  suffering, both mental and physical, caused by   
  bewitchment.”   
 
The sangoma, Rachel, in A Reasonable Man is represented as a rational and well-
educated character that even attends to Sean’s healing needs.  As Gumede observes in his 
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description of traditional healing, Rachel approaches Sean holistically and attends to his 
“spiritual, emotional, and physical needs” (Gumede 1990: 153-155).   
Before Rachel agrees to meet with Sipho and help evaluate his case, she insists 
that Sean deal with the “snake” inside him: 
Sangoma:  “You have a snake deep inside you.  You have seen something bad.   
 We must take out the snake.  After that, we can see you.”     
 
Instead of prescribing “medicine” as Western societies know it (1990: 153-155), the 
sangoma prepares Sean a jar of special oil to be rubbed on his eyebrows each night and a 
small bottle of muti, a traditional medicine made of herbs.  The second time Sean visits 
the sangoma in her home, he asks her to testify for Sipho but Rachel will not testify until 
Sean deals with his “snake.”  She pours Sean a cup of muti, and directly after Sean drinks 
it, he starts sweating and crouches down on the floor.  As Sean curls up on the floor in 
pain, experiencing a mild seizure induced by the muti, the scene cuts to a flashback of 
Sean as a soldier in the Angolan War in the late 1980s.  In the flashback originally shown 
at the beginning of the film but never completed, we learn that Sean killed a young boy 
hiding in a wooden bureau mistaking him for an Angolan soldier.  Therefore, Sean’s 
“snake” is metaphorically equated with Sipho’s dilemma.  This point is further supported 
later in the film when Sean, to defend Sipho’s beliefs, proclaims to Judge Wendon:  “I 
believed in a soldier, he believed in a tikoloshe.”   
After Sean’s flashback, the sangoma attends to Sean’s “snake” in a brief ritual.  
As Sean lies on the floor, the sangoma makes a small incision with a razor into Sean’s 
chest and then proceeds to suck out the “snake” from the cut whilst positioned on top of 
him.  Shockingly, the sangoma lifts up her head from Sean’s chest and spits a bloodied 
slug into the lid of a jar, removing the “snake” as if it were living in Sean’s body.  
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Though the sangoma obviously tricks the audience into believing in a “snake” by 
presumably holding the slug in her mouth while sucking on Sean’s incision, to most 
Western audiences such an act is biologically impossible.  However, the representation of 
the “snake” is not intended to function on literal, rational levels.  It is a depiction of 
emotional distress, which is symbolically linked to a physical affliction similar to 
Western medicine’s treatment of “germs” (Gumede 1990: 153-155) in order to offer a 
source or explanation for the root of Sean’s “disease.”  More importantly, as presented by 
the film, Sean’s “snake” could not have been relieved by Western medicine but only 
through traditional healing because the sangoma recognizes that Sean’s “snake” is a 
psychosomatic illness manifested physically that has been induced by “strains and 
tensions that are endemic to the social system” (Dillon 1997: 154) of the Angolan War in 
South African history.  In such a context, Richard Dillon argues that ritual is an “effective 
form of psychosocial therapy” (1997: 154).  Thus, the sangoma’s diagnosis and the 
source of Sean’s “snake” are confirmed and Sean finally confronts his emotional trauma.  
John Pemberton offers an appropriate insight to divination rites in order to 
understand the healing ritual performed by the sangoma: 
“All systems of divination are modes of communication developed to bridge 
realms that are intimately related yet distinguishable—the realm of ordinary or 
‘visible’ experience and the realm of unseen powers. Through words, gestures, 
sounds, and artifacts, divination rites arrest the conventional sense of time and 
place, providing for a moment another realm of experience, a world dense with 
meaning, perhaps more real than that in which one has been pursuing his or her 
daily life. Because they are one form of expression of a larger system of religious 
thought and practice, divination rites must be understood within a more 
encompassing cultural context and not as a prescientific mode of inquiry” 
(Pemberton 2006). 
   
By undergoing the ritual, Sean is able to experience “another realm of experience,” which 
before the rite was an unfamiliar cultural context.  In contrast, watching the entire rite 
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from the other side of the room, Sean’s wife is startled and horrified—all of the emotions 
a typical Western audience would feel if not familiar with sangoma practices nor 
traditional healing.  Sean, however, has obviously undergone an African insider’s 
experience and thereby crosses the multiple cultural thresholds.   
Though this discussion of Rachel, the sangoma in A Reasonable Man, revolves 
around a sangoma’s function as a traditional healer, it is important to note the conflation 
of traditional healing and religious practices.  Because traditional healers address an 
afflicted person holistically by treating the patient’s physical, emotional, and spiritual 
condition (Gumede 1990: 153-155), traditional healing and traditional religion are 
intricately linked.  Likewise, “as numerous scholars have recognized, African religions 
are part and parcel of the whole fabric of African cultural life” (Ray 1976: 16).  It is for 
this reason that the study of African religions is often “polymethodic and 
multidimensional” (1976: 16).   
In A Reasonable Man, the prosecution lawyer for Sipho’s trial, Sam Linde, views 
a sangoma not as a healer but a figurehead for a certain belief system that is superstitious 
and antithetical to Christianity.  Landau Kaspin cites a relevant example of African 
Christians who denounce non-Christian practices as a form of paganism: 
“In the political arena and private home, the city and the farm, African Christians 
identify faith with virtue and achievement, paganism with sin and incivility, and 
understand salvation—in this world or the next—to be the destiny of the 
observant” (Kaspin 2002: 328).   
 
In the same way, while interrogating Rachel on the stand in Sipho’s trial, Linde attempts 
to belittle sangoma practices in comparison to the “superiority” of Christianity: 
Linde:        “Sangoma, what level of education do you have?” 
Sangoma:  “I’m sorry?” 
Linde:        “What sort of official schooling do you have?” 
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Sean:         “Objection, my lord.” 
Linde:        “Official schooling goes somewhere towards eradicating superstition.” 
Sean:         “The witness is called as an expert in superstition, my lord.” 
Sangoma:  “Where I came from in Swaziland there was only a primary school  
  organized by the church.” 
Linde:        “You were raised to be Christian?” 
Sangoma:  “I was raised by my people.  I went to school for a short time.  We  
 learned about eating the body of Christ and drinking his blood.  It  
 seemed ugly.”   
Linde:        “I see, you prefer goat’s blood.” 
Sangoma:  “To the blood of the lamb?  Yes I do.” 
Linde:        “Right, but you have no professional qualifications?” 
Sangoma:  “I am not a professor of sangomas, Mr. Linde, I am a sangoma.” 
 
Not only does Linde try to prove that sangoma’s are uneducated, he endeavors to corner 
Rachel and reveal the supposed irrationality and superstition of sangoma practices.  In 
response, Rachel spoils Linde’s attempts by creating a parallel between Christianity and 
sangoma rituals.  Rachel sincerely suggests that the religious goals of Christianity and 
sangoma practices are not entirely different as Linde presupposes.  Therefore, in Linde’s 
effort to reveal traditional healing’s absurdities, he ends up highlighting his own 
hypocrisy.  Furthermore, Wines points out that sangomas actually “spend years in 
apprenticeships, not altogether unlike interns in Western hospitals” (Wines 2004).  
Though sangomas like Rachel may not have a fully Westernized education, she is still a 
well-trained traditional healer.   
Mwana and Traditional Healing in Pièces d'Identités 
  
 Mani Kongo sends his young daughter Mwana away to Belgium so that she can 
have a better life than the one she could have among the economic devastation of the 
Congo (California Newsreel n.d.).  Mani Kongo returns to Belgium after more than 
twenty years to reunite with Mwana and bring her back to the Congo.  However, Mani 
Kongo eventually learns that Mwana has not become the successful doctor he hoped she 
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would be when he sent her away with the Catholic missionaries.  In fact, the only doctor 
in Mwana’s life is her good friend, Safi.  We learn that Mwana, in comparison, has been 
in jail for two years for drug-trafficking because of her involvement with Viva-wa-Viva, 
“a small-time, designer-clad hustler or sapeur” (California Newsreel n.d.), and is now 
being forced by Jefke, the police commissioner in Brussels, to work as a dancer at the 
club, “Le Privé,” in order to keep her residence permit.  Jefke uses Mwana and threatens 
to deport her to get inside information to search for the notorious robber, “The Savior of 
Humanity,” and other suspects in the clientele of the club.  
 Ironically, Mani Kongo and Mwana eventually reunite towards the end of the 
film, not at “African Night” being held in one of the local clubs, but in an apolitical 
residence for “white” poor and elderly Belgians, a place in which Mani Kongo 
temporarily lives after leaving the politicized environment of the “African House” 
specifically designated for African émigrés.  Mwana then chooses to return to the Congo 
with her father and Mani Kongo suggests to Mwana that she can still become a doctor—a 
traditional healer for the village:     
 Mwana:          “Thanks, father.  I’m so happy, but I wish I had come home as a  
doctor.” 
Mani Kongo:  “Our medicine man, Mfumu, will give you your degree.  He knows  
the secret of all the plants.  No woman has ever been a medicine  
man!  But this trip has taught me that times have changed.  Let’s  
not rush though.  First we must call together the Elders.”   
 
Though Mani Kongo maintains his traditional beliefs, he also reflects an attitude of 
flexibility so that Mwana may become a traditional healer. 
 POLYGAMY  
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Polygamy, as explored in this paper, refers specifically to polygyny, in which one 
husband is married to more than one wife at the same time (Moller & Welch 1985: 1; 
Thomson 1994: 99).  Polygamy can also be called plural marriage.  Even though both 
social systems allow it, polygamy is more common among Muslim rather than Christian 
African communities (Peil 1984: 159).   
In a study conducted in South Africa, Valerie Moller and G.J. Welch list several 
reasons for the function of polygamy:  production and reproduction, status and prestige, 
and female companionship.  One possible explanation for polygamy is that the marriage 
of more than one wife facilitates the birth of a larger number of children per family 
during a given period of time (Moller & Welch 1985: 8; Peil 1984: 158).  Secondly, the 
number of wives one has can be considered a sign of wealth because multiple wives not 
only require material security but are seen as material possessions as well (Moller & 
Welch 1985: 14-16).  Finally, Moller and Welch propose that polygamy fosters female 
companionship among co-wives in an environment characterized by a division of labor 
among the sexes (1985: 16).  Household chores can thus be divided evenly amongst the 
wives so that additional time is available for other activities (Peil 1984: 158).    
 John Mbiti presents an insight into the social practice of polygamy among African 
cultures for reproductive and spiritual reasons:    
“If the philosophical or theological attitude towards marriage and procreation is 
that these are an aid toward the partial recapture or attainment of lost immortality, 
the more wives a man has, the more children he is likely to have, and the more 
children the stronger the power of ‘immortality’ in the family” (Mbiti 1969: 142). 
 
In this sense, a husband and wife’s “immortality” is based on the continual renewal of the 
family line:   
 116
“…we must note also that marriage and procreation in African communities are a 
unity: without procreation marriage is incomplete.  This is a unity which attempts 
to recapture, at least in part, the lost gift of immortality…It is a religious 
obligation by means of which the individual contributes the seeds of life towards 
man’s struggle against the loss of original immortality.  Biologically both husband 
and wife are reproduced in their children, thus perpetuating the chain of 
humanity”  (Mbiti 1969: 133). 
 
Mbiti’s line of reasoning echoes the discussion of ancestor veneration in an earlier 
section, in which a death without descendants is the punishment of an eternal death 
(Thomson 1994: 95).   
For most Western audiences, polygamy is an issue of fidelity.  The condemnation 
of polygamy is often based on Christian ideals of monogamy and marriage (Moller & 
Welch 1985: 17-18; Peil 1984: 158).  In fact, “over much of Africa monogamy now 
successfully competes with polygamy (at least formally)” (Roberts 1985: 421).  Une 
couleur café and Xala address the ideological conflict between Christian and traditional 
African practices of marriage.  In these films polygamous desires are contrasted against 
monogamous ethics, complicated, however, by modern trends of infidelity.   
 
Polygamy in Une couleur café  
  
 In Une couleur café, Doc has two African wives, Awa and Kada, and one Parisian  
mistress, Maria.  At the beginning of the film, Doc, Awa, his first wife, and his friend 
Spif, wait at the airport for Doc’s flight to the Ivory Coast in Africa.  Later we learn that 
Doc has made a special trip to the Ivory Coast to bring back Kada, his second and 
youngest wife, to Paris, based on an arranged marriage agreement he has made with 
Kada’s father.  Meeting Kada for the first time, Doc tries to impress her by telling Kada 
he is a doctor and has a house in Paris.  He also presents Kada with a gift—a small statue 
of the Eiffel Tower: “It’s Paris!”  The director, Henri Duparc, humorously reduces the 
 117
idealized grandness of Paris to a cheap souvenir.  Doc tries to further persuade Kada:     
“Kada, your future is not in this hole.  It’s in France.  In Paris.”  However, the French 
Embassy in the Ivory Coast does not allow Doc to obtain a visa for Kada as his second 
wife since polygamy is “tolerated but not actually legal on French territory” (Barlet 2000: 
135).  In a conversation with the visa counselor, the audience is exposed to the 
difficulties Doc encounters:     
 Visa Counselor:  “Being married, you can’t obtain papers for a second wife.” 
 Doc:                    “It’s racism.” 
Visa Counselor:  “No, sir.  It’s not racism.  It’s in the regulations concerning  
foreigners.”  
 
Doc angrily marches out of the Consulate General of France in the Ivory Coast.  Doc then 
secures visa papers and a passport from his cousin through underground sources and 
returns to France with Kada as his “daughter.”   
 When Kada arrives in France, she is not impressed with Paris, particularly the 
rundown building where she will be living: “So this is Paris?  Paris is dirty!”  The wives 
finally meet and kiss each other on the cheek.  Because there is only one bedroom in the 
small apartment, Awa and Kada must rotate nights with Doc.  Adding to this 
inconvenience, the other wife is expected to sleep in the living room on a mattress, 
ironically purchased with money from Maria, Doc’s Parisian mistress.  Doc insensitively 
asks Awa if she likes the “gift” he brought her from the Ivory Coast.  However, though 
Awa and Kada get along, she knows that Kada is truly Doc’s selfish “gift”:  “She’s not 
my gift.  She’s yours.  What do I get out of a gift like that?”   
Doc gets himself into even more trouble when he lies to Maria and first says that 
Kada is his “daughter” but quickly reveals that she is actually his “niece” after Maria gets 
upset that he has a “child.”  Doc suggests the situation is an “African” one and is 
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therefore complicated:  “Maria, it’s hard to explain.  You know, that’s Africa.”  Perhaps 
one of the funniest scenes in the film is when Doc brings Maria home to meet Awa and 
Kada.  Of course, Doc lies to all three woman and explains to Awa and Kada that Maria 
is merely his “union” representative.  In this scene, “the film playfully opens up 
polygamous possibilities across racial lines when Docteur [Doc] brings home a White 
coworker with whom he is having an affair.  As expected, the situation unravels when she 
discovers that she has rivals, and the man may in the end have to be content with one and 
only one obedient wife” (Pfaff 2004:113).     
Kada eventually becomes displeased by the arrangement and ultimately defies the 
patriarchal leadership Doc attempts to assume over Kada and Awa.  Both Awa and Kada 
comment:   
 Awa:  “I never imagined France like this.” 
 Kada:  “Me too.”     
 
Playing the same game that Doc plays, Kada ends up cheating on Doc with Fatim’s 
cousin, Pierre, an Arab butcher, and falls pregnant with Pierre’s child.  Upon first hearing 
the news, Doc assumes it is his baby.  After being accused of “incest” when Kada’s 
secretarial school finds out she is pregnant because they believe Doc is Kada’s “father,” 
Doc is brought to the police station and questioned: 
Police Officer:  “So you have two African wives, and a French mistress.  French  
   and white? 
Doc:      “Yes.” 
Police Officer:  “Plundering our natural resources!” 
 
The scene not only hilariously reveals Doc’s own web of lies, but how polygamy is not 
well understood by Western culture, in particular, French society.  
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Instead of Doc’s two wives bringing him double the amount of expected 
matrimonial bliss, he eventually ends up with twice the amount of trouble since Kada and 
Awa form a bond over not only their status as co-wives but as partners against Doc’s 
cheating.  Kada boldly tells Awa:  “My papa says:  Marriage is an alliance.  If you find 
better, leave.”  This indicates that even Kada’s father, who originally made profit out of 
her arranged marriage with Doc, is modernized because he enables Kada to set herself 
free from the “contract” he has facilitated.  After Awa and Kada find out that Doc is 
cheating on them with Maria, they decide to take “revenge” on Doc.  On one particular 
night, Awa makes dinner and Doc is excited that there is smoked meat.  Awa first serves 
herself instead of Doc.  He is absolutely shocked and says that he has a marital duty to 
perform so that he needs to eat properly.  Ironically, though Doc typically associates his 
marital duties with sex, Doc never upholds his responsibility to be faithful, which is also 
an important vow of matrimony, even within polygamous marriages.  Doc eventually 
ends up waiting on himself.  On the same night, Kada refuses Doc’s sexual advances:   
 Kada:  “No marital duty tonight.” 
 Doc:    “Are you crazy?  A wife obeys her husband.” 
 Kada:  “I’m your daughter.” 
 Doc:    “Are you sick?” 
 Kada:  “No, Papa, I’m fine.” 
 Doc:  “Me, your Papa!  You’re nuts!” 
 Kada:  “Go see your union!” 
 
Kada gets out of the bed and confronts Doc about Maria.  She takes control of the 
situation and imposes standards on Doc.  Instead of Doc being in control of his two 
wives, Kada reverses such roles and makes the ultimatum that until Maria comes to live 
with them as his “third” wife, Kada will not let Doc touch her.  If this does not happen, 
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Kada tells Doc that she will find her own lover.  Doc, however, insists on being the 
“man” of the house: 
Doc:  “Now listen good!  I’m the master here!  No one tells me what to do.  If I  
want to take a third wife, whether she’s a sausage, or a yam, or a string  
bean, that’s my problem!”   
 
Ultimately, Doc inevitably ends up losing his mistress, Maria, his second wife, Kada, and 
is immediately deported back to the Ivory Coast.   
Polygamy in Xala 
In Xala, Rama, the daughter of the main character, El Hadji, and El Hadji’s first 
wife, Adja, openly criticizes her father’s practice of polygamy.  Rama proclaims, “I 
won’t share my husband with another woman” and she soon continues, “a polygamous 
man is a liar.”  For Rama, as a young, educated African woman growing up in post-
colonial Senegal, there are alternative paradigms such as monogamy that could seem 
more appealing than the traditional practice of polygamy:  
“Criticisms may be aimed at either refining or modifying a received tradition to 
bring it more into harmony with the contemporary cultural trends, or at 
abandoning a tradition altogether because it is seen as good for nothing or as 
totally out of tune with the contemporary cultural ethos” (Gyekye 1997: 223). 
 
Petty contextualizes Rama’s criticism of the tradition of polygamy and suggests that 
Rama perceives underlying social conflicts based on unfair power relationships:  
“Rama sees the humiliation and unhappiness of her mother as an integral part of 
her own experience as a woman.  She also understands that her father’s third wife 
is a victim of a system of power relationships that do not in any way consider the 
human dignity of the woman concerned” (Petty 1996: 100).   
 
Offering a contextual explanation for Rama’s liberal attitudes, Margaret Peil contributes 
the change of gender roles to increasing urbanization.  Women living in the cities tend to 
become more autonomous due to a shift in power once held solely by men (Peil 1984: 
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172-173).  Peil suggests that in particular education among women decreases levels of 
polygyny:     
“Education for girls seems to be the most important factor in decreasing levels of 
polygyny.  Girls who go beyond primary school are often exposed to European 
ideas of monogamous marriage, either through the Christian values of the school, 
reading women’s magazines, or travel abroad” (Peil 1984: 158).  
 
Petty seconds this claim and notes that in particular, Rama’s Western education 
ultimately separates her ideologically from her traditional mother, Awa, who obviously 
sanctions polygamy (Petty 1996: 71).   
However, in the same scene where Rama questions El Hadji, her father slaps her 
in the face and immediately comments that polygamy is a traditional right for Senegalese 
men (Pfaff 2004: 136):  
El Hadji:  “I’m the master here.  You can take your revolution elsewhere.  It’s  
 people like me, your father, who kicked out the colonialists.  Polygamy     
 is our religious patrimony.” 
 
Petty notes that El Hadji’s and Rama’s contrasting ideologies are further represented in 
the film through the mis en scene (Petty 1996: 71).  In particular, Petty describes the 
scene in which Rama stops by El Hadji’s grocery store:  
“In this scene, El Hadji is seated in front of a political map of Africa (with borders 
established during colonialism), while Rama is seated in front of a pan-African 
map (without political borders).  This implied split in their positions is furthered 
when El Hadji offers a glass of French mineral water, which she refuses because 
it is imported.  By placing the bottle, which represents France, between them on 
his desk, Sembene makes literal the metaphorical and ideological gulf that 
separates father and daughter” (Petty 1996: 71).  
 
Thus, the director Ousmane Sembene not only expresses Rama and El Hadji’s different 
ideologies through dialogue but also through the use of physical space.  
 According to Petty, each of El Hadji’s three wives represents a different point of 
view that is relevant to “Senegal’s cultural bankruptcy as a neocolonial nation” (Petty 
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1996: 69).  El Hadji has three wives:  Awa, the first wife, Oumi, the second wife, and 
Ngone, the third and youngest wife.  Awa is the oldest wife and “appears as the 
embodiment of traditional African values (Mother Africa) in both her dress and her 
behavior (Petty 1996: 69).  In fact, when Rama questions her mother Awa about why she 
allows El Hadji to take a third wife, Awa remains quiet and passive about the situation. 
The second wife, Oumi, “embodies the materialistic, seductive temptress (Africa in its 
present neocolonial state) who leaves her husband at the first sign of financial insecurity” 
(1996: 69).  Oumi exudes an “immediate, vital, demanding and corporeal sexuality” 
(Mulvey 1994: 529). Oumi’s materialism, superficiality, and “status-seeking greed and 
love of all things Western” (1996: 70) is represented in stark contrast to the patience and 
traditional values of Awa.  However, as the first wife, Awa ultimately holds more power 
and authority and thus Oumi is forced to respect Awa:  “Awa pointedly reminds El Hadji 
of the Islamic marital laws which state that, as second wife, Oumi must come to her” 
(Petty 1996: 70).   
Ngone, on the other hand, is an “image and commodity and, half concealed 
behind the wedding veil, she evokes the double nature of commodity fetishism” (Mulvey 
1994: 529).  Laura Mulvey clarifies what is meant by such an observation:     
“The commodity, to circulate and realize the capital invested in it, must seduce its 
consumer and, in its very seductiveness, its ‘packagedness,’ disguise the secret of 
its origins” (1994: 529).   
 
In other words, unlike Awa and Oumi who have already been “consumed” by El Hadji, 
Ngone is a virginal bride:  Because of El Hadji’s impotence on his wedding night, and the 
other times he tries to perform for Ngone, however, she is a commodity, so to speak, that 
El Hadji never obtains.  El Hadji failed to copulate with Ngone and thus she remained 
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virginal, hence “packaged,” despite their marital union.  The representation of Ngone as a 
commodity is further illustrated by El Hadji’s treatment of Ngone’s car, a wedding gift 
from El Hadji: 
“As [El Hadji] leaves the villa after his unconsummated wedding night, he stops 
by the car and touches it mournfully, so that the car seems to substitute for 
Ngone’s unattainable sexuality.  The car’s fetishistic quality, its elevation out of 
ordinary use, the ribbons, is displaced onto her figure” (1994: 529).   
  
Thus, ironically, Ngone is both a commodity and commodified by El Hadji since to 
“purchase” Ngone, he embezzled and illegally sold the quota of rice intended for the 
country people thereby engaging in “financial corruption and exploitative entrepreneurial 
capitalism” (1994: 529). 
Thus, polygamy in Xala is not only a literal social phenomenon described in 
Senegalese culture, but also a metaphorical narrative device used to “expose the 
conflicting ideological positions” of Senegalese society (Petty 1996: 70) and to reveal the 
underlying value of commodification in the film since the plentitude of El Hadji’s wives 
represent a form of wealth and commodification in and of itself. 
  
PATRIARCHY AND MASCULINITY IN AFRICAN SOCIETIES 
  
 The function of patriarchal social structures among African societies is directly 
connected to ideas about masculinity.  Patriarchy is a “useful shorthand for conveying a 
relationship of inequity that is, in practice, highly variable because it works alongside 
other social structures” (Loomba 2005: 21).  Lisa A. Lindsay and Stephen Miescher 
define masculinity as a “cluster of norms, values, and behavioral patterns expressing 
explicit and implicit expectations of how men should act and represent themselves to 
others” (Lindsay & Miescher 2003: 4).  Just like “racial” signifiers such as “black” and 
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“white,” masculinity theories are culturally and historically constructed based on 
continually changing and contested power relations (2003: 4).  In particular, wealth, age, 
seniority, and ritual authority commonly articulate African definitions of masculinity 
(2003: 4).  While the term manhood typically refers to “notions explicitly related to 
men’s physiology” (2003: 4), masculinity, on the other hand, is a broader concept that 
can even be attributed to degrees of femininity, an idea which is expressed, for example, 
by the term “female masculinity.”  The concept of female masculinity implies that gender 
is not only restricted to physical definitions but social constructions as well.   
For this discussion, ideas about masculinity will be discussed in application to 
male African societies.  Through forms of masculine privilege, which include the power 
of hegemony, control of obedience, and the ability to subordinate (Connell 1995: 79), 
African men are able to enjoy “patriarchal dividend” or the “advantage men in general 
gain from the overall subordination of women” (1995: 79).  Scholars even claim that 
Islam, Christianity, and European colonization have intensified female subordination in 
Africa (Thackway 2003: 150).  Patrick Hogan proposes that patriarchal structures are as 
powerful and oppressive as colonialism because the “derogation of reflective and 
practical identity is the same—misogyny substituting for racism, disdain for women’s 
practices paralleling contempt for indigenous culture” (Hogan 2000: 86).  Therefore, 
patriarchal structures are typically oppressive and severely undermine female identities.  
Kada’s Father in Une couleur café  
The conversation between Kada and her father in Une couleur café is an 
appropriate example of patriarchal social structures.  True to the director Henri Duparc’s 
humorous depiction of stereotypes in Une couleur café, however, the patriarchal structure 
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is not represented as objective nor ultimately capable of subordinating women.  Duparc 
uses the scene between Kada and her father to establish exaggerated stereotypes and to 
dispel audience expectations about patriarchal structures in African cultures.  
Significantly, it is from this inversion of stereotypes that Une couleur café derives its 
overall message about African identities.    
After being summoned, Kada sits down and her father begins expressing his 
thoughts and the reason for summoning her:       
Father:  “You see, man liberated woman from slavery in society but it was to  
                make her his personal slave and it’s better that way.”   
 
Kada looks down and smiles as if amused by her father’s “wisdom” and instruction. 
Though dressed in traditional clothing and quietly respectful while her father speaks, 
Kada is not a subjugated character.  Though she hand-washes clothes, walks around bare-
foot, wears traditional clothing, and lives in a dusty rural village in the Ivory Coast, 
Kada’s amusement reveals a subtle defiance in her demeanor that one would not expect 
from the treatment of African female characters thus far in the film.  This is evidence that 
while Kada quietly listens to her father’s didactic guidance, she does not believe that 
women are truly inferior to men.    
During the father’s speech, the film makes a strong generalization about male 
African values and even African male/female relationships.  This is a common tactic that 
is used throughout the film in general to not only question stereotypes but to do so in a 
humorous way.  The conversation between Kada and her father helps create stereotypes 
within the film about patriarchy while at the same time denying the complete reality of 
such clichés.  Firstly, the father speaks and the daughter listens.  This is not a typical 
“conversation” in which two people are equally involved in sharing thoughts.  This 
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moment of female obedience and silence is echoed later on in the film when Awa, Doc’s 
second wife, tells the French police officer interrogating her that “for us, men do the 
talking.”  Though the film does not treat Kada’s father as an overbearing man, the 
father’s speech suggests that men attempt to have social power over women to the point 
of ownership.  In a way, the father’s speech reinforces the same values that Doc’s 
behavior hints at throughout the film—women are possessions.  
Secondly, one cannot ignore what most Western audiences would call the 
“political incorrectness” of the father’s statement.  There are several layers in the 
deconstruction of this “political incorrectness” as may be perceived by Western 
audiences.  The father obviously implies that women will always be slaves but that it is 
better to be a slave to one man than a society.  The societal slavery of which Kada’s 
father speaks refers to the general condition of slavery into which most “blacks” and 
other non-white people throughout history have been subjugated across the world:  
“Colonialism also dislocated people through its imperial organization of migrant 
labor and soldiering.  One of the striking examples of colonial dislocation was, 
obviously, the institution of African slavery, which was succeeded, in the 
nineteenth century, by the system of Indian indentured labor.  It is important to 
note that these dislocations did not constitute ‘free movement,’ but a ‘middle 
passage’ from one boundedness and bondedness to another.  Free movement of 
persons and commodities, a dogma of economic liberalism, was in many places 
restricted to the enlightened, Western colonizer” (van der Veer 1997: 91). 
 
Regardless of whether or not non-white communities, including both men and women, 
have been enslaved in the past does not matter.  Shared historical experiences of slavery 
do not enter the father’s mind nor appeal to his sympathy, since he argues 
opportunistically to support his privileges and financial gain from Kada’s arranged 
marriage.  However, this expected sympathy is simply a Western construct that allows 
Duparc to successfully exaggerate the chauvinism of the father without truly being 
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offensive.  This is one of the key elements in Duparc’s treatment of the chauvinism in 
this scene:  The father is set up as a “wise man” but his wisdom is not framed as 
objectively wise since even Kada quietly smirks during his speech.  In the father’s heart, 
he truly believes that what he shares with Kada is enlightening and helpful information 
despite the sexist and patriarchal undertones of his speech.  Thus, the father’s advice is 
not meant to forcefully dominate Kada but to reveal to her how male society works.   
 To top this, the father reveals to Kada that a marriage has been arranged between 
her and Diaby’s son, Doc.  Kada’s father finishes his line of reasoning: “It may seem 
strange but marrying a man is a way to be free.”  After silently listening to her father’s 
thoughts, Kada finally speaks out and protests the decision.  Though Kada is superficially 
presented as a traditional character, she is not fully subjugated as assumed by Western 
perceptions of women in traditional societies.  Kada’s response to the father implies that 
she has a mind of her own, despite respecting her father’s wishes.  Thus, while 
maintaining certain traditional values in her lifestyle as an African women, Kada is also 
semi-liberated from patriarchal social structures.  Concluded by Kada’s father and Doc in 
her absence, and thus off-camera, however, the arranged marriage serves as an example 
of a hegemonic masculine social structure (Connell 1995: 79) that is imposed upon her.   
Though Kada’s brief protest during the conversation with her father confirms that 
traditions such as arranged marriage are slowly being challenged, especially since such 
traditions as depicted by Une couleur café deny women complete freedom of choice, 
Kada eventually marries Doc.  When Kada leaves Doc, she leaves him for Pierre.  
Therefore, we learn that Kada is ultimately dependent upon men for security.  In this 
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way, Duparc’s represents the difficulty of permanently escaping patriarchal social 
structures.   
 
 
Doc in Une couleur café 
 In Une couleur café, Doc’s masculinity is derived from his ability to procreate 
and his wives’ obedience.  The importance of procreation and polygamy for Doc may be 
clarified by analysis of polygamy described in an earlier section.  First, polygamy 
facilitates the likelihood of reproduction success because the chances of fertility among 
several wives is greater than with just one wife (Moller & Welch 1985: 8).  Secondly, 
procreation is not only a reflection of a biological urge, but also a spiritual and emotional 
attempt to capture immortality (Mbiti 1969: 133, 142).  Thus, because Doc is sterile, his 
wives’ obedience becomes an even more critical source of control since he cannot derive 
his masculinity from his procreation efforts, and therefore, must obtain it through power.   
After returning from the Ivory Coast with his second wife, Kada, we learn that 
Doc is not a doctor but an orderly at a local Parisian hospital.  Doc reveals to his real 
doctor friend that he has brought back a second wife in hopes of increasing his chances of 
having a child.  The real doctor comments: 
Doctor:  “I am not sure that will solve your problem.  You should still follow the  
    treatment.”   
 
Up until this point in the film, Doc has been portrayed as a sort of large-and-in-charge 
character wearing fancy suits and seducing his mistress, Maria.  He has been fully 
masculinized by his wealth of wives and lover.  In this scene, however, it is revealed that 
Doc has a medical problem causing sterility.  Thus, no matter how many wives Doc may 
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secure in a polygamous marriage, his chances to procreate are impossible.   Therefore, 
besides just sexual gratification, because of Doc’s sterility, a new motive for having two 
wives and a lover is offered.   
Even though he has two wives and one mistress, Doc still has problems 
conceiving a child and therefore laments about his manhood:   
Doc:  “Am I still a man?  Maybe someone from my village put a curse on me.   
What’s going on?  Neither of you is pregnant?  Dr. Diallo must be right.  
He says it’s me.  It’s me who can’t have a child.”   
 
Thus, when Doc finds out that Kada is pregnant, he is completely ecstatic and excited 
because he assumes it is his child, and that miraculously he no longer has a problem with 
sterility:    
Social Worker:  “Mr. Diaby, please sit down.  I’m the social worker.  I asked you  
 to come because I have some bad news.  Your daughter Kada is      
 pregnant.  Cheer up.  It’s not a tragedy.” 
Doc:     “Pregnant.  Kada’s pregnant?  Oh, God, thank you!  Now I’m a  
   man, a real man.  The village will celebrate.  It’s me!  I   
   impregnated Kada.”   
Social Worker:  “You?  Her father?” 
Doc:                  “Me, her father?  I was joking!  It wasn’t me.  Madame, Kada is  
    not my daughter.  She’s my second wife.” 
 
Despite the trouble Doc gets into with the French police and French court, because they 
believe Doc has committed “incest” with Kada, Doc is relieved and his masculinity is 
momentarily re-affirmed. 
 In the final court scene, however, Doc discovers that the child belongs to Pierre.  
Not only is Doc re-emasculated, but he is also stripped of his power as a husband as well 
since Kada chooses to run off with Pierre.  In addition to this, Doc is deported back to the 
Ivory Coast and ultimately disempowered politically, matrimonially, and reproductively.    
Punishing Patriarchy:  Matriarchy in Hyènes 
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Alternatively, Hyènes is a film about matriarchy that strives to punish oppressive 
patriarchal structures.  One of the main characters, Ramatou, who has become one of the 
most powerful and richest prostitutes in the world after being scorned by the village 
almost thirty years ago, returns to Colobane and positions herself as the new economic 
matriarch.  The repeated imagery of hyenas—the juxtaposition of images of hyenas and 
shots of the townsmen in particular—within the film helps evidence the fact that 
Ramatou is a matriarch.  Among African societies, “hyenas arouse humor and horror—
the former because the genitals of the females inexplicably mimic those of males, giving 
rise to the myth that hyenas are hermaphrodites, and the latter because of a link with 
death (Carroll 2005: 55).  “One of Africa’s most successful predators” (2005: 50), spotted 
hyenas are most notoriously known as scavengers and feed on the same carcasses as 
vultures (Kruuk 1972: 145).  The jaws of a hyena are so powerful and well-adapted that a 
hyena can consume almost anything (Carroll 2005: 59).  Even the bones of animals are 
often eaten by hyenas (2005: 59).  
However, hyenas are also complex social animals:  “Hierarchical in all things, 
hyena etiquette usually requires the submissive animal to initiate the greeting” (Carroll 
2005: 53).  According to the American Wildlife Foundation, a group of spotted hyenas is 
called a clan or den and may include 5-90 members and led by a single alpha female 
called the matriarch (American Wildlife Foundation n.d.).  Females are the dominant 
members, followed in rank by cubs, while adult males rank lowest (Carroll 2005: 53; 
Kruuk 1972: 230-235).  Low-ranking members of the clan often learn how to “eat fast 
and eat alone” (Carroll 2005: 59) in order to avoid fighting with a dominant hyena for 
food.  Even though a clan of hyenas may reach up to 90 members (American Wildlife 
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Foundation n.d.), it is common for a group to split into smaller cells, and then rejoin the 
larger clan days or weeks later (Carroll 2005: 53).  Male hyenas, which are usually 
smaller and less aggressive than females, often begin leaving the clan when they are 
about two years old (Kruuk 1972: 234-235).   After the group reintegrates, “hyenas of all 
ages, ranks, and sexes engage in ceremonial one-on-one greetings” (Carroll 2005: 53).      
Not only does the socialization of hyenas reflect the community structure of 
Colobane, where Ramatou represents the matriarch and the townsmen serve as the lower-
ranking members of the group, but the imagery of hyenas also represents a counter-image 
of the townsmen’s own humanity within the film.  The hyenas serve as an embodiment of 
moral configurations and emotionally charged ideas (Werbner 1996: 237).  These moral 
lessons and ideas are linked to the overall message of Hyènes, in which the hierarchical 
structure of a hyena den leads to greed because of its openness for competition.  Because 
a hierarchy is by definition exclusive and undemocratic, it leads to a survival-of-the-
fittest scenario.  Therefore, in order to be rewarded materialistically, the townsmen must 
become competitors.  In order to ascend the hierarchy, the townsmen must do so through 
materialistic gain, even though inevitably, they will always fall short of the highest 
position, which is the matriarchal position controlled by Ramatou.  
Like scavengers awaiting the death of a prey, the entire town of Colobane eagerly 
awaits Ramatou’s arrival:  “Linguere Ramatou who left so long ago is returning richer 
than the World Bank.”  Once she returns, she will balance the social order of Colobane as 
matriarch, but is most importantly expected to restore its economic wealth.  A crowd of 
townspeople march the streets and announce the news of Ramatou’s return:        
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Linguere Ramatou is returning to Colobane after thirty years.  She is bringing 
riches with her.  She’s bringing everything back to Colobane.  Colobane, where 
trains, planes, and even cars no longer stop.” 
 
True to Ramatou’s affluence, she arrives in full force with her entourage and 
riches.  With the hope that Ramatou can restore Colobane’s lost splendor, the townsmen 
who cannot remember a single thing about Ramatou, cater to Ramatou once she returns 
even though ironically they once judged her for falling pregnant out of wedlock.  Instead 
of claiming Ramatou’s child, this was a lie perpetuated by Draman by manipulatively 
bribing two young men to say they had slept with Ramatou.  
   In one of the most important scenes of the film, the townspeople are all gathered 
to welcome Ramatou.  The mayor of Colobane greets Ramatou and recites a prepared 
speech in her honor, thanking Ramatou for returning to Colobane.  Though the mayor 
assumes control of the event and most of the events that have transpired before 
Ramatou’s arrival, it is obvious that upon her return, Ramatou has become the main 
source of control as the matriarch.  This fact is evidenced after Ramatou responds to the 
mayor’s welcome speech, especially after she buys Colobane’s court: 
Ramatou:  “Talking is good but telling the truth is better.  My childhood was  
 different from the way the Mayor described it.  Draman and I stole  
 those potatoes so we’d have a better bed to sleep on.  But to make you  
 happier, people of Colobane, I’ll give you 100 thousand millions.     
 Half you can share between you.  On one condition.” 
Mayor:     “What condition?” 
Ramatou:  “That I buy Colobane’s court.” 
 
At first, Ramatou proposes that she buy Colobane’s court, which is a startling revelation 
to the townsmen.  However, Ramatou’s startling requests become even more shocking as 
her speech continues:   
 Ramatou:  “The court did not give me justice….and that angered me.” 
 Mayor:      “And now?” 
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 Ramatou:  “I’ll give 100,000 millions if someone will kill Draman Drameh.  I’ve  
       forgotten nothing.  The pain is etched on my heart.  I have forgotten   
       neither our love nor your betrayal.  We’re both old now.  You’re     
       decrepit and I’m cut to bits by surgeon’s knives.  Now I want the  
       score settled between us.” 
 
The townsmen promptly refuse Ramatou’s demand to kill Draman.  The mayor replies to 
Ramatou’s assumption, but Ramatou smiles at the mayor with the confidence that the 
townspeople’s values can be easily undermined and compromised:         
Mayor:     “We’re in Africa but the drought will never turn us into savages.  In the  
       name of Colobane and humanity, I refuse your offer.  Rather  
       starvation than blood on our hands.” 
Ramatou:  “I’ll wait.”    
However, as Ramatou predicts, the townspeople eventually submit.  Ultimately, the 
material benefits of Ramatou’s wealth outweigh their moral concern.  Therefore, 
Ramatou not only purchases Colobane’s justice system, she eventually buys its economy 
and the right to human life.  Even though Ramatou is extremely wealthy, however, and 
therefore economically powerful, she is also represented as an emotionally authoritative 
figure.  Throughout the film Ramatou is depicted as an aggressive, assertive, and 
authoritative woman.  She is literally partially made out of iron and gold, both durable 
and resistant metals:   
Draman:   “Are you all artificial?” 
Ramatou:  “Take a look.  There it is.” 
Draman:   “But you’re all iron.” 
Ramatou:  “My plane crashed.  Everyone else died.  I crawled out.  I’m not that  
                               easily killed.  The spirits protect me.”   
Eventually Draman is killed by the townsmen in the penultimate scene of the film.  Thus, 
Ramatou successfully punishes the patriarchal systems that once subjugated her and 
ultimately controls the entire city of Colobane.   
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In Hyènes, temptations of material wealth and power in the face of poverty create 
tension, greed, and deceit among citizens in the peri-urban, Senegalese town of Colobane.  
Though the representation of the Colobane is abstract, the meaning it serves is clear and 
specific:   
“The Colobane of Hyènes is a sad reminder of the economic disintegration, 
corruption, and consumer culture that has enveloped Africa since the 1960s” 
(Ukadike 1999).   
 
Ramatou uses her money to show how corrupt the townspeople can be, especially the 
men, but as the storyline proceeds, the women in Colobane also exhibit greed and 
materialism.  The greed shown in Hyènes proves that “a facet of ‘modernization,’ which 
appears particularly damaging, is the illusory promise of plenty, or of an inexhaustible 
supply guaranteeing livelihood to all” (Abernathy 1971: 8).  Hyènes perfectly depicts 
how the “promise of plenty” that is associated with modernization can quickly nourish 
greed, which Ramatou uses to tempt the townspeople to kill Draman.  In the end, it is the 
townspeople’s greed that eventually kills Draman.  And not only is Draman killed, but a 
bulldozer erases Colobane “from the face of the earth” (Ukadike 1999), thereby 
symbolizing the complete destruction of Colobane at the expense of modernization and 
Westernization. 
 
EXAMPLES OF MODERNIZATION IN AFRICAN  
 
Informal Capitalism in Chikin Biznis 
 At the beginning of Chikin Biznis, the main character Sipho retires from his 
menial job at the Johannesburg Stock Exchange where he has put in “twenty-five years of 
sophisticated slavery.”  Once Sipho is handed a cash bonus from his former boss, he 
begins his retirement with a fresh start by opening up a chicken business in the township.  
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First, Sipho invests his money in an old yellow “bakkie,” formerly a police van during 
apartheid, for his new business.  After buying the second-hand bakkie, Sipho then 
purchases a large batch of chickens from a wholesale vendor.  Optimistic and hopeful, 
Sipho sets up his stand at the local street market in the township and quickly sells his 
batch of chickens to the dismay of his business rival, Uvali.   
Sipho’s chicken business is an example of informal capitalist sector within South 
Africa’s urban areas.  Common activities that qualify as informal sectors include “the 
brewing of traditional African beer, the operation of shebeens (illicit drinking places), 
baby-minding, street barbering, the running of ‘informal’ schools, garbage scavenging, 
newspaper-vending and street hawking in food, clothing and flowers” (Smith 1982: 106).  
Informal economies in South Africa’s urban centers are typically direct responses to 
structural unemployment, especially among “black” Africans (1982: 5).  South Africans 
living in the urban areas, particularly in townships, have resorted to informal activities to 
cope and survive economically (Smith 1982: 5) because urbanization tends to be merged 
with forces of industrialization, Westernization, and capitalism features (Ferguson 1997: 
137).  Thus, Chikin Biznis is able to offer an interesting glimpse at the informal 
economies of townships. 
 
FORMS OF WESTERNIZATION 
 
Westernization occurs voluntarily or involuntarily.  Voluntary Westernization 
may happen as a result of the conscious effort to assume the values of “the West.”  In 
contrast, involuntary Westernization often arises due to the imperialistic nature and 
hegemonic influence of “the West.”  For example, large-scale examples of Western 
influence include Western chronology in which time is perceived in years.  Western 
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chronology “encapsulates a whole world view and a periodization resting on Christian 
assumptions” (Roberts 1985: 38).  Furthermore, Western chronology has affected almost 
the entire world (1985: 38).  Other common features of Westernization are material 
progress and technological advancement (Roberts 1985: 9).  Thus, western civilization 
“has been the major world agent of cultural change from the beginning of modern times” 
(1985: 38).    
Western donor institutions such as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) have also played significant roles in indirectly controlling African 
countries through economic aid, evidently based on the sole experiences of Western 
social fulfillment: 
“In the African context, the role of civil society has been emphasized and 
advocated by the World Bank, the IMF and the international donor community.  
This represents another instance of discourse of Africanism and is illustrative of 
the triumphalism of the West. This triumphalism has resulted in the export, or 
even invention, of civil societies from the West to Africa” (Ahluwalia 2001: 83).    
 
In Hyènes, Ramatou is even compared to the World Bank because of her vast wealth.  
Because most post-colonial African states are weak and experience financial, 
organizational, operational, and environmental constraints, it has been easy for Western 
donor institutions to control them  (Makumbe 1998: 316).  In effect, the post-colonial 
state has been locked into a certain conception of Western modernity with an emphasis 
on development and progress (Ahluwalia 2001: 67).  The devaluation of the CFA and 
assistance from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund have encouraged 
African nations to call for a second independence, particularly among Francophone 
countries (Givanni 2000: 89).       
The Liberation of African Women  
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 Features of Western modernity have had a tremendous impact on women’s 
liberation movements throughout history.  John Morris Roberts suggests that the rights of 
women are “quintessentially a Western cause” (Roberts 1985: 39).  In particular, 
technology and capitalism gave women more spare time (Roberts 1985: 421).  For once, 
women were able to choose to go to work or to even advance their education (1985: 421).  
Neither child-rearing nor domestic responsibilities had to be the main priorities for 
women.  Similarly, urbanization has also affected African women who view town-life has 
a “‘modern’ liberation from the drudgery and social constraints of village life” (Gyekye 
1997: 142).  Liberated and empowered female characters like Rama in Xala suggest that 
Westernization has its rewards, particularly for the development of feminism.  Feminism 
has not only contributed to the liberation of women from domestic roles but continues to 
be a critical force in the overall political and social welfare of women by demanding 
equality in the workforce, and most importantly, a woman’s control over her own body, 
which of course, is directly linked to issues such as abortion and the use of birth-control.    
Western-Educated Elite 
Armes provides a lucid analysis of the historical production of Western-educated 
elite among Third World nations.  Three examples of such elites include criollos 
(American-born Spaniards), ilustrados (Philippine-born Spaniards), bhadralok (Hindu 
elite), and assimilés (West African elite).  These Western-educated elites, and others 
throughout the colonized world, have typically played “a complex mediating role 
between the opposed cultures of the colonizer and the colonized” (Armes 1987: 18).  In 
fact, the elites were intentionally Westernized, or more specifically, provided with a 
Westernized education during the colonial era to work as low-rank administrative 
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positions for the colonial regime (1987: 16-17).  As such, Armes writes, “the elites that 
emerged under colonialism at virtually all the key points of interaction between 
traditional societies and the West” are the social layer through which “ideological, moral 
and philosophical traditions of Western civilization have been transferred, at least 
superficially, to non-Western societies” (1987: 21).  Thus, it is normally the elites of non-
Western countries that speak “the language of the West” (Roberts 1985: 39) with the 
strongest conviction.  Sam Linde, the Western-educated lawyer in A Reasonable Man 
perfectly fits this description.  As is evidenced by his prosecution of Rachel, the 
sangoma, and his vehemence toward Sean for defending Sipho’s beliefs, Linde 
passionately identifies with Western values while condemning non-Christian practices of 
traditional healing and traditional religion.       
In particular, assimilés were “consciously created by the French in West Africa 
from the middle of the nineteenth century onward as an elite that would be more attached 
to its French privileges than to its African identity” (Armes 1987: 19).  A conversation 
between a group of Senegalese bourgeoisie in Xala illustrates this fact: 
African elite#1:  “I didn’t know he was getting married but I brought him a  
     present.” 
African elite#2:  “I don’t go to Spain anymore.  There are too many blacks.” 
African elite#1:  “Negritude!” 
African elite#2:  “Yes, it gets around.”    
 
Though the scene is short, Sembene’s representation of the African bourgeoisie is an 
interesting one, compact with multiple meanings about Western-educated elites, 
particularly the privileged of Senegalese society shortly after Senegal’s independence.  
First, one of the African elites references “négritude,” a literary and political movement 
known developed in the 1930s by Léopold Sédar Senghor, independent Senegal’s first 
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president from 1960 to 1980, Martinican poet Aimé Césaire, and the Guianan, Léon 
Damas.  Léopold Sédar Senghor explains that “negritude,” a form of humanism of the 
twentieth century, refers to the “sum of the cultural values of the black world; that is, a 
certain active presence in the world, or better, in the universe” (Senghor 1994: 28).  The 
group of African bourgeoisie speaking in Xala obviously do not connect their identity to 
any “racialized” signifier like “black” but instead identify with their elite and Western 
education.  By making such comments, these characters offer an interesting example of 
what Memmi calls “Negrophobia,” a fear of “black” people commonly held by the 
colonized but also a form of self-hate:      
“The crushing among the colonized is including among the colonizer’s values.  
As soon as the colonized adopts those values, he similarly adopts his own 
condemnation.  In order to free himself, at least so he believes, he agrees to 
destroy himself.  This phenomenon is comparable to Negrophobia in a Negro, or 
anti-Semitism in a Jew” (Memmi 1965: 122).   
 
The paradox, however, is that colonial “whites” “who, aware of their ‘historic ties,’ see 
themselves as part of Europe, are repudiated by Western capitalist interests, while the 
Western-educated elites, who define their identity in terms of independence from 
colonialism, are in fact incorporated into the capitalist world system”  (Armes 1987: 24). 
Western Law in Une couleur café  
 Because French laws do not acknowledge the legality of polygamy, Doc resorts to 
acquiring a passport and fake birth certificate for Kada and therefore ends up legally 
escorting her to Paris as his “daughter.”  Doc lies about Kada being his “daughter” 
because the practice of polygamy is not recognized in France and therefore Doc must 
disguise African traditions to fit into Western value systems.  Though Doc’s seemingly 
white lie allows him to successfully bring Kada to France, it becomes a comical problem 
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when Kada’s school, Doc’s “white” French mistress Maria, the French police, and the 
French court all discover the truth and prosecute Doc accordingly.  However, Kada’s 
lover, Pierre, pays his uncle Omar to defend and represent Doc in court.  While speaking 
to Doc in his temporary holding cell in jail, Omar reassures Doc:    
 Omar:  “I wonder if French culture ever reserved a place for immigrants.  We’ll  
find that place.”    
 
Once in court, Omar lectures to the French judges to defend Doc: “What’s on trial here 
today is the act of polygamy.”  Omar suggests that it is not specifically Doc that the 
French court judges but “black” African society in general.  However, Omar’s defense 
ultimately proves futile.  Thus, the scene in the courtroom expresses the clash of French 
civilization with African values:  
“The filmic exposure of miscarriages of education, satirical treatment of urban 
African types and mores, and examination of traditional norms and their clashes 
with modernity—synonymous with French, or more generally Western, 
civilization—can be interpreted as attempts by filmmakers to uncover and retrieve 
authentically African cultural practices” (Pfaff 2004: 118). 
 
Consequently, Doc is deported back to the Ivory Coast.  Ironically, the last scene echoes 
the beginning of the film when Awa, Spif, and Doc are gathered at the airport in France 
for Doc’s departure to the Ivory Coast to secure his second-wife, Kada.  However, this 
time Doc is being deported with Awa and Spif back to the Ivory Coast.  Unlike the 
depiction of a return to the Congo in Pièces d'Identités, which represents salvation, the 
renewal of African identity, and a continuation of the ancestors, in Une couleur café the 
situation is neither optimistic nor hopeful.  Instead, Doc and Spif are stripped of their 
Western privileges and are unhappily punished and sentenced to being African.   
Western Law in A Reasonable Man 
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Throughout the entire film A Reasonable Man, a split between Western values 
and African values is highlighted.  At the end, Sipho’s charges of culpable homicide 
depends upon the court’s definition of “a reasonable man,” which is centered on Western 
values:    
Sam Linde:  “A person is guilty of culpable homicide if he has caused the death in  
a situation where a reasonable man would have not done so.  That is  
the law.  Where reasonable people do not believe in goblins and 
ghosts.  They do not lash out with hatchets at phantoms.  These are 
backward ideas rejected by reasonable people.” 
 
However, Sean Raine points out that South Africa is a multicultural society, which 
consists of people whose beliefs do not always conform to Western values:   
 
 Sean:  “The prosecution seems to take it for granted that the beliefs and actions of  
the accused were unreasonable.  Surely this depends upon a definition.  A 
definition of what is reasonable.  A definition of a reasonable man.  We 
live in a multicultural society.  The question we must face is this: Who in a 
multicultural society is a reasonable man?  Is he urban or rural?  Is he a 
person of Western-education with Judeo-Christian beliefs, or is he perhaps 
a person from the kraal with a deep faith in his ancestors and a genuine 
fear that evil may take the form of a tikoloshe?” 
 
Similar to Doc’s legal situation in Une couleur café, Sean’s speech specifically highlights 
the Westernization of the South African court and its lack of multicultural understanding 
in terms of Sipho’s situation.  Though the law in general derives its power and authority 
from the assumption of its inherent rationality, which can be described by such mindsets 
as “no one is above the law,” for example, and the courtroom represents a rational forum 
for the practice of rationality, so to speak, the law is not a self-evident nor objective 
standard by which others may be judged.  “The law” as Sipho’s village knows it, is not 
premised on the structure of a Westernized legal system but is controlled by the headman 
who consults with the village elders.  In fact, after Sipho mistakenly killed the baby, the 
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headman demanded that Sipho stay in the village and be prosecuted accordingly, and not 
escorted to prison where the authorities would not know how to “appropriately” deal with 
Sipho’s situation.   
Thus, A Reasonable Man highlights two legitimate legal systems, but because 
Western law is institutionalized, it is privileged over the village’s practices of law, and is 
ultimately the standard by which Sipho is judged.  Sipho’s beliefs, which are outside of 
the Western paradigm, are therefore considered irrational, or more specifically, 
unreasonable based on the legal definition of “a reasonable man” mentioned by Sam 
Linde.  Ironically, the most unreasonable action as it presents itself in A Reasonable Man 
is not the rationality of Sipho’s beliefs, but the lack of flexibility of Western law in the 
context of multicultural South Africa.  
CONCLUSIONS 
  
 Besides complicated applications of “race” in African societies, social phenomena 
such as modernization and Westernization also contribute to the development of material, 
religious, and cultural values among African communities.  From examples of characters 
that fit into tradition, modernization, and Westernization groupings described in this 
chapter, it is now possible to investigate how contemporary African identities are 
ultimately shaped by the dynamics and interaction of tradition, modernization, and 
Westernization processes: 
“A significant portion of what constitutes African cultural, symbolic, and 
intellectual thought and practices—be they oral, written, dramatic, visual, or 
filmic—can be characterized as responses to, and interventions in, the factors and 
forces that have shaped Africa over time.  Generally conceived as triple, these 
factors and forces have been described by Kwame Nkrumah (1964) and, more 
recently, by Ali Mazrui (1986) as:  (1) indigenous, (2) Arab-Islamic, and (3) 
Euro-Christian.  The patterns of interaction and cross-fertilization and the tensions 
and conflicts between and among these forces over many centuries on African soil 
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have produced a wide range of complex dynamics and transformations that have 
resulted in the shape of Africa at the present moment” (Pfaff 2004: 49). 
 
African identities are so nuanced and hybridized that no clear boundaries can be marked 
where, for example, tradition begins and forms of modernization and/or Westernization 
end.  The overall portrait of African identities is not this simple.  Though there is a 
tendency that may be attributed to entrenched colonial mentality within African societies 
to place African identities on the outer-fringe of Westernization i.e. any connection with 
European identities, the process of social change is happening and transforming the social 
fabric of African communities and make-up of African identities.   
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5   Forming a Cultural Hybridity Theory 
Complicating understandings of African identities in A Reasonable Man, Chikin 
Biznis:  The Whole Story, Fools, Hyènes, Pièces d'Identités, Une couleur café, and Xala 
is the fact that most Westernized social traits such as the practice of medicine, beliefs in 
monogamy, female empowerment, and entrepreneurial aspirations depicted in the films 
have also been filtered through “traditional” and “non-traditional” African value systems 
within the represented communities.  Thus, the African societies which filmmakers strive 
to define and represent—against either Western or African points of reference—are 
actually neither fully Western nor entirely “African” but a hybridized version of both 
cultural spheres.  To begin peeling away the layers surrounding a discussion of African 
cultures, therefore, is to find oneself continually on the surface of what it actually means 
to be “African.”  The purpose of this chapter is to propose an alternative socio-cultural 
model capable of describing the multi-faceted dynamics of cultural components in the 
forging of contemporary African identities portrayed in African film.  Theories of 
cultural hybridity apply to the study of African film because such models can be used to 
describe the dynamics of tradition, modernization, and Westernization in the 
development of contemporary African identities. 
 
“RACIAL” HYBRIDITY IN TYPOLOGY AND COLONIAL DISCOURSE 
 
The notion of cultural hybridity will be clarified in more detail in relationship to 
each film in the next chapter, but to provide a foundation to begin this discussion requires 
looking at “racial” hybridity theories.  In Chapter 1, typology and selectionist discourses 
were introduced in order to explain how colonial mentality was affected by nineteenth 
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century “racial” theories.  In particular, hybridity was one of the main topics of debate. 
Ana Maria Alonso provides a thorough analysis of the etymological origins and 
application of the term “hybrid”:  
Hybrid and its cognates in the Romance languages derive from the Latin hibrida, 
which was “[most probably kindred with hubrizˆo, hubris, qs. Unbridled, lawless, 
unnatural, hence], of animals produced from two different species, a mongrel” 
(Lewis and Short 1879).  Hibrida also meant “of persons, one born of a Roman 
father and a foreign mother, or of a freeman and slave” (Lewis and Short 1879). 
During the 17th century, hybrid became used in English to refer to the offspring 
of a wild boar and a tame sow (1623); in 1630 B. Johnson used it to characterize a 
woman as “wild Irish born . . . and a hybrid” (Oxford English Dictionary Online 
2000). The botanical sense of the term does not show up in English until the late 
18th century and the linguistic sense does not appear until the middle of the 19th 
century, when hybrid begins to be used with greater frequency (Oxford English 
Dictionary Online 2000).   
(Alonso 2004: 482) 
 
Alonso clearly illustrates that the rhetoric of hybridity has typically been used to 
discuss standards of purity in both animals and humans.  Robert Young helps clarify 
common naturalists’ views and notes that according to dominant nineteenth century 
discourse, “a hybrid is a cross between two species, such as the mule and the hinny, 
which are female-male and male-female crosses between horse and ass” (Young 1995: 
8).  According to Young’s line of reasoning, therefore, the term hybridization evokes 
both the botanical notion of inter-species mating and the “vocabulary of the Victorian 
extreme right” who regarded different races as different species (1995: 10).   
Typologists fostered hybridity theories based upon assumptions about the fertility 
of animal offspring (Banton 1983: 44; Goldberg 2000: 78; Young 1995: 6-9).  Even 
though “races” of the contemporary world were all mixed, typologists argued that hybrids 
were ultimately sterile and because of “human foolishness, races might deviate from their 
type, nature kept the deviation within bounds” (Banton 1983: 44).  This observation was 
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supported by naturalists’ argument that if animals of two different species were to breed, 
the hybrid offspring would perish or become extinct since it was impossible for the 
“products of such a mixture” to reproduce (Young 1995: 8).  In the same line of thinking, 
the product of a human “hybrid” offspring would also result in subsequent infertility 
(Goldberg 2000: 78).  In The Origin of Species, Darwin countered typology theories of 
hybridity by citing examples of high-fertility among the offspring of crossbred geese 
(Young 1995: 11).  Unlike typologists who believed different “types” should not mate 
because of subsequent infertility problems among offspring, Darwin believed “sub-
species” or “varieties” could mate with individuals in different “sub-specie” groups and 
still produce fertile offspring (Banton 1988: 21).  
In nineteenth century colonial discourse, the rhetoric of hybridity reflected 
“dominant concerns that white or European-based purity, power, and privilege would be 
polluted, and in being polluted diluted” in the advent of interbreeding with non-white 
populations (Goldberg 2000: 79).  Constructed in this way, hybridity mainly refers to 
groups arising from the progeny of mixed-race relationships, which have resulted, for 
example, in “bi-racial” distinctions such as “mestizo,” “mulatto,” “half-breed,” “half-
caste,” “mixed breed,” “quadroon,” “octoroon,” “sambo,” “mango,” “creole,” and 
“coloured” throughout the colonized world, particularly Hispano-America and regions of 
Africa (Goldberg 2000: 78; Papastergiadis 1997: 260).  So-called “mixed races” were the 
result of a greater contact between “white” colonialists and indigenous people during the 
peak of colonial commerce and migration in the second half of the nineteenth century 
(Goldberg 2000: 78).  Alonso notes that “mestizo and hybrid have overlapping semantic 
ranges, despite their different etymologies.  Both terms originally denoted the stigmatized 
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offspring of parents classified as ‘different’ along ethnic, racial, and status lines; hence, 
both terms are marked by ‘accents’ of conquest and inequality” (Alonso 2004: 460).  
Ironically, Ania Loomba cites an interesting example of colonial policy in Latin America 
in which interbreeding between “whites” and “Indians” served as a way to “extinguish” 
natives, so to speak, by “hispanicizing” them (Loomba 2005: 145).  In other words, 
colonial policies in Latin American attempted to diminish cultural and “racial” 
differences by creating Europeanized “natives” (2005: 145).  The aim of this policy was 
premised on the underlying belief that Indians could mimic but never truly become 
English, and that this social gap between the Indians and the “real thing” would continue 
to facilitate acts of subjugation (2005: 146).   
Therefore, “racial” hybridity was a discourse that allowed colonialists to further 
categorize the “Other” to justify notions of superiority based on the “hybrid’s impurity,” 
an ideology which was premised on alterity, exclusivity and purity (Papastergiadis 1997: 
260).  By categorizing the “Other,” European colonialists had the overall ability to 
politically, socially, and economically exclude the colonized (Goldberg 2000: 73). 
Despite the opening up of borders and boundaries that occurred transnationally due to 
growing global integration, which challenged dominant hegemonies, the modern state, 
developed by colonial expansion in the nineteenth century, crafted and implemented 
racialized policies in order to “to guarantee, to (rein) force, materially what they have 
claimed (to be committed to) conceptually and axiologically” (Goldberg 2000: 73).   
However, the ironic “need for organic metaphors of identity” based on an 
idealized conceptions of “racial purity,” “developed alongside one of hybridity, grafting, 
of forcing incompatible entities to grow together” (Young 1995: 4).  The paradox extends 
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even further and is rooted in the historical links between colonization and conquest 
through “sexual penetration” (Young 1995: 4).  The existence of “hybrids” reflected the 
“paradox of conquest” in that “sexual penetration” led to “racial amalgamation” and not  
“racial purity”:   
“The globalization of the imperial capitalist powers, of a single integrated 
economic and colonial system, the imposition of unitary time on the world, was 
achieved at the price of dislocation of its peoples and cultures.  This latter 
characteristic became visible to Europeans in two ways: in the disruption of 
domestic culture, and in the increasing anxiety about racial difference and the 
racial amalgamation that was apparent as an effect of colonialism and enforced 
migration” (Young 1995: 4). 
 
“Hybrids” consequently embodied the “threatening forms of perversion and 
degeneration” of the European colonialists through acts of sexual conquest.  The hybrid 
was a risk to the fullness of European selfhood and was therefore positioned in society as 
a “moral marker of contamination, failure, or regression” (Papastergiadis 1997: 257).  In 
fact, colonialists continued to contradict themselves:  hybridity was blamed for causing 
fatigue, indolence, economic inertia, moral decadence, and syphilis, while on the other 
hand, “the colonizer’s and the priest’s preferred mistress was the mulatto,” “for the 
lascivious hybrid woman” (1997: 260).  Colonial desire was marked by a “dialectic of 
attraction and repulsion” accompanied by “the threat of the fecund fertility of the colonial 
desiring machine, whereby a culture in its colonial operation becomes hybridized, 
alienated and potentially threatening to its European original through the production of 
polymorphously perverse people who are, in Bhabha’s phrase, white, but not quite” 
(Young 1995: 175).     
One of the main points this chapter hopes to prove is that the notion of cultural 
hybridity—though related in its examination of colonial influence and semantic origins—
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does not necessarily imply either “racial” or cultural impurity: “a hybrid has an internal 
structure of its own, which is just as unitary as that of any ‘purer’ organism (whatever 
that might mean)” (Friedman 1997: 87).  In the films Une couleur café and Pièces 
d'Identités, which will be discussed in the next chapter, filmmakers have incorporated 
themes of “racial” hybridity that express literal dimensions of “mixing” but in an 
optimistic way.  Furthermore, Homi Bhabha proposes that the concept of hybridity can 
actually be used to “expose the conflicts in colonial discourse” and to “address both the 
heterogeneous array of signs in modern life and the various ways of living with 
difference” (Bhabha 1990: 307).  Thus, the main premise of this paper in a discussion of 
cultural hybridity is that hybridization is not based an ideology of  “pure culture” but 
differences in culture.  No value judgment is placed on cultural superiority or cultural 
primordiality (i.e. unique culture, first culture, original culture) but in the negotiation of 
difference among cultures. 
CULTURAL HYBRIDITY THEORY 
The Boundlessness of Culture 
 
Culture is defined loosely as “a structured ensemble of traits characterizing a 
cultural domain in a given society” (Chaudenson 2001: 194).  However, Renato Rosaldo 
suggests that in a post-colonial context, the concept of “authentic” culture “as an 
autonomous, internally coherent universe” is no longer a viable discourse given rapid 
globalization and modernization processes (Rosaldo 1989: 217).  Thus, cultural systems 
are not isolated from one another and there is “no culture in and of itself” (Chaudenson 
2001: 195; Werbner 1997: 5).   
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Jonathan Friedman qualifies Rosaldo’s observation and notes that “cultural 
specificity” “can never be understood as an autonomous domain” (Friedman 1994: 207).  
Friedman and Rosaldo’s observations simply mean that given the “rapidly increasing 
global interdependence” (Rosaldo 1989: 217) and “travel, contact, transmutation,” the 
“hybridization of ideas, values, and behavioral norms” is inevitable (Ahmad 1995: 18).  
Therefore, typical methods of investigating cultural differences and cultural heterogeneity 
must be abandoned.   
Instead, a new understanding of culture “must face up to contemporary realities” 
and “will no longer be preoccupied with the eternal and unchanging” nor the “timeless 
and suspended complex whole” but with transformation, cultural continua, and variation 
(Wicker 1997: 39).  This is why theories of cultural hybridity more accurately describe 
the boundlessness of culture:   
“Cultural modernization or the halfway house of hybridization is not a necessary 
outcome of the world system.  But it may be a way of reclassifying a world that 
has become more difficult to control in cultural terms” (Friedman 1994: 13).  
 
The ability for “cultures” to merge and interact is based on a “previous metaphor, that of 
culture as matter, in this case apparently fluid” (1994: 208).  Understanding “culture” as a 
“flowing cultural complexity”—rather than a static and bounded entity—that can 
penetrate multiple spaces, accurately describes the hybridization of African societies 
depicted in African film to be discussed in Chapter 6.    
Defining Cultural Hybridity 
Cultural hybridity is defined as a state of juxtaposition and fusion amongst 
objects, languages, and behavior from different spheres of culture (Werbner 1992: 2).  
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The cultural blending of African societies, especially in cities, is well articulated by 
anthropologist, Debra Spitulnik:   
“Throughout history, African cities have been major sites of cultural blending, 
innovation, fluidity, and multilingualism. Moreover, it could even be said that 
stretching from Casablanca to Cape Town, from Cairo to Kinshasa, from the 
Cameroonian grasslands to Great Zimbabwe, African cultures—not just cities—
have been characterized more by cultural dynamism, invention, and hybridization 
than most conventional views of African cultures would admit” (Spitulnik 1999: 
30).  
 
The term creolization has also been used to describe cultural blending “whereby 
individuals of different cultures, languages, and religions are thrown together and invent 
a new language, Creole, a new culture, and a new social organization” (Michael & Nuttal 
2000: 6).  “Creolization” has been negatively associated with “racial” mixing in the past.  
Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, the term cultural hybridity has been chosen 
instead.  However, it is worth observing a few details about the non-racial connotations of 
creolization that further positive cultural hybridity debates.  First, creolized culture is not 
a description that is used in opposition to “pure” cultural categories (Dash 1994: 165).  In 
fact, it is the “transgressive power of symbolic hybrids to subvert categorical oppositions 
and hence to create the conditions for cultural reflexivity and change” that make it an 
appealing discourse (Werbner 1997: 1).  In the Caribbean, for example, creolization is an 
idea that expresses the “glorification of the composite nature of people” since no one in 
the world has been spared “cross-cultural” influences (Dash 1994: 165).  This argument 
is qualified by Cheryl-Ann Michael & Sarah Nuttal point out that  
“It is not as if other ‘cultures, languages, and religions’ were hitherto more 
discrete and bounded: rather, it is something about this ‘throwing together’ that 
makes more visible fluidities that characterize all societies.  Creolization may take 
on different inflections:  it may for instance take the form of a dynamic and self-
conscious process, or it may refer to a  more porous process occurring in societies 
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and cultures.  Across these different inflections, we emphasize the transformative 
fusions that the term has been used to suggest” (Michael & Nuttal 2000: 6)   
 
Consequently, affirming the creolization of cultures is a positive way to help deconstruct 
the negative associations of “impurity,” or rather, “the halfway between two pure 
extremes” linked with “creolized” “racial” identities (Dash 1994: 165).  By definition, a 
Creole-type model of culture accents “internal variation, diachronicity and transitions,” 
“intersystemic” events that “arrive at an entirely new manifestation of cultural 
continuity” (Wicker 1997: 37-38).  Such an “intersystemic” process is the same 
dialectical articulation that characterizes post-colonial cultures (Young 1995: 24).  
Engaging Difference 
Michel Foucault proposes that “the freeing of difference requires thought” that 
accepts divergence and “the nomadic and dispersed multiplicity that is not limited or 
confined by the constraints of similarity” (Foucault 1977: 185).  Bill Ashcroft has also 
observed that theories on the hybridization of culture “provide a framework of ‘difference 
on equal terms’ within which multi-cultural theories, both within and between societies, 
may continue to be fruitfully explored” (Ashcroft 2002: 35).  Homi K. Bhabha advances 
Foucault and Ashcroft’s assertions and suggests that when considering ethnoracialized 
reference points and dissimilar realms of culture there is a “need to think beyond 
narratives of originary and initial subjectivities and to focus on those moments or 
processes that are produced in the articulation of cultural differences” (Bhabha 1994:1). 
Unlike “racial” ideology, which fosters a fear of difference, Ashcroft, Bhabha, Foucault, 
Papastergiadis, and Young’s theories of cultural hybridity point out that “the positive 
feature of hybridity is that it invariably acknowledges that identity is constructed through 
a negotiation of difference, and that the presence of fissures, gaps and contradictions is 
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not necessarily a sign of failure” (Papastergiadis 1997: 258).  Furthermore, cultural 
hybridity theories, particularly “hybrid counter-energies,” challenge “the centered, 
dominant culture norms with their unsettling perplexities generated out of their 
‘disjunctive, liminal space” (Young 1995: 23).  Hybridity, therefore, represents the “form 
of cultural difference itself, the jarrings of a differentiated culture” (1995: 23).   
At this point in the discussion, it is therefore important to briefly note the subtle 
theoretical distinctions between cultural hybridity and debates on definitions of 
assimilation.  Patrick Colm Hogan proposes that “assimilation is the full acceptance and 
internalization of the other basic culture” (Hogan 2000: 14).  For example, “for an 
English person, [assimilation] is, in effect, becoming African or Indian.  For an African 
or Indian, it is, in effect, becoming English” (Hogan 2000: 14).  However, Memmi argues 
that authentic assimilation is not possible:  “Everything is mobilized so that the colonized 
cannot cross the doorstep, so that he understands and admits that this path is dead and 
assimilation is impossible” (Memmi 1965: 125).  When speaking of the formulation of 
culture in general, therefore, whereas a straightforward description of assimilation 
involves the process in which one group takes on the cultural traits of a larger group 
(Hogan 2000: 14), the theory of cultural hybridity acknowledges the juxtaposition and 
fusion of two or more cultures but not necessarily the absorption and disappearance of the 
weaker into the dominant community.  Instead, cultural hybridity accents “internal 
variation, diachronicity and transitions” (Wicker 1997: 37-38).   
To be discussed in Chapter 6, hybridized African identities depicted in A 
Reasonable Man, Chikin Biznis:  The Whole Story, Fools, Hyènes, Pièces d'Identités, 
Une couleur café, and Xala prove that despite the presence of Western cultures, certain 
 154
African values, traditions, and behavior remain intact.  Thus, assimilation is more 
commonly used to explain the hypothetical homogeneity of two merging societies, but 
cultural hybridity is a term that can be better applied to highlight the elements of African 
values that do not submit to complete integration but continue to evolve based on the 
dynamics of juxtaposition,  difference, and the fluidity of cultures (Michael & Nuttal 
2000: 6; Wicker 1997: 37-38).  In the next chapter, we will look at several examples of 
characters whose “African” and “Westernized” attitudes, behaviors, and values reflect the 
multi-faceted dynamics of tradition, modernization, and Westernization in the 
development of African identities.   
African Identity as a Fluid Spectrum 
Cultural hybridity theorists such as Bhabha, Ashcroft, Papastergiadis, and Young 
propose that by engaging in cultural difference, we can confront homogeneous and 
“pure” assumptions of culture.  Further exploring the idea of cultural hybridity leads to 
more intricate descriptions of how culture has been conceived and may be re-conceived 
by looking beyond “originary and initial subjectivities” such as ethnoracialized reference 
points and dissimilar realms of culture (Bhabha 1994: 1).  Though the idea of “originary 
and initial subjectivities” is not applied specifically in Bhabha’s argument, it would not 
be a stretch to presume that he espouses a way to consider subjective reference points 
such as identity, culture, or even African identities and non-African identities.  This is 
important because according to Bhabha’s line of reasoning, the significance of particular 
ideas of African identities and non-African identities, for example, as bookends marking 
absolute distinctions is irrelevant to a discussion of identity and culture.  One cannot look 
at the construction of identity, specifically African identity in this case, as a spectrum.  If 
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we assumed every form of identity could be placed on either side of the spectrum, we 
would have an easy task of investigating representations of African values and identities 
in African cinema.  However, we would also mistakenly presume that the world is so 
conveniently classifiable and that all components of culture exist within a vacuum.   
 The problem with a spectrum model of identity arises when one tries to delineate 
two neatly separate categories to define each end of the range—for example, what is 
“African” and what is “non-African”; or, according to Bhabha, what would be considered 
“originary and initial subjectivities.”  All that composes the content of an “African 
identity”—values and social practices—in films like A Reasonable Man, Chikin Biznis:  
The Whole Story, Fools, Hyènes, Le cri du coeur, Pièces d'Identités, Une couleur café, 
and Xala does not clearly exist on one end; nor does every characteristic of a non-African 
identity rest on the other.  Instead, both initial subjectivities are unfixed cultural 
temporalities that change with the evolution of society:  “despite the illusion of 
boundedness, cultures evolve historically through unreflective borrowings, mimetic 
appropriations, exchanges and inventions” (Werbner 1997: 4-5).  So if the initial 
subjectivities—“African” and “non-African”—at each end of the spectrum are just 
shifting “cultural temporalities” (1994: 2), one could easily suppose that no clear 
assessment of identity can ever be made because the boundaries of culture are blurred.  
Rather, though “identity always presupposes a sense of location and a relationship with 
others” “this attention to place does not presuppose closure, for the representation of 
identity most often occurs precisely at the point when there has been a displacement 
(Bhabha 1994: 185) and is only “conceived in the ‘twixt of displacement and 
reinvention’” (Papastergiadis 1997: 277-278).  Therefore, a spectrum of identity may 
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allow for classification, “otherness,” and simple diametric oppositions, but it does not 
highlight the nuances of multi-cultural processes in the formation of identity.  
Instead of arguing about the similarities that constitute the content of originaries 
such as “African” and “non-African,” Bhabha suggests that through the examination of 
“cultural differences,” and the engagement of such differences, it is possible to “authorize 
cultural hybridities that emerge in moments of historical transformation” (Bhabha 1994: 
2) and thereby accept non-fixed elements of identity.  However, Bhabha further notes, 
“the borderline engagements of cultural difference may as often be consensual as 
conflictual; they may confound our definitions of tradition and modernization” (1994: 2).  
In other words, “racialized” and even absolutist cultural understandings of difference may 
be abandoned but at the expense of creating open-ended meanings.  This way, there are 
no fixed “white,” “mixed,” or “black” Europeans, Americans, Africans, Asians, etc; no 
ultimate traditions, forms of modernization, or even Westernization.  But, there is 
plentiful theoretical room for definition and re-definition; enunciation and re-enunciation; 
and so forth demanded by cultural change and evolution.  
Of course, a quick response to this diagrammatic formulation is the question—
what lies in between “African” and “non-African” identities?  Though we cannot 
precisely label the two ends of the spectrum, everything in between constitutes the 
theoretical make-up of cultural hybridity; or in other words, the cultural differences with 
which Bhabha, Ashcroft, Papastergiadis, and Young encourage critical engagement.  In 
this regard, cross-culturality becomes an even more complex category of description for 
the condition of African identities because of its sheer breadth.  Despite the 
overwhelming amount of theoretical space that the rhetoric of cultural hybridity occupies, 
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we should still attempt to interpret the interaction between both shifting initial 
subjectivities such as “African” and “non-African,” for instance, so that we may arrive at 
an understanding of the fluidity of identity.  Referring to Renee Green’s work Sites of 
Genealogy (1991) in which she uses forms of architecture to help envision binary 
constructions such as Black/White and Self/Other, Bhabha extends Green’s metaphor of 
the stairwell and adds that  
“the stairwell as a liminal space, in-between the designations of identity, becomes 
the process of symbolic interaction, the connective tissue that constructs the 
difference between upper and lower, black and white.  The hither and thither of 
the stairwell, the temporal movement and passage that it allows, prevents 
identities at either end of it from settling into primordial polarities.  This 
interstitial passage between fixed identifications opens up the possibility of a 
cultural hybridity that entertains difference without an assumed or imposed 
hierarchy” (Bhabha 1994: 4). 
   
Therefore, it is possible to evaluate “cultural difference” in the spectrum as a  
dialectic—the swapping and exchange between non-fixed, cultural originaries—just as 
long as neither periphery takes precedence: 
“hybridity can be seen as operating on two levels:  it refers to the constant process 
of differentiation and exchange between the center and periphery and between 
different peripheries, as well as serving the metaphor for the form of identity that 
is being produced from these conjunctions” (Papastergiadis 1997: 274).   
 
Through the symbolic interaction of differences, the category of cultural hybridity 
emerges to describe the formation of identity and culture but does not limit such a 
grouping to a hierarchal models such as the three-stage hierarchy of civilization 
mentioned in Chapter 1 that regulate the superiority/inferiority of the initial subjectivities 
on either end of the spectrum.  In other words, neither shifting subjectivities—African 
identity versus non-African identity, for example—are “superior” to the other as would 
be emphasized in old three-stage models of hierarchy and colonial discourse.  
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As we can see, although strict and bounded definitions of identity cannot be 
procured from an analysis of cultural hybridity, this does not mean that society then 
resorts to a cultureless state of existence:  
The standard model of "a culture" aligned with "a people, a place, and a 
language" is a model that has real significance in manifold ways—as it structures 
human experience, drives political battles over identity and representation, guides 
public policy campaigns, and orients research inquiries into the nature of culture. 
But it also hides the constructed and even messy nature of the relations between 
language, place, people, and culture, and it hides the possibility that these entities 
themselves are not as stable and as singular as they are often imagined to be” 
(Spitulnik 1999: 30-31) 
 
Culturally hybrid identities are not incomplete nor fall short of aspiring to a sense of 
wholeness as if some unfinished product (Papastergiadis 1997: 275).  In fact, part of the 
exploration of identity involves accepting culture’s boundless parameters.  According to 
Bhabha, the quest for fixed identification never ends:  “the social articulation of 
difference, from the minority perspective, is a complex, on-going negotiation” (Bhabha 
1994: 2).  This statement also echoes Werbner’s belief that culture continually evolves 
(Werbner 1997: 4-5).   
Therefore, homogenous assimilation is not possible because continually 
transforming differences and additions to culture will keep the dialectic of hybridization 
moving.  It is only because of the insistence upon instituting homogeneity by dominating 
hegemonies that a monocultural commitment has ever been initiated at the expense of 
diverse cultural and political repression (Goldberg 2000: 73).  Modern cities such as 
London and Amsterdam, for example, have been heterogeneous since the early 
seventeenth century and contemporary trends point to a rapid acceleration of diversity 
(2000: 74).  Therefore, “racial” and cultural diversity is not a recent phenomenon.  
However, it is because of the political execution of “race” discourse and the fear of 
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heterogeneity that the concept of hybridity, particularly “racial” hybridization, constituted 
“an object of fear and celebration, paranoia and persistence, repression and resistance…” 
(2000: 74).  To undo policies and attitudes promoting homogeneity would entail 
abandoning exclusive and exclusionary ideals that facilitate political, social, and 
economic dominance (2000: 73).       
CONCLUSIONS 
The impact of colonial influences, general trends of Westernization, 
modernization, and tradition in the history of Africa have transformed the parameters of 
African identities.  The hybridization of African values and identities, molded from 
competing forces of tradition, modernization, and Westernization, is a common thread 
woven into the aesthetic, political, and social content of African cinema by filmmakers.  
Hybridization is one of the many subtle details filmmakers strive to reflect in the 
psychology of characters and plots in A Reasonable Man, Chikin Biznis:  The Whole 
Story, Fools, Hyènes, Pièces d'Identités, Une couleur café, and Xala.  While theories of 
cultural hybridity do not completely unite the vast gap between tradition, modernization, 
and Westernization into one definable unit, it is a discourse that accurately considers how 
filmmakers address the role of Westernization and modernization processes in the 
formation of African identity and culture.  Furthermore, through an understanding of 
cross-culturality, it is possible to assess the emotional responses of characters in African 
film to the cultural flux of African societies.  It is exactly the implications of in-
betweenness and the shifting conditions of the spectrum of identity that create difficulty 
in pinpointing “true” African identities, but despite a lack of ultimate specificity, African 
identities are nevertheless real and substantial.  Developing and applying the concept of 
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cultural hybridity involves recognizing elements of culture—in this case, ingredients of 
African cultures such as common social practices, ambitions, and values—which have 
mixed with Westernized and modernized systems but nonetheless remained accented 
signs of difference specific to African communities.  The correlation between tradition, 
modernization, and Westernization as it influences the development of identity in Africa 
is undeniable, but how does such a relationship moderate forms of representation in 
African cinema?  In what ways have filmmakers offered expressions of cultural 
hybridity?  In the following chapter, we shall see how filmmakers vary by offering 
different versions of hybridized African identities in both “racial” and cultural terms.  
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6 The Fluidity of Post-Colonial Hybrid 
Lifestyles in African Film 
 
When cultures evolve, identities change and nation-based specificities like 
“African” also vary, depending upon the influence of alternative paradigms including 
modernization and Westernization.  In broadening the already expansive theoretical 
domain of identity, it is difficult approaching such a profoundly complex concept such as 
what it means to be “African.”  Thus far, from Chapter 1 to Chapter 5 of this paper, to be 
“African” encompasses a plentiful amount of examples:  African identities may be 
centered on “racial” definitions, and may be built upon traditional structures such a 
language, polygamy, traditional religion, and traditional healing.  Likewise, the impact of 
social processes such as modernization and Westernization also indicates that African 
identities are not merely confined nor defined by traditions but continually evolving.   
The main purpose in this chapter, therefore, is to evaluate the hybridization of 
African identities based upon cultural hybridity arguments offered in Chapter 5.  While it 
is highly problematic to assume that the negative applications of “race” can ever be 
abandoned, a move towards a melting-pot society, so to speak, that asserts hybridity is 
gradually developing.  In other words, trends present in the films A Reasonable Man, 
Chikin Biznis:  The Whole Story, Fools, Hyènes, Pièces d'Identités, Une couleur café, and 
Xala reveal a move toward a modern, predominantly Westernized socio-economic 
infrastructure and political system with emphasis on cultural and religious diversity. 
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CULTURAL HYBRIDITY MODEL  
Theories of cultural hybridity discussed in Chapter 5 help contextualize and 
describe the impermanent and subjective components of identity such as “race,” culture, 
and tradition that are exposed to continual flux due to internal and external forces like 
modernization and Westernization.  When applied to film analyses, the rhetoric of 
cultural hybridity explains the dynamic processes of cultural change in the development 
of African identities based on a simple model.  Instead of a split between Westernized 
and African societies, discourse on cultural hybridity challenges the notion of fixed 
cultural end-points.  Rather, theories of cultural hybridity suggest that the end-points are 
actually shifting continuously in relation to a third, intermediate space (Bhabha 1994: 36-
39).  Ironically, however, the third, intermediate space of which Bhabha speaks is 
“unrepresentable in and of itself” and is a “moving metaphor,” but this theoretical feature 
of hybridization ensures that “the meaning and symbols of culture have no primordial 
unity or fixity; that even the same signs can be appropriated, translated, rehistorized and 
read anew” (1994: 37).   
The rhetoric of cultural hybridity, therefore, encourages the formation of an 
accurate model of modern culture that reflects the presence of a third hybridized cultural 
space between non-fixed, temporal, and subjective end-points such as “Western” and 
“African” (1994: 36-39).  Though undefined in terms of specificity of “race,” culture, and 
traditions, this in-between space is authentic and counts the most in a discussion of 
African identities represented in African cinema.  By reflecting upon this intermediate 
space and its relation to subjective end-points such as “Western” and “African,” 
filmmakers, audiences, and critics can approach multicultural dilemmas such as “race,” 
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tradition, modernization, and Westernization that persist in African cinema to re-evaluate 
conceptions about African identities.   
 
SPATIAL HYBRIDITY IN UNE COULEUR CAFÉ   
 
Theories of cultural hybridity apply specifically to Une couleur café because the 
film sets up distinctions between separate geographic and social spaces—the city of 
Paris, a rural village in the Ivory Coast, Doc’s apartment in Paris, and an immigrant 
section of Paris known as Montreuil.  This arrangement structurally reflects the cultural 
hybridity model in its delineation of cultural spheres.  Une couleur café highlights the 
misunderstandings, frustration, and conflicts that occur as a result of clashes between 
Doc, French laws and culture, and his wives, Kada and Awa.  In this discussion of Une 
couleur café, conclusions about “Africanness,” traditions, and the hybridization of 
African cultures will be drawn based on a close analysis of scenes, character psychology, 
and dialogue in the film.   
The beginning scene of Une couleur café helps establish an important contrast 
between two significant geographic and social spaces in the film—the city of Paris and a 
rural village located in the Ivory Coast.  Une couleur café opens with a conversation 
between Doc, his wife Awa, and their friend Spif inside an airport in Paris.  All three 
characters are in a good mood and seem excited for Doc.  Before leaving, Doc jokingly 
tells Spif that a true friend is “one who can sleep with your wife but not touch her.”  The 
film immediately introduces the audience to Doc’s sense of humor as well as his 
underlying possessiveness.  In addition to this piece of information about Doc’s 
personality, Spif soon reveals that Doc is known as “le docteur.”  Certain assumptions 
about Doc’s professional status can be made given Doc’s suit attire, Spif’s comment 
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about Doc being a city slicker, and Doc’s nickname “le docteur,”  The evidence thus far 
suggests that Doc is an “important” man.  Dressed in a grey suit and wearing a straw 
cowboy hat, Doc appears professional and confident, if somewhat comical, as he walks 
away with his briefcase in hand to catch his flight.  While on the moving walkway, Doc 
turns back and jokingly reminds Spif:  “And no sleeping in my wife’s bed!  Ok?”  Very 
light-hearted music begins to play as a brief title sequence ensues.          
The introduction music gradually fades as the scene cuts from the busy airport in 
Paris to a rural village in the Ivory Coast.  In this instant, the city is immediately 
juxtaposed with the village, a common theme in African films.  More specifically, this 
city happens to be Paris, the cultural center of France and the former dominant colonial 
power in West African countries such as the Ivory Coast.  The cut signals not only a 
physical change in space and geography but a cultural transition as well, thus suggesting 
fluidity of physical and cultural space in which Doc moves.  A close-up of a young 
African woman, Kada, wearing a blue flower-patterned cloth wrapped around her chest 
appears on screen.  Hovering over a bucket of soap and water, she washes clothes by 
hand.  In the background, a group of older women with their hair wrapped are also 
wearing traditional dresses and wash clothes by hand in buckets of soap and water.   
While hand-washing clothes, Kada’s younger brother off-screen shouts that her 
father wishes to speak to her.  Originally hovered over the bucket, Kada stands up 
straight and looks in the direction of the shouting.  The shot changes from a close-up of 
Kada washing clothes to a medium-shot of an open field with large plants, in which a 
woman is walking with a basket and Kada’s brother is running toward the group of 
women.  The landscape and lack of technology place Kada’s atmosphere in stark contract 
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to the opening scene of Awa, Spif, and Doc in the airport in Paris.  With this 
juxtaposition, Duparc clearly wishes to mark two separate geographic and cultural 
spheres, or in other words, the originary and initial subjectivities—African and French 
culture—with which the film will play (Bhabha 1994: 1).  This contrast will be even 
more important later when the film shifts focus to Kada and Doc’s life in Paris.   
Kada turns and walks away and the title of the film appears on the screen.  Once 
again, light-hearted and up-beat music begins to play.  Then the scene cuts to Doc riding 
in a vehicle amongst other passengers; his arms are propped against the briefcase on his 
lap as he stares out of the window.  Doc’s reason for visiting the Ivory Coast has yet to be 
revealed at this point in the film, but his briefcase and attire suggest his purpose in the 
village is a matter of business.  Yet again, the film frames Doc as a man of importance.  
As Doc rides along in the vehicle, in some way, the original juxtaposition of city and 
rural spaces have merged since Doc “brings” his air of urbanity into the village. 
Therefore, a hybridization of cultural space is suggested by Doc’s presence in the village.   
After a couple of minutes inside the car with Doc, the camera switches to a long-
shot of Kada walking bare-foot in the dusty streets of the town.  The same car in which 
Doc is riding abruptly shoots past Kada causing her to drop the bucket she is balancing 
on her head.  The bucket hits the ground and then the car speeds away.  The vehicle as a 
modern form of technology not only interrupts the scene visually since its sleek, grey 
body stands out against the dusty and run-down environs of the town, but it also 
foreshadows future tension and conflict of values between Doc and Kada.    
Carrying a bucket on her head, Kada arrives at home.  In the same scene, five 
other women are shown in front of the house, cooking and sifting grain.  Thus far, there is 
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a clear sense of community and fellowship among the groups of women depicted in the 
film.  While these women are shown working diligently, Kada approaches her father who 
pretends to be asleep in his chair outside.  No clear value judgment is placed on his 
inactivity contrasted against the apparent hard work of the females in the village, but it 
can easily be deduced from the film that within the African village, women are mainly in 
charge of domestic responsibilities. 
 Doc’s arrival in the village as a “city-slicker,” intending to take a second wife, 
obviously suggests that traditions such as arranged marriage are still practiced by 
Africans who live in Paris.  Traditions are not contained by physical space nor isolated 
from urban influences (LeVine 1963: 285).  As Doc approaches the village in his sleek 
grey suit, straw cowboy hat, formal shoes, and briefcase in hand, he is barraged by a 
group of young children who continually chant “City slicker, city slicker.”  Just like the 
beginning scene between Doc, Awa, and Spif illustrates, Doc’s space is in Paris and no 
longer in the village.  Doc represents the former villager who has moved to the city and 
become “Westernized.”   
 When Doc and Kada finally meet, he brags about being a doctor and having a 
house in Paris.  He also provides Kada with a small statue of the Eiffel Tower, reducing 
Paris to an idealized myth—“This is Paris,” Doc exclaims.  France is not only a 
geographic space but a “phantasmic space”—the location of hopes, dreams, references, 
disappointments, uncertainties, divided loyalties” (Pfaff 2004: 121)—to which Doc and 
many other immigrants flee.  The village in Une couleur café, on the other hand, 
represents the opposite of Paris’ glamour and intrigue.  Doc tells Kada:  “Kada, your 
future is not in this hole.  It’s in France.  In Paris.”   
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So far, the film has briefly introduced two major geographic and cultural spaces—
the city of Paris and the village in the Ivory Coast.  The short sequence of Kada and her 
life in the village help create a context for Doc and Kada’s life in Paris still to come.  
Immediately the film begins to present stereotypes about African female and male 
identities, traditions, and values, especially a comparison between urban and rural 
lifestyles. 
When Kada and Doc arrive in Paris, the reality of immigrant life in the city 
quickly emerges.  Kada notices that Paris is dirty and that Doc, his first wife, Awa, and 
Kada must live together in a cramped apartment with only one bedroom.  There is no 
television and barely enough money for Awa, Kada, and Doc to eat “proper” food.  In 
fact, in one hilarious scene, Awa prepares rice and “meat,” which Doc soon finds out is 
cat food but nonetheless enjoys the meal.  Francois Pfaff suggests that a common theme 
among Francophone African cinema is the construction of a mythical France, yet in 
relation to a counter-reality that reveals the true hardships of African immigrants: 
“When a White woman friend asks why he came to Paris, Docteur replies, ‘Paris 
is beautiful.’  Such declarations—of which we find many restatements in 
Francophone African cinema in the form of songs, slogans, and catchphrases—
belong to the mythical construct about France and Europe that Africans have 
absorbed through schooling, radio programs, films, television, and, especially, the 
stories that immigrant ‘returnees’ tell because failure is so difficult to admit.  
Much of Francophone African cinema set in France, consequently, is replete with 
stories that belie the lie, showing audiences how it really is.” (Pfaff 2004: 119).   
 
Doc clearly lies in order to cover up the truth from Kada, Awa, and Maria.  However, 
Doc’s immigrant status is not represented negatively in Une couleur café.  Doc obviously 
feels comfortable and content in France, especially since he is well-taken care of by his 
French mistress, Maria, who often provides financial help.  In fact, though Doc works as 
a hospital orderly, he is able to sell African goods and cheap watches on the side, which 
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he brings back from the Ivory Coast.  Therefore, Doc’s life as an immigrant is not one of 
desperation, humiliation or typical poverty: 
“Une couleur café denounces the reality of immigration while exaggerating the 
clichés surrounding the image of the Black:  it mingles reality and exaggeration, 
the tragic and the extravagant.  By exaggerating to the point of caricature, it 
produces a counter-discourse, and denounces intolerance and stupidity.  This is a 
dangerous exercise, because mockery can be misconstrued:  more than one 
African felt directly offended when the hero enjoys the cat food which his wives 
serve up for him on one occasion…and more than one European has felt 
embarrassed by the parodic display of clichés he would like to reject” (Barlet 
2000: 136).     
 
Once in Paris, the film quickly dispels assumptions about physical boundaries and 
cultural spaces.  Echoing Vansina’s definition of traditions in the first chapter, Une 
couleur café proves that African traditions are not restricted to geographical space but 
can be carried in the mind of whoever practices the tradition (Vansina 1990: 259-260).  
Doc’s attitude about maintaining “African laws” in his house evidence Vansina’s 
observation:    
 Doc:    “Enough work!  I need to perform my duty and go to sleep.” 
 Kada:  “Goosing is against the law. ‘Sexual harassment.” 
 Doc:    “Don’t go bringing French laws in here.  My house is African with African  
 laws.  I can take you, even by force.  France is corrupting you.” 
 
During one of Doc’s romantic dinners with Maria, she asks him whether or not his 
“niece,” Kada, is well-adjusted in France:    
 Maria: “Is she homesick?” 
 Doc:    “No, when she comes home it’s boubou and sandals.  France stops at my  
 door.”   
 
Doc believes that he is able to keep the outside French world and influence from inside 
his “African” house, but it is clear through Duparc’s representation of Kada and Awa’s 
defiance that Doc’s house is not as “African” as he would like i.e. not traditionally 
subordinate (Connell 1995: 79).   
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Within the context of urban life, a third, hybridized space emerges within the 
parameters of Paris that attests to the fact that cultural space, especially in cities, is fluid 
(Spitulnik 1999: 30).  Montreuil, the African immigrant quarter in Paris, is a diasporan 
African space: 
“More often than not, these communities are characterized by their sense of 
solidarity.  This counterbalances the solitude and difficulties confronting the 
immigrant characters in Europe, thus again promoting African community values 
in the same way that films from the continent do.  The immigrant communities 
are frequently represented as a space in which the characters can perpetuate and 
affirm their African traditions and practices, thus enabling them to recreate absent 
African space” (Thackway 2003: 144). 
 
Maria even makes the comment that Montreuil is the immigrant African communities’ 
very own “capital”:     
 Maria:  “It’s your capital.” 
Doc:     “My marabout, African cloth, peanut butter…I get it all there.  But no  
  whores.” 
 Maria:  “Montreuil is like Ali Baba’s cave.” 
 Doc:     “Ali Baba?  There are no Arabs at the dorm.” 
  
In a certain way, Montreuil is like a specialized African convenience store where, as Doc 
hilariously comments, he is able to obtain desired “African” items products.  For Doc,  
Montreuil represents authentic African life:  “Montreuil is real African life.  Paris is hell, 
but Montreuil is a pleasant hell.” 
However, Montreuil is not an open space.  It is exclusive and reserved for “black” 
Africans, but “foreigners” such as the French may enter at the discretion of the Montreuil 
community.  Just as France reserves the right to screen the immigrants that enter the 
country, the members of Montreuil reserve the right to exclude so-called “foreigners.”  In 
one scene, a “white” Parisian male approaches the immigrant quarters to purchase 
cigarettes.  He obviously stands out and does not “belong.”  Two unnamed African men 
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ask the Parisian male if he has a visa and then the Frenchman quickly asks why he needs 
a visa just to enter that area of the city: 
African male:  “To get in.  This is our space.  We need visas to come to  
France so it’s only fair.”  
 
In this moment, not only is power reversed between French authority and immigrant 
authority but space is also inverted—a piece of “Africa” remains intact in the form of 
community and solidarity in Montreuil.  The two unnamed African men express the 
autonomy of African identity; in other words, African identity can exist outside of 
Western constructed geographical and political borders.   
At the beginning of the film, the city and the village are carefully juxtaposed as 
obviously separate physical spaces but the representation of Montreuil also shows how 
these spaces merge by highlighting the survival of African culture in Paris.  Thus, 
Montreuil physically and symbolically represents the third space of which Bhabha speaks 
(Bhabha 1994: 36-39).  Though Africa is obviously represented as a separate geographic 
and cultural space, elements of African cultures survive outside of the Ivory Coast in 
Paris, which are embodied in Montreuil. This reflects an overall “fluidity of borders 
brought about by European colonization and subsequent African emigration to Europe” 
(Thackway 2003: 122).     
 
 
 
 
 
 
RELIGIOUS HYBRIDITIES 
 
Religious Hybridity in Une couleur café 
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 Unlike Christianity, which is barely one hundred years old in Africa, Islam is at 
least a thousand years (Sanneh 1994: 23).  A marabout is a Muslim cleric usually 
working as a prayer leader, jurist, teacher, or ritual specialist within Islamic cultures (Ray 
1976: 177) and may be known simply as a “Muslim holy man” (Mann 2003: 69).  The 
religious identity of the marabout, Spif, in Une couleur café is highly hybridized.   
The demonstrated religious hybridity in Une couleur café is two-fold.  First, Spif, Doc’s 
friend and leading marabout among the African immigrant community in Montreuil, 
equates the practice of being a marabout with Westernized medicine.  This is evidenced 
by Spif’s use of the common scientific suffix of “ology” when he introduces himself to 
Maria during a session:    
Spif:     “Idrissa Ouédraogo, doctor of maraboutology. I sense you have a rival.   
              She’s African.” 
 Maria:  “They have big behinds that men adore.  The way they arch their backs!   
  They’re so erotic….especially when they walk!” 
Spif:     “In God’s eyes, man has no color.  Even if your rival is black, God will  
  protect you.”  
 
The English suffix “ology” denotes a field of study or academic discipline but Spif is 
portrayed as an opportunistic businessman trying to make some quick cash.  Earlier in the 
film, in the middle of a session with a “customer,” Spif’s cellphone rings.  Thus, Spif 
represents the commodification of traditional healing.      
A second aspect of religious hybridization in this scene is the presence of Maria, 
Doc’s Parisian mistress.  Maria, who will be described in more detail later, visits Spif so 
that she may “hook” Doc through traditional methods.  After she hands Spif a check for 
one thousand francs, Spif tells his lover, Afiba, that Doc has a Parisian mistress.     
Religious Hybridity in A Reasonable Man  
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 The religious hybridization of South African society as depicted in A Reasonable 
Man is slightly less discreet and more seriously framed than in Une couleur café.   
Several moments in the film highlight the dual influence of Christianity and traditional 
religion.   
Professor MacKenzie recommends to Sean that he seek the help of a sangoma.  
Sean then drives off from the archaeological site where he met Professor MacKenzie and 
soon enters an urban township area.  Before arriving at the sangoma’s house, Sean drives 
past a Christian church, which ironically, happens to be directly next to the sangoma’s 
house.  The juxtaposition of the church and the sangoma’s house in this scene clearly 
points to a co-existence of Christian and traditional faith.  Furthermore, though practicing 
traditional healing, Rachel reveals to Sam Linde, the prosecution lawyer in Sipho’s trial, 
that she attended a Christian missionary school.  Therefore, it is not surprising that she is 
called “Rachel,” a name found in the Bible.       
 The conversation between Sean and Rachel, the sangoma, when he enters her 
house also exposes additional elements of religious hybridity in A Reasonable Man.  She 
tells Sean that he has a “snake” inside him.  Though Rachel is a traditional healer, she 
alludes to common Christian symbols such as the “snake,” which is similar to the serpent 
in Christianity.  Thus, she suggests that evil is universal and fluid.    
 While Sean investigates the background mythology of the tikoloshe, the evil spirit 
Sipho believed he killed, Sean learns that Christianity and traditional faith are closely 
linked:    
 Sean:  “You worked at the mission?” 
 John:  “Yes, for two years before the funds become less and less.  Father James  
said we should not just rely on our ancestors, we should talk to Mary.  
God can give you a good life forever, or he can give you Hell.” 
 173
 Sean:  “Do you believe in the tikoloshe, John?” 
 John:  “Tikoloshe is like Jesus.  Never see him.” 
 
John suggests that Father James sanctions the belief in ancestors as well as the canonical 
figures of Jesus and Mary.  Jon P. Kirby observes that it has been common among 
Christian missionaries to recognize the dual identity of African practices:   
“Parallel institutions have therefore been maintained to meet the needs of a dual 
identity—one Western, the official one aligning itself with church culture, and 
one African, the unofficial one aligning itself with African traditional culture or 
what missionaries called ‘paganism.’  Today, according to one’s African identity, 
an individual Christian or non-Christian might be required to enter into plural 
marriage; make sacrifices; pour libations to the ancestors; participate in rites of 
puberty and initiation; observe traditional laws regarding land use, taboos, and 
inheritance; and maintain certain shrines for one’s own or one’s family’s good.  
On the other hand, an individual’s new Christian identity may dictate that one 
attend Mass, have one’s marriage blessed, receive the sacraments, and join 
charitable organizations.  Except for the fact that prevailing marriage customs still 
stand in the way of sacramental marriage and therefore disqualify most Africans 
from full Christian church membership, the expectations of these two systems are 
not mutually exclusive.  Rather, they are parallel” (Kirby 1994: 65). 
 
Furthermore, when being questioned by Sam Linde during Sipho’s trial, the sangoma 
reveals to the court that even though she is a traditional healer, she was educated in a 
church during primary school.   
 
HYBRIDIZED IDENTITIES 
The Hybridized Identity of Chaka-Jo in Pièces d'Identités 
 
Chaka-Jo, the taxi-driver from Belgium in Pièces d'Identités, does not conform to 
simple “black” and “white” “racial” distinctions discussed in the first chapter.  As a 
“mulatto,” Chaka-Jo symbolizes the “threatening forms of perversion and degeneration” 
that the European colonialists expressed through acts of sexual conquest (Young 1995: 
4).  Though Chaka-Jo knows that his mother is a “black” Congolese woman named 
Anastasia, he does not know that his father is Jefke, a former Belgian colonial 
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administrator and the current police commissioner in Brussels where Chaka-Jo also lives.  
As Chaka-Jo’s name suggests, he is a “bastard” child just like Shaka, the well-known 
Zulu warrior.  Chaka-Jo, therefore, is an embodiment of hybridity, both in its “racial” and 
cultural form.   
The consequences of his “mixed” identity leave him fatherless and removed from 
his Congolese heritage—when Chaka-Jo was young, he was among the many “white” 
children and “mulattos” that were flown from the Congo to Belgium during the Moueliste 
Rebellion.  The Belgian government’s treatment of “mulatto” children in this way is 
interesting when compared to American policies dictated by what is known as the “one 
drop rule,” in which people with any “drop” of African blood, so to speak, are considered 
African, even if part European (Sweet 2005; Wright 1994).  The one-drop rule was 
historically implemented to distinguish as many “black” Africans as possible for the 
purpose of slavery (Wright 1994).  Unlike Doc in Une couleur café who voluntarily 
chooses to emigrate from Africa, Chaka-Jo was forced to leave at a young age and longs 
to return to his place of birth.  For Chaka-Jo, the “bastard” “mulatto,” a return to Africa is 
a form of salvation and the articulation of identity (California Newsreel n.d.).    
The characterization of Chaka-Jo is a complete reversal of the fear of hybridity 
and an emphasis on European superiority since Chaka-Jo privileges his African heritage 
over his European ancestry.  In a similar vein, ironically, it is Maria, Doc’s “white” 
Parisian mistress in Une couleur café, who echoes Chaka-Jo’s sentiment and yearning for 
“pure” African identity.  Even the name “Chaka-Jo,” closely linked to the famous Zulu 
warrior, Shaka, suggests a sort of fractured, dual identity in which a relationship between 
African and European heritage are simply joined together with a hyphen.  The first part of 
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the name “Chaka” seems to be of African origin—whereas the second part, “Jo,” is 
similar to the common Anglicized name, “Joe.”  The hyphen suggests that a pure 
assimilation into either culture cannot be made and that Chaka-Jo is only defined by his 
mixed identity.  Chaka-Jo laments to Mwana, Mani Kongo’s daughter, that he is “fake”:    
Chaka-Jo:  “I don’t need it now that you’re leaving.  I’ll stay here with my fake  
taxi, my fake name.  Fake Black, fake White, fake passport.  I can’t  
stand it anymore.”   
 
However, ultimately Chaka-Jo “avoids becoming the stereotype of the ‘tragic mulatto’ by 
discovering in Mani Kongo a friend, a father figure, a new identity and a concrete 
mission for himself in Africa” (California Newsreel n.d.).   
The Hybridized Identity of Doc in Une couleur café    
 
 Set in a rural, Ivory Coast village and the immigrant quarters of Paris, Une 
couleur café is an illustration of how Doc, an African janitor at a Parisian hospital, wears 
his African identity on his sleeve like a badge—the traditions and stereotypes of African 
identity projected onto Doc by his “white” Parisian mistress, Maria, are used as 
mechanisms for deceit and fraud.  Doc is able to successfully and easily wile Maria, his 
Parisian lover, by fabricating traditions because she projects exoticized stereotypes about 
African customs onto Doc (Bonnett 1997: 186).  Duparc experiments with Western 
generalizations about African traditions and cultures and even expresses clichés about 
French society as well.  Une couleur café never definitively offers definitions for African 
identity, but the film focuses on characters such as Doc, Spif, Maria, and Kada, in 
particular, who represent hybridized versions of both French and African cultural values.     
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 In the very first scene we see Doc dressed in a fancy grey suit, holding a 
briefcase, and wearing a cowboy hat.  Doc is the ultimate combination of hybridized 
value systems—value systems between which Doc switches when the timing suits him. 
The first evidence of Doc’s hybridized identity is after Doc leaves France to the Ivory 
Coast in Africa.  Doc, the “city slicker,” as a group of young boys chant, enters the 
village and obviously stands out because of his suit, but Doc has business there—to 
escort his second wife Kada back to Paris, having set up an arranged marriage with 
Kada’s father.  This scene represents how Doc can physically move between French and 
African geographical spaces.    
 Doc also moves between socio-cultural spaces as well. Doc values his patriarchal 
role as “authoritative” husband to his two wives, Kada and Awa in a polygamous 
arrangement.  He is also engaged in informal business by selling African goods on the 
side.  Doc is opportunistic and switches identities based on how he can gain or benefit.  
For example, when visiting Fatim’s parents, Kada suggests to Doc that he should bring 
flowers as a gift.  However, because Doc is too cheap to buy flowers, he picks random 
flowers from a bush on the side of the road and then presents the “bouquet” to Fatim’s 
parents as a “traditional” greeting:    
     Doc:  “In my country, the first time we’re invited, we offer this.” 
Doc’s “sincerity” is rather humorous and effective.  Though he invents traditions on the 
whim, it is inevitably his sincere practice of polygamy that gets him deported by French 
authorities.  Thus, Doc is a hybridized character because he asserts patterns of 
Westernized, modernized, and traditional behavior, but it is ultimately his traditionally 
held African beliefs that create trouble.  
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 By the end of the film, there are very few traditional practices, which one could 
point to as genuinely “African,” but as Doc proves timelessness and sanctity are not 
necessarily prerequisites for traditions.  Traditions can be made up on the whim and 
innovated to suit one’s needs since traditions are flexible social phenomena, thus echoing 
Bhikhu Parekh’s definition discussed in Chapter 3 (Parekh 1989: 19).  Ironically, 
however, Doc holds tight to his belief in polygamy, patriarchy, procreation, manhood, 
and the obedience of his wives.  Doc first lies to the French embassy by securing visa 
papers for Kada as his “daughter” and not as his wife so Kada may enter France with 
him.  An overall conflict between Doc’s underlying traditional values and French society 
ultimately lead to Doc’s arrest and deportation.  Thus, Doc eventually becomes 
disgruntled with the French legal system and French culture and his status as an 
immigrant when he is brought into the police station and accused of incest with his 
“daughter,” Kada.   
At the end of the film, Doc is finally “punished” for his transgressions—in the 
final scene after his trial, he is shown being escorted by French policemen through the 
airport on his way to being deported back to the Ivory Coast.  Spif and Awa solemnly 
accompany Doc.  A return to Africa is thus represented as a backwards step unlike the 
positive and hopeful depiction of Mani Kongo, Chaka-Jo, and Mwana’s return to the 
Congo in Pièces d'Identités.  Ironically, the same African identities which Spif and Doc 
once flaunted are now their sentences.  
The Hybridized Identity of Maria in Une couleur café  
  
Maria is an intriguing character because instead of conforming to the policy of 
assimilation articulated by French colonial practices (Barlet 2000: 118; Boateng 1978: 
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62-63; L’Ange 2005: 170), she wishes to emulate African identity.  Therefore, the 
“superior” appeal of European culture is completely undermined by Maria’s attempted 
internalization of “Africanness” and her “colonial desire,” which will be discussed in 
more detail later.         
However, as Une couleur café demonstrates, it is never possible for Maria to take 
on a “pure” African identity because she is French.  Thus, her attempt to be African is 
merely farcical, mimetic, and parodic.  According to Patrick Hogan, there are two types 
of assimilation patterns—purgative and stereotypical.  Maria falls into the stereotypical 
mode by which the “African” behavior and customs she wishes to mimic are simply an 
exaggeration of extremes:       
 “mimeticism is the repudiation of those aspects of English culture that overlap 
with indigenous traditions.  It involves the maximization of difference between 
the two traditions.  It is enacted through an emphasis on and exaggeration of the 
most extreme and non-Indian/non-African/non-Irish aspects of English culture, 
even to the extent of appearing to be a sort of English custom—as when a Hindu 
gives up Indian food to sit every evening at a high table with a white cloth and eat 
vast quantities of boiled beef.  This parodic effect is particularly easy to achieve 
because, much like the reactionary traditionalist, the mimeticist most often has 
only the most superficial knowledge of the culture to which he/she has devoted 
him/herself.” (Hogan 2000: 15) 
 
In the stereotypical mode, “the mimeticist strives to imitate a standard idea of English 
custom that has little relation to actual British practical identity—as when an Igbo man 
wears an ill-fitting three-piece suit while at leisure in a remote village on a sweltering 
afternoon” (2000: 15).   
Several key scenes in the film illustrate Maria’s parodic desire for an Africanized 
identity.  After an intimate encounter, Doc presents Maria with a special string of beads.  
Doc encourages Maria to wear the beads he brought back from his recent trip to the Ivory 
Coast around her hips for protection against evil spirits.  Doc also presents Maria with a 
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boubou—a long, loose-fitting African garment—from the Ivory Coast as well.  Later in 
the film in a very humorous scene, Maria opens the door in the boubou with her hair in 
tight braids against her head; she has even prepared “African” food for Doc.  Maria opens 
the door to her apartment and reveals her surprise to Doc.  As he enters the room, Doc 
exclaims:   
Doc:  “You’re black…a real black!”   
Doc’s response to Maria’s appearance implies that “blackness” is only superficial.  
Later in the film, Maria visits Spif, a practicing marabout in the immigrant 
community of Montreuil within Paris, so that she can secure Doc through “traditional” 
means.  Maria pleads to Spif that she needs help because she cannot “compete” with the 
sensuality of African women:  
Spif:  “I sense you have a rival.” 
Maria:  “She’s African. They have big behinds that men adore.  The way they  
             arch their backs! They’re so erotic…especially when they walk!”  
Spif:  “In God’s eyes, man has no color.  Even if your rival is black, God will  
protect you.”   
 
Maria consults a marabout with full conviction that such traditional African practices will 
help yield the results she wants—i.e. winning Doc’s heart—because she is not “exotic” 
enough for him since she is not “African.”  Therefore, Maria’s passionate efforts to 
become Africanized refute colonialists’ assumptions about African cultural inferiority. 
Though African cultural values were once disdained during colonial times, Maria 
exalts “Africanness” to the point of imitation—instead of “Europeanization,” Maria 
wishes to undergo “Africanization.”  Maria recreates the three-stage hierarchy model 
with African identity on top and European identity on the bottom (Young 1995: 35, 94). 
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Maria’s personality and infatuation with African culture is an interesting role reversal 
since African cultural values were once degraded by colonial powers through the 
perpetuation of negative stereotypes in film; for example, in etiquette films produced by 
the British Colonial Film Unit, in which  “proper” hygiene and behavior was taught 
(Bakari & Cham 1996: 88; Diawara 1992: 1-3; Ukadike 1994: 44).  Ultimately, however, 
Doc breaks the illusion after Maria’s unsuccessful attempt to prepare African food:   
Doc:  “Forget about African food.  You can’t become African in France.  Even  
Africans have a hard time staying African.”   
 
To analyze Maria’s overall identity, it is also necessary to explore the 
psychological implications of her relationship with Doc.  A noteworthy depiction of the 
reversal of “white” colonial psychology discussed in Chapter 1 is the depiction of 
Maria’s relationship with Doc.  Maria represents the reversal of male “colonial desire,” 
the eroticized desire for the “Other”: 
 “And so too racial theory, which ostensibly seeks to keep races forever apart,  
transmutes into expressions of the clandestine, furtive forms of what can be called 
‘colonial desire’:  a covert but insistent obsession with transgressive, inter-racial 
sex, hybridity and miscegenation” (Young 1995: xii). 
   
In particular, “colonial desire” may be characterized by a hidden “fascination with the 
‘magnificent’ African woman” (1995: 2).  Kopano Ratele labels such fascination as 
“kinky politics” (Ratele 2004: 142), or rather, “racial” perversion, which is derived from 
the “fetish of, and refetishizing” of “race,” in particular the eroticization of the “Other” 
(2004: 142, 147).  According to Ratele’s line of reasoning, racism leads to “kinky racial 
positions” that eventually “transmogrify into sexual relations” (2004: 145).  In other 
words, social and governmental politics dictate “proper” sexual relationships, thereby 
deeming and distinguishing what is “proper” from what is “improper” according to 
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“racial” standards.  “Proper” relationships, therefore, are mono-racial and “improper” 
ones are “perverse” and considered “fetishes.”   
Maria dotes upon Doc because of the exoticism she associates with his African 
identity.  This adoration echoes the fascination Western audiences once had with “black” 
Africans because of pre-conceived notions of African traditions, “race,” culture, and 
exoticism:  
“Simon Jones, in his ethnographic study of White Rastafarians in Birmingham 
(Jones 1989), looks at a ‘White community’ that self-consciously splices its own 
Whiteness with styles and ideologies associated with Rastafarianism.  This 
escape, as Jones notes, draws on a correlation of Whiteness with boredom and 
passivity and of Blackness with rebellion and the exotic.  It is an ‘escape,’ then, 
based on certain familiar clichés of Whiteness and Blackness.  Despite this 
reliance, however, the process of becoming and socially interacting as a White 
Rastafarian inevitably opens up the fluidity of ‘racial’ identity, creating 
incomplete, impermanent and explicitly constructed moments of appropriation 
and cultural ‘play’” (Bonnett 1997: 186) 
 
Ratele’s theory of “kinky politics” and Young’s discourse on “colonial desire”  may be 
applied to Maria’s relationship with Doc, Maria’s “black” African lover, but both theories 
mainly consider the sexualization of females under forms of political and social 
domination, and not the sexualization of the male under female power.   
Maria’s obsession is with the exotic African female, but not in the sexual manner 
expressed by typical male “colonial desire.”  More specifically, Maria not only expresses 
sexual “colonial desire” for the “Other”—Doc—but this desire is manifested as an 
attempt to internalize African behavior, particularly eroticized African womanhood.  This 
is an interesting psychological reversal of the proposed “colonial desire” condition 
because Maria is female, so instead of being in the position to engage in the sexual 
exploitation of an African woman, Maria simply seeks the African woman’s body and not 
its “furtive” violation:   
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“Theorists have written extensively about how the political conquest of the 
African man by the European man is often marked by sexual violence committed 
over the bodies of the conquered,” in this case, African females (Magogodi 2003: 
194). 
 
Adding to this reversal of characteristic male “colonial desire” and “kinky politics” 
theories, Doc has two wives—Awa and Kada.  Doc represents the stereotypical 
“oversexed” African male (Pfaff 2004: 112-114) whose masculinity is derived from his 
marital “duties” to his wives and extra-marital relations with Maria.  The over-
sexualization of Doc “recalls the fantasies about black sexuality common in the colonial 
era” (Thackway 2003: 141).  Interracial male/female relationships are often “allegories 
for the domination and subordination between the former colonizer and colonized” 
(2003: 139).   
However, Doc is not subordinated by Maria’s “colonial desire,” which would be 
the case in a position of “normal” male “colonial desire” power relations between the 
colonialist and “native” woman.  On the contrary, Doc is ironically empowered by 
Maria’s “colonial desire” since she also adds to his collection of sexual escapades and 
provides him with material gifts.  Thus, there are two significant power structures at play 
here:  Maria’s projection of exoticism onto Doc, and Doc’s reversed projection of 
exoticism onto Maria.  In other words, “colonial desire” and “kinky politics” become a 
two-way reversal of power since Maria is not the “historically muted subject of the sub-
altern woman, who only becomes a productive agent through an act of colonial violation” 
(Young 1995: 19).  Maria and Doc’s relationship suggests that the sexual fantasies 
concerning the “Other” are mutual.  However, even though Maria is not a “historically 
muted” female and the sexual fantasies between Doc and Maria are mutual, Doc 
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ultimately gains from the relationship since he uses Maria not only as a sexual escapade 
but also as a money-tree.    
 Overall, Duparc’s portrait of Maria is highly entertaining and insightful since she 
symbolizes the hidden desires of colonialists to engage in “interracial” relationships with 
the “other.”  Because gender power structures are reversed, Duparc is also able to play 
with the stereotypes of “interracial” and socially taboo relationships.  
Kada, Pierre and the Unborn Child 
In Une couleur café during Doc’s small trial for allegedly committing “incest” 
with his “daughter” Kada, who is actually his second wife, the Arab butcher, Pierre, 
Kada’s lover, laughs with his cousin Fatim at the very end of the film:     
 Fatim:  “Pierre, you’re the father?  What color will the kid be?  Coffee color?”  
 Pierre:  “Coffee and cream.” 
Duparc uses Peter and Fatim’s conversation to address the issue of the unborn baby’s 
“race” but obviously implies that Pierre does not feel the same fear of hybridity expressed 
by the colonial mentality (Young 1995: 4).  This is evidenced by his love for Kada and 
even when Pierre says, “Kada sure is pretty with her lovely coffee color.”  For Pierre, 
cultural impurity, so to speak, does not exist.  He does not see the mixing of two “races” 
as “impure” but beautiful.  
The Hybridized Identity of El Hadji in Xala 
  
The depiction of El Hadji in Xala is a complex portrayal of a man who represents 
Westernized values characteristic of a Western-educated elite described by Roy Armes in 
Chapter 4 (Armes 1987: 18) but at the same time values certain traditions such as 
polygamy and eventually resorts to traditional healing.  For the most part El Hadji is 
placed in a negative light and indicted for his materialism, chauvinism, and bureaucratic 
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power as a newly appointed official in the post-colonial Senegalese Chamber of 
Commerce.  Similar to Doc, the values that El Hadji exhibits are directly linked to 
personal gain:  El Hadji is a capitalist; a polygamist; and a corrupt bureaucrat because he 
benefits from such positions.  El Hadji’s materialism is evidenced throughout the entire 
film.  Of particular note, El Hadji’s wedding to his third wife, Ngone, represents the 
extravagant practices of the Senegalese elite: 
“In a manner typical of an elite as keen to profit from the West as to copy it, El 
Hadj lives beyond his means, taking a third wife.  His contempt for beggars and 
for those who are in any way disabled echoes his rejection of tradition.” (Barlet 
2000: 16)     
 
As a wedding gift, El Hadji has a car wrapped in a bow for the bride and has even 
lavished his mother-in-law with a box full of gold.  When the other eight newly appointed 
bureaucrats arrive, a red carpet is rolled out for them.  El Hadji is also dependent upon 
material goods:       
 El Hadji:  “I’m used to air-conditioners.  I can’t sleep without them.” 
El Hadji prefers Evian, imported French water, to local water.  The goods sold in El 
Hadji’s grocery store are imported only from Italy, Luxembourg, and Belgium in Europe.  
The colonizer’s goods are accepted with confidence (Memmi 1965: 121).  Kwame 
Gyekye contextualizes this preference for European goods over indigenous products:    
“For the mentality of the person infected by this kind of thinking is supposed to 
have been skewed under the influences of the colonial thought categories, 
resulting in the tendency to regard foreign cultural products as of much greater 
worth than those of the indigenous culture.  The indigenous cultural products are 
in fact spurned by the individuals with colonial mentality; some individuals even, 
unashamedly, show aversion to speaking the local languages” (Gyekye 1997: 
234).   
 
Not only does El Hadji show an aversion to local products, he refuses to speak Wolof as 
mentioned in Chapter 4 in the discussion of language as tradition (Gyekye 1997: 221).  
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Thus, El Hadji “sets about discarding this infirm language, hiding it from the sight of 
strangers” because for El Hadji, who has been partially assimilated into the Western-
educated elite of Senegalese society, speaking French is a matter of social status and 
expression of power—an exclusive, elitist power (Petty 1996: 120).  Ultimately, El 
Hadji’s bilingualism is evidence of a “linguistic drama” faced by the colonized in which 
though the capacity for bilingualism exists, “bilingualism is neither a purely bilingual 
situation in which an indigenous tongue coexists with a purist’s language…nor a simple 
polyglot richness benefiting from an extra but relatively neuter alphabet” (Memmi 1965: 
108).  Thus, El Hadji’s “linguistic ambiguity is the symbol and one of the major causes of 
his cultural ambiguity” (1965: 108) since the “possession of two languages is not merely 
a matter of having two tools, but actually means participation in two psychical and 
cultural realms” (1965: 107).         
However, towards the end of the film, an assembly among the newly elected 
bureaucrats of the Chamber of Commerce is called to judge El Hadji’s transgressions of 
“corruption, malfeasance, and of endangering the positions of the other members of the 
Chamber” (Pfaff 2004: 137).  In a moment of newfound pride for Wolof, and distaste for 
the French language and its colonial associations that have been building up throughout 
the film, El Hadji addresses the assembly in Wolof.  The president of the Chamber of 
Commerce quickly reprimands El Hadji for speaking Wolof just as El Hadji had once 
critiqued Rama and notes that the only language of business is French (Barlet 2000: 201):   
President:  “Even insults must be addressed in the purist French tradition.”   
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In this scene, Sembene highlights the use of mother tongues to project national sentiment 
against Western colonial structures of control such as “official languages” in business and 
commerce. 
El Hadji’s materialism is also revealed through his relationships with his wives 
and children.  El Hadji consistently shows his “love” through money.  Just like a cash 
dispenser, as El Hadji enters his second wife Oumi’s house, he hands out cash to his 
children.  There is no formal display of affection except through monetary means.  El 
Hadji also gives his second wife, Oumi, a large amount of cash—yet again no clear 
exchange of emotion or affection is displayed.  Thus, Xala is one of the many “post-
national liberation fables that critically unveil the sociocultural shifts determined by the 
universalization of the money form” (Petty 1996: 35).  
However, like Doc, El Hadji is also punished for his materialism and greed:  The 
audience learns that “ultimately, [the] curse is the result of El Hadji’s pursuit of material 
enrichment and social advancement at the expense of his compatriots” (Petty 1996: 69).  
Both characters deal with a sexual flaw, but only El Hadji is specifically cursed with 
impotence through bewitchment in the form of a “xala”—the Wolof word for 
“impotence” but loosely translated as “curse” in English.  The impotence of El Hadji 
serves as a metaphor for the political incapability of post-colonial Senegal:   
At first blush we understand [the xala] to symbolize the failures of Senegalese 
society to realize the dream of independence. This is made painfully clear with the 
opening shots signifying the passage from colonialism to independent rule in 
Africa.  This passage was compromised at the outset, as we can see in the scene in 
which the silent Frenchmen in business suits buy off the newly established 
members of the Chamber of Commerce, a thinly disguised attack on the 
government under Senghor.  As El Hadji announces his marriage at the same 
opening scene in which the African businessmen occupy the council’s chambers, 
the parallelism between the state of affairs in the newly independent country and 
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his own marital state of affairs is established.  His xala signals the impotency of 
the neocolonial state (Pfaff 2004: 129) 
 
To cure his xala, El Hadji resorts to traditional methods of healing.  The twist is ironic 
and hypocritical at the same time because El Hadji, who explicitly prefers Westernized 
goods and speaks the colonizer’s tongue, ends up desperately seeking help from 
alternative, non-Western sources.   
El Hadji’s friend, the president of the Chamber of Commerce, recommends the 
first marabout that El Hadji visits.  The marabout consults El Hadji and gives him a bottle 
of “holy water” to wash his body and private parts.  In addition to the “holy water,” El 
Hadji is given an amulet for his arm, a special belt for his waist, and told that he must 
wear everything while holding something between his teeth and crawl to his wife.  
However, the marabout’s “cure” does not fix El Hadji’s impotence.  The second 
marabout El Hadji visits is recommended by El Hadji’s chauffeur who lives in the rural 
outskirts of Dakar.  The chauffeur takes El Hadji to Dakar’s rural outskirts to consult the 
marabout.  After seeing the second marabout, in the ultimate Western gesture of 
commodification and convenience, El Hadji pays with a check.  The marabout looks at El 
Hadji suspiciously but El Hadji ensures him that the check will cash without any 
problems, but it does not cash since El Hadji is in the middle of becoming bankrupt after 
spending too much money and causing financial trouble for the Chamber of Commerce.  
The end of the film is a series of events that lead to El Hadji’s slow downward spiral 
from top Westernized elite to humiliated father, husband, and bureaucrat.  
 At the end of the film, the people who originally initiated the “xala,” 
unbeknownst to El Hadji, finally confront him.  El Hadji finally learns that his half-
brother, Gorgui, seeking revenge after El Hadji stole the entire family’s inheritance and 
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left everyone destitute, has inflicted the “xala.”  However, to redeem himself, Gorgui 
insists that El Hadji partake in a humiliating ritual in which each of Gorgui’s beggar 
friends, and Gorgui himself, are allowed to spit on El Hadji as he stands in his underwear 
in the living room:    
“Both in business and in polygamy, El Hadji loses the virility which seemed so 
natural to him.  The marabout of his driver’s village releases him from the spell, 
but El Hadji pays him with a bouncing check.  Rendered impotent once more, he 
comes to understand that virility is not the product of a will to power, but requires 
respect for its own values.  He will manage to regain it by rejecting his alienation 
and allowing the outcasts, in an extraordinary expiatory scene, to cover him with 
their spit.” (Barlet 2000: 16-17) 
 
In the end, El Hadji’s is cured from his “xala” by allowing the people who the Western-
educated Senegalese elite outcast to spit on him.  Even though El Hadji’s Westernized 
business ethics and traditional values such as the practice of polygamy are ultimately 
critiqued, it is not El Hadji’s hybridized identity that causes problems, but El Hadji’s 
abuse of power, greed, and materialism.    
The Hybridized Identity of Rama in Xala  
 
Rama, El Hadji’s aggressive and outspoken daughter from his first wife Adja,  
makes critical inquiries into “acceptable” behavior and African values.  Rama is thus 
represented as a positive Westernized character in contrast to her father (Thackway 
2003:175).  For instance, in Xala, Rama continually questions and encourages her mother 
Adja to disapprove of El Hadji’s polygamous ways:  
“One stands for tradition, the other for an African modernity.  Adja Awa Assatou, 
El Hadji’s first wife, portrays quiet dignity, patient devotion to the principles of a 
Muslim marriage, loyalty to her husband even in his ruin.  Rama, their daughter, 
shares her mother’s dignity, but she embodies the future, reborn Africa, a society 
that will draw on its own language and culture while emancipating women from 
patriarchal traditions” (Gugler 2003: 128). 
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However, Rama is not a completely Westernized character.  Though Rama is a 
modernized female, she is also traditional in some respects.  For example, the film 
suggests that Rama believes in the curse that is put on her father and asks her mother if 
she placed the “xala” on El Hadji.  Thus, Rama believes in non-Western ideas of 
bewitchment.  Secondly, Rama insists on speaking Wolof—a native Senegalese 
language—instead of French, the colonizer’s language:  In attempt to revolt, the colonizer 
“will forego the use of the colonizer’s language, even if all the locks of the country turn 
with that key…” (Memmi 1965: 137).  Rama is well-educated and highly Westernized in 
terms of egalitarian values, but she also respects certain traditions such as the 
preservation of Wolof.  Therefore, Rama symbolizes the new Africa in which both 
tradition and features of Westernization symbiotically work towards forging 
contemporary African identities: 
“…Ousmane Sembene tackled the neocolonial bourgeoisie in his Xala.  There, 
too, traditional and modern women come face to face, but the most interesting 
character is the young daughter of the Hadji Abdu Kadr Bey.  She is a cultivated 
student who speaks to her father only in Wolof.  She symbolizes a certain kind of 
modern Africa.  She is ‘a positive heroine’ in the sense that she does not allow 
herself to be suffocated by the weight of tradition nor does she get carried away 
by the intoxicating mirages of modernity” (Bakari & Cham 1996: 183). 
 
Instead of conforming to the tendency “for African youth to hold in high esteem all 
things European or American over all things African” (Ukadike 1994: 107), Rama 
preferences all things African.  
CONCLUSION 
 
Not all changes within culture due to modernization and Westernization 
completely eradicate fundamental values associated with African identities.  Obviously, 
though African identity is not a fixed state, nor is there a “pure” African identity, there 
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are fundamental qualities that help distinguish African identities from, for example, 
European ones.  As shown in chapter 1, history is an important factor in determining the 
overall construction of identity.  The colonial era in African history significantly altered 
the course of cultural development on the entire African continent by bringing with it 
Western values, modernization, and other forms of development.  However, the 
characters described in this chapter attest to the fact that tradition, modernization, and 
Westernization cannot only co-exist but form the intricate and multi-layered content of 
African identities.  These roots can come in many forms—as traditions, religion, 
language, and values. 
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7  African Identities Reconsidered 
 
An attempt has been made to address the ways which characters in A Reasonable 
Man (South Africa 1999), Chikin Biznis:  The Whole Story (South Africa 1998), Fools 
(South Africa/France 1997), Hyènes (1992), Pièces d'Identités (France/Congo/Belgium 
1998), Une couleur café (France 1997), and Xala (Senegal 1975) reflect filmmakers’ 
perceptions of the profound cultural, social, political, and economic changes that typify 
contemporary African realities.  To contextualize filmmakers’ construction of characters, 
an analysis of important concepts such as “race,” “black” and “white” identities, 
ethnicity, tradition, modernization, Westernization, neo-colonialism, and cultural 
hybridity have been provided.  A brief observation of the historical function of “race” has 
been outlined as an important factor in the colonial subjugation of indigenous African 
populations.  It has been shown that racial theories developed in the nineteenth century 
were significant hegemonic tools in the formation of Western self-definition based on 
otherness and difference (Young 1995: 93).   
The idea of “race” was first applied by colonial powers in “educational” films that 
aimed to instill feelings of inferiority among non-European African populations.  Early 
Hollywood productions also helped perpetuate the negative portrayal of African identities 
because films exhibiting “exotic,” “savage,” or uneducated African characters were 
popular forms of entertainment for Western audiences.  Thus, a significant amount of the 
destruction of African cultures in the early twentieth century can be contributed to the use 
of film as form of social control. 
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As African countries began gaining independence from former colonizers in the 
mid-1950s (Wilson 1994: 1), the control of film production also gradually switched 
hands.  It is from around this starting point in Senegal’s postcolonial history that Xala 
takes place.  In Xala, Ousmane Sembene posits a humorous yet critical view of neo-
colonialism in Senegalese society as a form of economic control by France.  Other films 
such as Chikin Biznis also take place in a certain context of post-colonial independence. 
In Chikin Biznis, the director Ntshaveni wa Luruli light-heartedly examines the sense of 
freedom and optimism felt by the main character, Sipho, in post-apartheid South Africa.  
In contrast, A Reasonable Man by Gavin Hood seriously addresses issues of cultural 
misunderstanding that affect post-apartheid South Africa’s legal and social systems.  
Most dramatically, the film Fools by Ramadan Suleman, though a post-apartheid 
production, retrospectively positions its narrative in the township of Charterston during 
the apartheid history of South Africa.  Through the main character, Professor Zamani, 
Suleman analyzes the emotional impact of oppression and its role as a cause for cyclical 
violence among the oppressed.  The film Hyènes by Djibril Diop Mambety is a beautiful 
adaptation of Friedrich Durrenmatt’s play, The Visit.  Often abstract, Mambety’s 
treatment of materialism, greed, and community among the peri-urban Colobane in is 
nonetheless effective and visually bold.  Lastly, Une couleur café by Henri Duparc and 
Pièces d'Identités by Mweze Ngangura explore the relationship between former 
colonizing countries such as France and Belgium and African émigrés.    
A Reasonable Man, Chikin Biznis:  The Whole Story, Fools, Hyènes, Pièces 
d'Identités, Une couleur café, and Xala are all significantly diverse films in content, 
narrative, and country of origin, but each film in its own way points to one relevant 
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theme:  The hybridization of contemporary African cultures and identities.  This trend is 
expressed in each film’s humorous but often serious treatment of the dynamics between 
traditional structures of African cultures and processes of modernization and 
Westernization occurring in African societies.   
The theory of cultural hybridity proposed in this thesis addresses the intricate 
relationship between processes of change such as tradition, modernization and 
Westernization in the formation of African identities.  A Reasonable Man, Chikin Biznis:  
The Whole Story, Fools, Hyènes, Pièces d'Identités, Une couleur café, and Xala have 
been investigated in order to arrive at new understandings of contemporary African 
identities based on understandings of the fluidity of culture.  In order to reach the 
pinnacle observation of the hybridization of African identities in African film, Chapter 1 
examines the historical applications of the term “race” and its influence on colonial 
discourse and early Hollywood cinema.  Re-iterating a key argument of this thesis, 
Chapter 1 investigates how “white” and “black” identities are not natural categories 
(Race Traitor 1994: 108) but “racial” signifiers based on social, historical, and 
geographical contingencies (Bonnett 1997: 186).  Though “racial” signifiers are social 
constructs, and thus in a sense inconstant, they are simultaneously the purpose and engine 
for colonialism.  To this advantage, Chapter 1 explores how cinema was first used by 
colonial regimes as a social mechanism to spread control over African communities in 
the early 1900s.   
In the shadows of such a gripping social phenomena exists the quiet optimism that 
“racial” perceptions can be abandoned.  Such is Bhabha’s insistence on a “beyond 
theory” (Bhabha 1994: 179) approach to articulating identity.  Despite a significant 
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historical transition from a generic “black” and “white” spectrum of identity, Chapter 2 
explores how “race” is still depicted in contemporary African cinema in order to reflect 
upon stereotypes, a Catch-22 tactic that ironically perpetuates the existence of more 
“racial” stereotypes.  This tension between old and new “racial” stereotypes is a 
discernibly grave social concern among scholars, filmmakers, and general audiences 
evaluating the concept of “race.”  The reconciliatory force of post-1960 Africa cinema, 
however, stems directly from this tension.  In order to empower African communities so 
that they may seize control of their images, stereotypes must be negated.  “Race” is not 
an anachronistic debate that can be discarded but an on-going social dilemma that has 
infiltrated social consciousness.  Thus, Chapter 2 demonstrates that at work among the 
messages asserted by contemporary African cinema, particularly by A Reasonable Man, 
Chikin Biznis:  The Whole Story, Fools, Hyènes, Pièces d'Identités, Une couleur café, and 
Xala is a dialectic possibly forging a path toward the articulation of identity based upon a 
fluid socio-cultural model. 
In Chapter 3, a discussion of “race” is temporarily set aside in order to focus on 
thoroughly defining tradition, modernization, and Westernization.  Most importantly, 
Chapter 3 demonstrates that traditions do not exist as oppositions between “past versus 
present,” “continuity versus change,” “tradition versus modernity,” or as a clash between 
the “old and new.”   Instead, traditions are flexible and dynamic phenomena that may 
persist in the face of change.  The belief that African communities are timeless may be a 
common misconception, but a more accurate examination investigates the effects of 
modernization and Westernization on traditional belief systems.  Therefore, Chapter 3 
tackles the subject of what it means for a nation to be modern by explaining how 
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modernization occurs as a result of technological progress.  Chapter 3 approaches the 
grandiose subject of “the West,” and how such a concept is no longer a geographic 
description, but rather a political and economic classification.  In fact, the most notable 
feature of “the West” applies to developed countries with market economies.  Finally, 
Chapter 3 concludes that traditions as well as modernization and Westernization are 
pushing African communities toward significant political, social, and economic 
transformations.   
Specific examples of traditions, modernization, and Westernization are derived 
from observations of situations in A Reasonable Man, Chikin Biznis:  The Whole Story, 
Fools, Hyènes, Pièces d'Identités, Une couleur café, and Xala.  These films offer varying 
judgments on the qualitative effects of tradition, modernization, and Westernization.  
Chapter 4 examines the significance of traditional practices of language, reproduction, 
ritual, superstition, traditional healing, polygamy, patriarchy, and ancestor veneration to 
demonstrate that not all traditions are held in high-esteem, but those that are deeply 
regarded, often conflict with on-going forces of change.  Likewise, the examples drawn 
from these case-studies of traditional practices expresses the tension between (INSERT).       
Chapter 5 reflects upon changing definitions of culture and the re-evaluation of 
identities on fluid socio-cultural models.   With such evaluations, Chapter 5 advances the 
simple notion that a one-dimensional “African” identity does not exist, thereby further 
debunking common Western stereotypes about so-called “black Africa.”  Whereas the 
rhetoric of pure racial hybridity first espoused by nineteenth century typologists once 
dominated the  colonial mentality, in Chapter 5, the conclusion is made that a need for 
metaphors of identity created by racial-minded colonialists actually exacerbated the 
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spread of both racial and cultural hybrid processes.  For example, colonial desire 
inevitably resulted in the conquest of the other through sexual penetration.  Even if a so-
called racial purity once existed in the mind of the colonialist, the single integrated 
colonial system quickly disintegrated through processes of both racial and cultural 
hybridization.  Such processes ultimately undermined the static and hegemonic forces of 
colonial powers.   
Chapter 6 is an illumination on the application of cultural hybridity to specific 
identity and cultural spaces in A Reasonable Man, Chikin Biznis:  The Whole Story, 
Fools, Hyènes, Pièces d'Identités, Une couleur café, and Xala.  Instead of neatly defined 
identities, cultures, and spaces, cultural hybridity theories help describe the fusion of 
traditional and non-traditional African societal structures and systems of belief.  Chapter 
6 further advances the notion of cultural hybridity as a way of analyzing and describing 
the post-colonial hybrid lifestyles of African and non-African characters, lifestyles which 
are directly influenced by features of modernization and Westernization such as 
materialism, entrepreneurialism, and individualism, just to name a few. 
  During this thesis’ discussion of cultural hybridity, it has never been assumed 
that a “pure,” “pre-hybrid” culture has ever existed or can exist.  Culture as a complex 
whole is not immutable but changing.  Culture is a social construct in the sense that it has 
been identified and named by society, but it is still a recognizable phenomenon no matter 
what it is labeled.  Therefore, this discussion has not been based on whether or not a 
“pure” culture ever has or has not existed, but on the contemporary conditions forging 
cultural hybridization in African societies.  It is perhaps the conditions that build or 
develop hybridization, and not its existence, which may legitimately be open for debate.   
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More specifically, this thesis has focused on the existence of perceivable 
phenomena such as tradition, modernization, and Westernization that can be identified in 
African cinema.  The function of contemporary African cinema has not only been to 
evaluate African identities on a personal basis—a privilege and control filmmakers 
regained during the 1960s—but to relay these new portrayals to local and world-wide 
audiences.  In light of new processes of change, which may carry new names and new 
meanings, African identities will also change.  At the end of this paper, what is left open 
for future discussion is how African cinema will continue offering representations of 
African identities based on such positive or negative changes; and most importantly—
how such representations will continue to influence local and worldwide perceptions of 
what it means to be of a particular African identity.  
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